Madras High Court
Al. Ramanathan Amutha And Co. vs The Government Of India Represented By ... on 9 June, 2008
Author: V. Dhanapalan
Bench: V. Dhanapalan
ORDER V. Dhanapalan, J.
1. This petition has been filed challenging the proceedings of the second respondent in Na.Ka.C1/61031/2003 dated 29.04.2005 and to consequentially direct the respondents to exclude the lands comprised in T.S. Nos. 249/1-A, 249/1-B, 253/2-A and 245/1-B at Old W. No. 3, New W. No. C-Block, No. 4, Srirangam Town, Tiruchirappalli District from acquisition proceedings.
2. The petitioner is the lessee of the land comprised in T.S. No. 249/1- B owned by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. ("IOCL" for short). The said land houses a Petrol and Diesel Fuel Station the dealership of which is given to the petitioner by IOCL. Beside this land, the petitioner owns lands in three survey nos. While the petitioner and IOCL have jointly invested about Rs. 1 crore for the establishment of the Petrol and Diesel Fuel Station, the petitioner has also invested about Rs. 10 lakhs in the Service Station housed near the Petrol and Diesel Fuel Station in addition to constructing a two storeyed building in his land spending about Rs. 25 lakhs. The Petrol and Diesel Fuel Station and the Service Station are located on the north of NH-45 in compliance of the norms for access for fuel stations, service stations and the rest of the areas prescribed by the first respondent vide proceedings dated 04.11.2003.
3. While so, coming to know that the respondents are proposing to acquire his lands as part of expansion of NH-45, by converting the existing two lane road into a four lane road, the petitioner had submitted his objection letter dated 17.09.2004 in response to which the first respondent, vide his letter dated 01.12.2004, citing certain reasons, has stated that the petitioner's land is very much required for four laning of NH-45. Pursuant to the proceedings dated 19.11.2004 of the third respondent calling the petitioner to appear for enquiry on 29.11.2004, the petitioner had appeared in person and had also submitted his objections with regard to acquisition of his land. Yet, the second respondent had issued Proceedings dated 09.12.2004 under Section 3(A)(1) of the Act published as Notification in The Hindu dated 15.12.2004 as regards the acquisition of lands including that of the petitioner. In reply, the petitioner had submitted his detailed objections on 19.12.2004. However, the petitioner's objections had been rejected by the second respondent vide his impugned proceedings dated 29.04.2005 against which this petition has come to be filed.
4. The main grounds urged by the petitioner are that:
i while the authorities have already acquired about 50 metres of land on the south of his Fuel Station way back in 1960 and the total breadth of the four lane road measures only 30 metres, they do not require any more land for widening NH-45; and ii as per the designs formulated by the Indian Road Congress, a competent authority to adopt the standards and designs of roads as per Clause 10(1) of the Schedule to the National Highways Authorities Rules, 1957, the minimum radius at the curve point near his Fuel Station should be 1,800 metres, whereas, by acquisition of his lands housing Fuel Station, Service Station and the two storeyed building, the radius at the curve point would be only 360 metres which would only result in frequent occurrence of accidents and as such, the proposal of the respondents to expand NH-45 on Tindivanam - Trichy Road is in gross violation of the specifications of the Indian Road Congress.
5. The second, third and fourth respondents have filed counter affidavit more or less uniformly contending that:
i a detailed project report on the widening of NH-45 on Trichy - Tindivanam Road was got prepared from the project consultants according to whom 35m width on the widening side and 25m width on the non-widening side from the centre point of the existing NH road is the minimum requirement and the petitioner's properties in S.F. No.s249/1 and 253 fall in this requirement and hence, it has been proposed to acquire 8m on the southern side and 16.8 m on the northern side;
ii the minimum radius at the curve point proposed by the project consultants is only 360m and this is also in compliance of the stipulation Ministry of Road Transport and Highways and as such, the re-alignment of the existing NH near the petitioner's properties is not at all required;
iii after a careful perusal of the consent statements given by the petitioner, the Notification under Section 3(A)(1) of the Act vide proceedings dated 09.12.2004 has been published in "The Hindu" on 15.12.2004 after obtaining technical remarks from the fourth respondent;
iv the petitioner appeared before the second respondent for personal enquiry based on his letter dated 02.02.2005 and submitted his objections as regards acquisition of land and the same were carefully considered before they came to be rejected without violation of any of the norms of the Act and thus, there is neither arbitrary exercise of power nor non-compliance of provisions of the Act as regards affording opportunity of personal hearing;
v if at all any re-alignment is to be made, it would only necessitate demolition of more number of structures/buildings and above all, it may not at all be feasible at this point of time when about 60% of the project work has already been completed;
vi above all, as per the norms of the fourth respondent and the global tender of the Government and its agreement, the land should be handed over to the international contractors within the time stipulated in the agreement, keeping in mind, the welfare of the public at large, facilitating quick transportation through the nation, failure of which would result in claim of damages by the international contractors from the Government.
6. Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner harped mainly on the aspect of non-application of mind on the part of the second respondent while passing the impugned order whereby and whereunder the second respondent has rejected the petitioner's objections by simply stating that the project plan has been finalised by the project consultants and as such, re-alignment of the existing NH is not possible. It is also his strenuous contention that by acquiring the lands of the petitioner, the respondents are depriving his right to carry on his trade which is guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
7. Further, he has vehemently contended that it is essential on the part of the second respondent to give due reasoning for his conclusion by considering the petitioner's objections inasmuch as giving of reasons in an administrative decision is a rule of natural justice by an extension of the prevailing rules and because of the lapse on the part of the second respondent in this regard, his impugned order has come to be passed without assigning any reason in violation of principles of natural justice. Lastly, it is his strenuous argument that the impugned order of the second respondent cannot be sustained and hence, has to be quashed for the reason that he has not considered the petitioner's objections as per the procedure contemplated under Section 3-C of the Act and has also not exercised the powers of a Civil Court conferred on him under Section 3-I of the Act as a consequence of which the petitioner's objections have come to be rejected by him in a mechanical manner without due application of mind.
8. In support of his arguments, the learned Senior Counsel has placed strong reliance on the following judgments:
i. P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right.
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 enunciates right to property under Article 17:
Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid.
Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 under Sections 17(i) and 17(ii) also recognises right to property:
17. (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment, etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom. The Court herein tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights.
The European Council of Human Rights importantly laid down three-pronged test to judge the interference of the Government with the right of "peaceful enjoyment of property". While referring to Beyeler v. Italy, it was held that the "interference" should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.
ii Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd. But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by a administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The Government of India also failed to give any reasons in support of its order rejecting the revision application. But we may presume that in rejecting the revision application, it adopted the same reason which prevailed with the Collector. The reason given by the Collector was, as already pointed out, hardly satisfactory and it would, therefore, have been better if the Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while rejecting the revision application. We hope and trust that in future the customs authorities will be more careful in adjudicating upon the proceedings which come before them and pass properly reasoned orders, so that those who are affected by such orders are assured that their case has received proper consideration at the hands of the Customs Authorities and the validity of the adjudication made by the Customs Authorities can also be satisfactorily tested in a superior tribunal or court. In fact, it would be desirable that in cases arising under customs and excise laws an independent quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, is set up which would finally dispose of appeals and revision applications under these laws instead of leaving the determination of such appeals and revision applications to the Government of India. An independent quasi-judicial tribunal would definitely inspire greater confidence in the public mind.
iii Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v. Union of India In this case there is no provision of any appeal from the order of the Central Government in either granting or refusing to grant sanction under Section 86 of the Code. This sanction or lack of sanction may, however, be questioned in the appropriate proceedings in court but inasmuch as there is no provision of appeal, it is necessary that there should be an objective evaluation and examination by the appropriate authority of relevant and material factors in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 86 by the Central Government. There is an implicit requirement of observance of the principles of natural justice and also the implicit requirement that the decision must be expressed in such a manner that reasons can be spelt out from such decision. Though this is an administrative order in a case of this nature, there should be reasons. If the administrative authorities are enjoined to decide the rights of the parties, it is essential that such administrative authority should accord fair and proper hearing to the person to be affected by the order and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons. Such reasons must be on relevant material factors objectively considered. There is no claim of any privilege that disclosure of reasons would undermine the political or national interest of the country.
iv. S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India In Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering the question whether it is obligatory for an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940 to give reasons for the award. It was argued that the requirement of giving reasons for the decision is a part of the rules of natural justice which are also applicable to the award of an arbitrator and reliance was placed on the decisions in Bhagat Raja case and Siemens Engineering Co. case. The said contention was rejected by this Court. After referring to the decisions in Bhagat Raja case, Som Datt Datta case and Siemens Engineering Co. case this Court has observed : (SCC pp. 751-52, para 35) It is no doubt true that in the decisions pertaining to administrative law, this Court in some cases has observed that the giving of reasons in an administrative decision is a rule of natural justice by an extension of the prevailing rules. It would be in the interest of the world of commerce that the said rule is confined to the area of administrative law.... But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that what applies generally to settlement of disputes by authorities governed by public law need not be extended to all cases arising under private law such as those arising under the law of arbitration which is intended for settlement of private disputes.
The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi- judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions ; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.
Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right.
vi. Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh By proportionality, it is meant that the question whether while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority "maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve.
This Court as far back as in 1952 in State of Madras v. V.G. Row observed: (AIR p. 200, para 15) [T]he test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self- restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.
The principle started gaining momentum in other countries and it was applied and developed in England as noticed by Lord Diplock in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind. This Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India while opining in concurrence with the judgment of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service that the extent of judicial review should ordinarily be limited to illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, observed that they are only the broad grounds but did not rule out addition of further grounds in the course of time and also noticed "Brind".
Ever since 1952, the principle of proportionality has been applied vigorously to legislative and administrative action in India. While dealing with the validity of legislation infringing fundamental freedoms enumerated in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court had occasion to consider whether the restrictions imposed by legislation were disproportionate to the situation and were not the least restrictive of the choices. In cases where such legislation is made and the restrictions are reasonable; yet, if the statute concerned permitted administrative authorities to exercise power or discretion while imposing restrictions in individual situations, question frequently arises whether a wrong choice is made by the administrator for imposing the restriction or whether the administrator has not properly balanced the fundamental right and the need for the restriction or whether he has imposed the least of the restrictions or the reasonable quantum of restrictions etc. In such cases, the administrative action in our country has to be tested on the principle of proportionality, just as it is done in the case of main legislation. This, in fact, is being done by the courts. Administrative action in India affecting the fundamental freedom has always been tested on the anvil of the proportionality in the last 50 years even though it has not been expressly stated that the principle that is applied is the proportionality principle.
vii. The District Collector, North Arcot Ambedkar District, Vellore and Ors. v. Manickam (2005) 3 MLJ 123 - (para 7) Thus, it is not correct to say that administrative orders are not subject to judicial review at all. According to the Wednesbury principle, if an administrative order is passed without proper application of mind by the administrative authority to the relevant factors to which the said authority should have applied his mind, then the said order is liable to be quashed, vide: Rohtas Industries Limited v. S.D. Agarwal .
9. Mr. K.M. Vijayakumar, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 contended that the impugned order rejecting the objections of the petitioner had come to be passed by the second respondent only after carefully considering the said objections of the petitioner and as such, there is no violation of fundamental rights, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. It is also his strenuous contention that when the prestigious project of four laning has already come to the verge of getting completed as per the specifications of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways and in compliance of the norms prescribed by the project consultants, the re-alignment of NH-45 cannot be even thought of as it would only lead to demolition of more structures/buildings.
10. Dr. D. Rajagobal, learned Standing Counsel for the fourth respondent contended that when the "3 D publication" has already been over even before the fourth respondent had been impleaded as a party and "3 G enquiry" had also been conducted on 16, 19 and 20.12.2005 and award has been passed and even compensation has been distributed to the land owners, the writ petition is not maintainable and that this proposition is already settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance on the decision of the First Bench of this Court reported in 2006 (4) CTC 640 R. Kumar and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary to Government, Highways Department, Fort St. George and Ors. in which the over-riding effect of the Act has been discussed. During the course of his arguments, the learned Standing Counsel brought to the attention of this Court that the petitioner has given his consent statement for acquisition of his land in lieu of compensation and as such, he is estopped from agitating the said acquisition of land by way of this writ petition.
11. I have carefully considered the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel on either side and have also perused the relevant documents besides the various decisions relied on by them.
12. It is seen that the petitioner is the lessee of 18,000 sq. ft. of land comprised in T.S. No. 249/1-B, Old Ward No. 3, New Ward No."C", Block-4, Srirangam, Tiruchirappalli belonging to IOCL and he is running a Petrol and Diesel Fuel station as a dealer of IOCL; he got the dealership in the year 1983 and since then, he has been carrying on the business in the name and style of "Amutha & Co."; he also owns the land comprised in T.S. Nos. 249/1-A, 253/2A and 245/1B, all adjacent to the Petrol and Fuel Diesel Station; the petitioner, along with IOCL, has invested a huge sum for the establishment of the Petrol and Fuel Diesel Station; he has constructed a two-storeyed building and also a service station.
13. Also, it is seen that as early as in the year 1988, National Highways Authority of India which has been empowered under Section 16 of the Act, has issued norms for access for fuel stations service stations and the rest areas along with Highways as per its proceedings dated 04.11.2003 prescribing certain minimum distances to be maintained between the National Highways and fuel stations, according to which, the entry to fuel station shall be through decelaration lane of minimum length of 70 metres and width of 5.5 metres and the exit through accelaration lane of minimum length of 100 metres and width of 5.5 metres and the minimum distance between the four-lane National Highway and the fuel station shall be not less than 30 metres. The petitioner claims that his fuel station is located on the north of the NH No. 45 as per these norms. Earlier, there were acquisition proceedings by the second respondent on behalf of the first respondent to improve NH-45 between 313/0 kms. and 314/0 kms. on the Tindivanam - Trichy Road so as to increase its breadth and it was also proposed to convert NH-45 from 2 lane to 4 four lane road.
14. Further, it is seen that in 1960, lands were acquired by the Government for the purpose of developing NH-45 and accordingly, on the south of the petitioner's fuel station, the authorities have so acquired lands to a breadth of 50 metres; while, the breadth of the 2 lane road at the said point is 7 . metres and if the road is widened as per the plan by making 4 lanes, it can be laid within the land already acquired by the first respondent; therefore, the petitioner has objected to the acquisition of his land as as the Government does not require any more land for widening NH-45 as proposed nearer to his fuel station.
15. While that being the position, the petitioner's main stand appears to be that as per the standards and designs of roads at the point of curves formulated by the Indian Road Congress which is the competent authority to adopt the standards and designs under Clause 10(1) of the Schedule to the National Highways Authorities Rules,1957, taking into account the speed and safety of vehicles, the first respondent is bound to develop roads strictly in tune with the same and not in violation of the same. The petitioner has indicated all the standards to be followed in tune with the designs of the Indian Road Congress and according to him, if those standards are followed, there may by no necessity for the Government to acquire his land and instead of doing so, the second respondent has proposed to acquire his land, thereby affecting his business. Indicating various calculations as per the Indian Road Congress standards and designs, an elaborate objection has been made by the petitioner to the first respondent on 17.09.2004 specifying the distance to be maintained and the need to consider the various factors and particularly requesting the authorities concerned to maintain the turning radius between 1000 to 1800 metres at the point in question. The petitioner's objection was responded by the first respondent on 01.12.2004 admitting that the present turning radius as per the existing geometry is only 360 metres for the 2 lane road and that even after the conversion into 4 lane road, the turning radius would be maintained at 360 metres. According to the petitioner, the proposed widening of the road maintaining 360 metres of turning radius is against the norms and specifications of the Indian Road Congress and if the road is widened on the southern side within the land already acquired by the first respondent, the turning radius of the road shall be around 1000 metres thereby falling in tune with the norms and specifications of the Indian Road Congress and in which case the petitioner's land on the northern side also need not be acquired. While so, the third respondent, on 19.11.2004, had directed the petitioner to appear before him on 29.11.2004 for an enquiry in respect of acquisition of his land and accordingly, he had appeared for the enquiry thereby submitting his detailed objection on the above points. However, the second respondent has issued Notification under Section 3(A)(1) of the Act vide his proceedings dated 09.12.2004 in response to which the petitioner had appeared before the second respondent and submitted his detailed objection which was rejected by the second respondent vide his order dated 29.04.2005 impugned in this writ petition.
16. A bare reading of the impugned order reveals that based on the technical opinion given by the Project Director with regard to formation of 4 lane road in which it has been said that the draft plans have been finalised and it is not possible to change the road alignment as it would result in demotion of several buildings and structures and that the lands belonging to Amutha and Co. are absolutely necessary and as such, the land acquisition proceedings cannot be avoided, the second respondent has rejected the petitioner's objection, however, stating therein that the petitioner would be duly compensated as per the Act.
17. Needless it is to say that this Court is not an expert body to go into the feasibility or otherwise of the project of laying 4 lane road or to find out whether there is any possibility for alternative alignment of the road. However, this Court is not powerless and rather it is duty-bound to examine whether the order passed by the second respondent is in conformity with the law laid down and the principles contemplated in this regard and whether the decision taken by the second respondent is also in accordance with law.
18. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the order impugned is very much non-speaking in nature inasmuch as the petitioner's objections have not been considered in detail and at the same time, it has also been passed without application of mind by mechanically following the technical opinion given by the Project Director.
19. A careful analysis of the impugned order would reveal that it has been passed by the second respondent merely based on the technical opinion given by the Project Director who has stated that the draft proposals have been finalised by the planning experts and hence, there is no scope for change in the alignment of road and as such, acquisition of petitioner's land cannot be avoided. To say otherwise, it can easily be seen that the objections raised by the petitioner have not at all been dealt with by the second respondent individually and no reason whatsoever has been assigned by the second respondent while rejecting the petitioner's objection except the vague and bald reasoning that the petitioner's objection is rejected based on the technical opinion given by the Project Director and this conclusion arrived at by the second respondent is certainly not in compliance with Section 3-C of the Act dealing with "Hearing of Objections" which reads as under:
1 Any person interested in the land may, within twenty one days from the date of publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 3-A, object to the use of the land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in that sub-section.
2 Every objection under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the competent authority in writing and shall set out the grounds thereof and the competent authority shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard, either in person or by a legal practitioner, and may, after hearing all such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as the competent authority thinks necessary, by order, either allow or disallow the objection.
20. It is trite that any authority, particularly quasi-judicial authority, who exercises his powers is required to spell out the reasons for his conclusion irrespective of the fact whether the conclusion is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. The extent and nature of reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances and those reasons must be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority concerned has given due consideration to the points in controversy. More so, the need for recording reasons is greater in a case where his order is based by an order of other authority. The requirement of consideration of objection mandated in the Act is not an empty formality and as such, the second respondent ought not to have rejected the petitioner's objections simply based on the technical opinion given by the Project Director. To put it otherwise, the second respondent should have restrained himself from considering the petitioner's objections simply for the sake of doing. This is because it is not sufficient if the rule of law is followed in letter and it should be followed in spirit as well in a constructive manner. In addition to relying on the Project Director's technical opinion, the second respondent should have also applied his mind and dealt with the petitioner's objections one by one and should have arrived at his conclusion with due reasoning in a speaking manner. It has been held in a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that spelling out of reasons in an administrative decision is a rule of natural justice. It is a well settled principle that reasoning is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same, the conclusion becomes not only meaningless but also lifeless. The object behind spelling out reasons is that the affected party should know as to why the decision has gone against him. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made even in rejecting the objections. At this juncture, it would be very much appropriate to state that a very recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2008 AIR SCW 2858 in the case of Director, Horticulture, Punjab and Ors. v. Jagjivan Parshad, adds strength to this settled proposition of law and the relevant portions of which are extracted as under:
Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further aveune of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court's judgment not sustainable.
Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of the sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
21. Thus, it is made crystal clear that quasi-judicial authorities, while arriving at conclusion, must record reasons for arriving at such conclusion. As already discussed, in this case, it is seen that the second respondent has failed to consider the petitioner's objection individually due to non-application of mind and has passed the order impugned mechanically simply based on the technical opinion of the Project Director. That apart, it is also worth referring to Section 3-I of the Act which states that the competent authority shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document, (c) reception of evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record from any Court or office and (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses, according to which the second respondent ought to have exercised his powers in examining the petitioner's objections, but, he has failed to complied with the same.
22. Normally, the scope of interference in land acquisition matters is very much limited as they involve public interest. However, the Court cannot afford to fold its hands and be a mute spectator when the quasi-judicial authority, namely, the second respondent has not applied his mind while passing the impugned order. It is an ordained principle that the Court is duty-bound to uphold the rule of law when there is any lapse on the part of the decision- making authority of the Government, particularly in a matter where public interest is involved. It can also be said that In rarest of rare occasions, this Court can go into issues such as this in case if they warrant interference and doubtlessly, this is one such case where the second respondent has not serious thought while passing the impugned order which is totally non-speaking in nature.
23. Therefore, this Court finds no other option except to hold that the impugned order of the second respondent is vitiated by its non-speaking nature and non-application of mind on the part of the second respondent inasmuch as he has not dealt with the petitioner's objection individually in detail and as such, it is in violation of principles of natural justice.
24. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the second respondent cannot be sustained and it is accordingly set aside.
25. Further, it is to be noted that while considering the stay petition and vacate stay petition, this Court has dealt with the matter extensively and had passed an elaborate order on 21.09.2006, thereby making the order of stay passed on 18.05.2005 absolute which has become final and is continuing to be in effect till date.
26. This Court is conscious of the importance of the 4-lane project involving several crores of rupees the execution and completion of which is the need of the hour for the benefit of the public at large. Therefore, as already stated, while setting aside the impugned order dated 29.04.2005 passed by the second respondent, this Court directs the second respondent to consider the objections of the petitioner in detail with due application of mind and pass appropriate orders giving due reasoning in a speaking manner, at any rate, within a period of four weeks from today. The time factor indicated in this matter has to be strictly adhered to and the parties are directed to co-operate in giving a finality to the litigation taking note of the public interest involved in it and It is made clear that it is open to the parties to the proceedings to agitate all the issues over which they are aggrieved if they so desire.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above with the aforesaid directions and observations. No costs.