Madras High Court
Navinraj vs Gnanasekar ... 1St on 11 August, 2015
Author: P.Devadass
Bench: P.Devadass
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 11.08.2015
RESERVED ON : 07.08.2015
DELIVERED ON : 11.08.2015
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.DEVADASS
C.R.P.(MD) No.1084 of 2012
and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012
Navinraj ... Petitioner/3rd Defendant
-vs-
1.Gnanasekar ... 1st Respondent/Plaintiff
2.Annathai
3.Sutha
4.Vijila
5.Piramila ... Respondents 2 to 5/Defendants
2 & 4 to 6
PRAYER
Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
against the fair and decreetal order passed by the District Munsif,
Sathankulam in I.A.No.728 of 2011 in O.S.No.84 of 2010 dated 13.02.2012.
!For Petitioner : Mr.V.K.Vijayaragavan
^For 1st Respondent : Mr.S.Subbiah
Respondents 2 to 5 : Given up
:ORDER
This revision is directed by 3rd defendant in O.S.No.84 of 2010 as against dismissal of his I.A.No.728 of 2011.
2.The plaintiff (1st respondent) laid up the suit in O.S.No.84 of 2010 in the Court of District Munsif, Sathankulam for declaration that the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 executed in favour of 1st defendant (Saroja) is null and void and consequently injunction with respect to the two items of suit properties situate in Puthukulam Village in Sathankulam Taluk in Thoothukudi District as against the first defendant.
3.The suit property belongs to one Samuel Nadar. His son Kovil Pitchai's son is plaintiff. According to plaintiff, while alive, on 27.05.2005, by way of his registered Will, Samuel Nadar bequeathed the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff's side. On 03.11.2005, Samuel passed away. Thereafter, his said Will came into force.
4.1st defendant took the stand that on 28.01.2002, Samuel Nadar executed a power deed in favour of her husband Selvaraj in respect of the suit properties. In pursuant to that on 24.01.2008 her husband executed a sale deed in her favour. She denied the truth and validity of the will propounded by the plaintiff.
5.Subsequently, defendants 2 to 6 came on record. They contended that on 31.01.2001, Samuel Nadar sold the suit properties to Gnanaraj Nadar for Rs.96,500/- by way of an unregistered sale deed. Under the said sale deed, Gnanaraj was put in possession of the suit properties. After the demise of Gnanaraj Nadar his legal heirs viz. defendants 2 to 6 are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Burking the above aspects, plaintiff and the first defendant have filed the present collusive suit.
6.In the suit, issues were framed. The suit was put on trial. It was part-heard. It was posted for cross-examination of defendants side. At this juncture, the third defendant filed I.A.No.728 of 2011, producing the said unregistered sale deed dated 31.11.2011, seeking permission of the Court to pay the stamp duty.
7.The said application was opposed to by the plaintiff contending that payment of stamp duty will not cure the said unregistered sale deed, it is legally not valid and it cannot be admitted in evidence.
8.The trial Court dismissed the said interim application since the document is bad in law, it cannot be cured by paying deficit stamp duty and penalty mainly relying on a decision of this Court in Ammamuthu Ammal (Died) and Others v. Devaraj and Others (2011 (5) MLJ 15).
9.Aggrieved, the third defendant has directed this Civil Revision Petition.
10.The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the trial Court has thoroughly misunderstood the ambit, purport and scope of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Both the provisions operate in different arena. Of course, some time they may overlap, but they differ in their field and operation.
11.The learned counsel for the revision petitioner further submitted that when a document is liable for stamp duty is either un-stamped or insufficiently stamped has been produced in Court with a view to receive it in evidence, then it is the duty of the Court to impound such a document and levy stamp duty, of course with penalty, if need be If the producer of the document demurs/refuses or has second thought over the issue, thereafter, it is the duty of the Court to send it to the Collector of Stamps to adjudicate the question. Once the stamp penalty is paid, it is qualified for being received in evidence. This position emanates from certain important provisions of the Indian Stamps Act viz. Sections 29, 33, 35, 38, 40 and 44. On any account, the Court cannot refuse to receive the stamp duty, on a document which is liable to be stamped according to the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act.
12.The learned counsel for the revision petitioner further submitted that collection of stamp duty on a document which is subjected to stamp duty is different from registration of the document under the Registration Act. Once stamp duty is paid, the document qualifies for consideration as to its admissibility in evidence. Of course a reading of Sections 17 and 49 of Registration Act shows that a document requires to be registered but not registered cannot be used for any purpose. But as per the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, it can be looked into for a limited purpose viz. collateral purpose. Though the terms and conditions, right and title and interest under an unregistered document cannot be enforced, but it can be used for certain collateral purpose, for instance, the possession under such unregistered document is whether illegal or legal etc.
13.The learned counsel for the petitioner also would submit that even based on an unregistered document date of possession can be counted for the purpose of 'animus possessendi' to establish the plea of adverse possession against true owner of the property, because it is only a collateral purpose.
14.The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that at the stage of admission of a document in evidence, as per the judicially recognized practice, the trial Court is expected to note down the objections of the parties and decide the same at the final stage of the case.
15.The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner is ready to pay the stamp duty. Whether the unregistered document can be accepted, whether it can be accepted for a collateral purpose are matters to be considered at the final stage of the case. Petitioner cannot be deprived of such opportunity by not receiving the document in the middle stage of the trial.
16.In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner cited the following decisions:
(i) V.Ponnusamy v. N.Namis Dhas and others (1998 (I) MLJ 407).
(ii) Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat and another (2001 (3) SCC 1).
(iii) Peteti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra (2002 (10) SCC 427).
(iv) Bonder Singh & Others v. Nihal Singh & Others (2004 (1) L.W. 706).
(v) Karuppannan v. Thavasiappan and another (2006 (4) MLJ 706).
(vi) Chairman & Managing Trustee Krishnaswamy Educational Trust v.
C.V.Rajeswari Ammal (Deceased) & others (2013 (3) L.W. 381).
17.On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would contend that defendants 2 to 6 are late comers to the suit/Court. There is no plea of adverse possession in their pleadings. They wanted to succeed on the strength of an unregistered document, which requires compulsory registration. It is impermissible in view of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act.
18.The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would further contend that use of an unregistered document for any purpose, whatsoever in a Court of law is barred. It cannot be looked into for collateral purpose also. Thus, payment of stamp duty cannot cure the defect of non-registration.
19.In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent cited the following decisions:
(i) K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd. (2009 (2) MLJ 526 (SC) ).
(ii) Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra (2009 (2) SCC 532).
(iii) Ammamuthu Ammal (Died) and Others v. Devaraj and Others (2011 (5) MLJ 15).
20.I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of both. I have already given the necessary factual matrix and relevant pleadings of the parties for the disposal of the Civil Revision Petition. Let us not duplicate.
21.Now, questions arises for our consideration are whether a document with respect to which stamp duty is payable, but not paid and impounded by the Court, what next the Court has to do, whether even after paying the stamp duty, because it being not registered, such an unregistered document has to be thrown out, now, at the stage of the suit what we have to do with the unregistered sale deed dated 31.01.2001.
22. In V.Ponnusamy v. N.Namis Dhas and others (1998 I MLJ 407) an unregistered mortgage deed was filed along with the plaint. It was held that unless it has been intended to be admitted in evidence, calling for the party to pay the stamp duty and penalty, if any will not arise.
23.In Chairman & Managing Trustee Krishnaswamy Educational Trust v. C.V.Rajeswari Ammal (Deceased) & others (2013 (3) L.W. 381) an unregistered deed was involved. In this case, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:
?54. After the execution of Ex.P.2 and Ex.P.3, the status of the plaintiff stood altered, as held by us earlier both these transactions formed a composite transaction and cannot be read in isolation. The recitals in Ex.s P.2 & P.3 are clear to establish that the plaintiff, who was then the lessee had surrendered possession of an extent of about 20 grounds to the defendants. The taking over of possession was acknowledged and the Donor, first defendant gifted 9 grounds and 1400 sq.ft., to the plaintiff and the defendants delivered possession of the property so gifted. Therefore, by virtue of the recitals in Ex.P.2 & Ex.P.3, the plaintiff came into possession of the suit property in their own right w.e.f., 06.01.1985. The plaintiff is sought to be non-suited on the ground that such possession by virtue of an unregistered document cannot confer any right on them. We have already held that though Ex.P.2 gift deed does not create a valid title in the plaintiff, the same could be looked into for collateral purpose to show the nature and continuous possession of the plaintiff. This conclusion is fortified by the following decisions.
55. In Secretary of State and another vs. Mahant Harcharan Das [AIR 1926 Oudh 98], a similar question was considered. The appeal in the said case arose out of a suit for possession of two plots brought by the plaintiff Mahant Harcharan Das against the State and 11 others. The case of the plaintiff was that one Mr.Sankar Lal was the owner of the plots and he made a gift of the plots in favour of his predecessors in title and he remained in possession of the said plots throughout. The Municipal Board gave the plots to the defendants 3 to 12 for building purposes and those had caused dispossession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore claimed a decree for possession of the land as proprietor. The defendant State denied that the plots belonged to Sankar Lal and also the gift made by him in favour of the predecessor-in-
title of the plaintiff. It was also contended that the gift being unregistered was invalid and conveyed no title to the plaintiff and the plots of land belonged to the defendant No.1. The trial Court found that Sankar Lal was not the owner of the plots, but was merely a grove-holder and that the deed of gift was inoperative being unregistered. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the Sub-Court allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint by allowing him to claim as a grove-holder and having found that the plaintiff had continuously been in possession of those plots, decreed the suit. In Second Appeal one of the questions, which was considered was that the deed of gift was invalid being unregistered and was therefore ineffective to pass any title to the plaintiff. While considering the said question, it was held that the deed of gift was invalid for want of registration. It was further held, it is clear that the plaintiff had been in possession of the grove over, since the date of gift right upto the date of suit for a period of close about 40 years, the unregistered gift deed may be invalid, but it is relevant for a collateral purpose to show the continuous possession of the plaintiff. It is further held that Sankar Lal or his heirs could not have claimed back the grove from the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title, after the expiry of 12 years from the date of the execution of the deed of gift. The right to possession became perfected after the expiry of 12 years from the date of the gift. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in N.Varada Pillai and another vs. Jeevarathnammal (Vol 38 MLJ 313).
56. In N.Varada Pillai and another vs. Jeevarathnammal (Vol 38 MLJ 313), (Privy Council) one of the questions which fell for consideration is does adverse possession change its character, when the possessor acquires title by an unregistered gift deed, which is inadmissible in proof of title. The Hon'ble Privy Council held as follows:-
It should be added that although the petitions of 1895 and the change of names made in the register in consequence of those petitions are not admissible to prove a gift, they may nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thenceforth held by Duraisani. In other words, although the petitions and order do not amount to a gift of the land, they lead to the inference that the subsequent receipt of the rents by Duraisani was a receipt in the character of donee and owner of the land, and therefore in her own right and not as trustee or manager for her mother and aunt.
57. Therefore, even if the Ex.P.2 gift deed is an unregistered instrument, inadmissible in evidence, the recitals therein read with recitals in Ex.P.3 which is also an unregistered instrument could be referred to for explaining the nature and character of possession of the plaintiff. In the light of above conclusion and taking note of the recitals in Ex.P.2 & Ex.P.3, the nature of possession of the plaintiff after 06.01.1985, was that of a Donee and plaintiff's possession was adverse to that of the defendants. ...
60. In Venkatasubramania Ayya & Ors. vs. S.Sivagurunatha Chettiar & Ors., [AIR 1938 Madras 60], one of the questions which fell for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court was the date from which adverse possession of alienee starts in cases of void and voidable transfers. In the case on hand, the defendants contention is that Ex.P2 gift deed being an unregistered document, no title flows from the same and the same is inadmissible. The Division Bench while considering such question held as follows:-
On the other hand, if the original transfer was void, then the alienee would have been adverse possession since the date of transfer i.e., 1900 in the case above put. The above is the effect of 44 Mad 831 [Vidya Varuthi vs. Baluswami Iyer], 12 Pat 251 (Ram Charan Das vs. Naurangi Lal), 46 Mad 751 (Subbaiya Pandaram vs. Mahammad Mustapha Maracayar); and the cases there cited and later cases such as AIR 1983 PC 44 (Mahadeo Prasad Singh vs. Karia Bharathi), which follow the above. The 12 Pat 251, group is dealing with the case of a transfer that is effective up to a time; the 46 Mad 751 group with cases void ab initio. Both groups date the adverse possession from the moment the alienee is without lawful title. That time is, in the case of a void transfer, the date of the transfer; in the case of a voidable transfer, the date of the avoidance; in the case of a transfer effective for a period (whether because of estoppel or otherwise), the date of the termination of the period.
...
62. Useful reference may be made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in (Karnam) Kandasamy Pillay vs. Chinnabha & Ors., [AIR 1981 Madras 82]. The Division Bench held that an unregistered sale cannot be set up as a transaction having effect of itself to transfer any interest in property; but it is permissible to consider it, as showing the nature of transferees subsequent possession. That being established it would after the expiry of 12 years ripen into a full title.?
24. In Karuppannan v. Thavasiappan and another ((2006) 4 MLJ 706), insufficiently stamped and unregistered release deed was sought to be introduced in evidence. In this case this Court held as under:
?7. The trial court by order dated 28.1.2005 refused to mark the release deed dated 14.8.1994 on the ground that it was neither registered nor adequately stamped. The correctness of this order is questioned before me.
8. It is well settled in law that even an unregistered document can be admitted as an evidence as the same can be looked into for collateral purpose. At the same time the admissibility of the unregistered document is not automatic if the same is not stamped. If the revision petitioner is willing to pay the deficit stamp duty as well as the penalty on the same, the unregistered release deed dated 14.8.1994 may be admitted as evidence and the trial court thereafter to apply its mind as to the merits of admissibility of the document irrespective of the fact whether the document is registered or unregistered document is also admissible for collateral purpose.
9. In the present case, the trial court clearly erred in law in refusing to mark the document as an Exhibit solely on the ground that it is an unregistered and inadequately stamped document. Therefore I am inclined to interfere with the order of trial court dated 28.1.2005.
10. The trial court is directed to mark the document in question as an exhibit if the revision petitioner/plaintiff is willing to remit the deficit portion of the stamp duty together with the penalty. The admissibility or otherwise of a document could be gone into by the trial court on merits thereafter to find out whether the document is relied on for collateral purpose or not.?
25.Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra ((2009) 2 SCC 532), the learned counsel for the respondent herein submitted that a document which is liable for payment of stamp duty when unstamped it cannot be looked into for any purpose, whatsoever.
26.In Vijay Krishna Mishra (supra), what the Court held was that if stamp duty is not paid as per Section 35 of the Act, then it would not be looked into for any purpose, even for a collateral purpose. If stamp duty is paid then it can be looked into for a collateral purpose.
27.Even in Ammamuthu Ammal (Died) and Others v. Devaraj and Others ((2011) 5 MLJ 15), which was relied on by the trial Court and in which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent herein, the above position of law has been reiterated by the Court viz. if the stamp duty is paid, then it can be referred to for a collateral purpose, but, even if the stamp duty and penalty is paid, if the document is unregistered, it cannot be looked into for any purpose other than the collateral purpose. This is what the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench of this Court which we have already mentioned. But the trial Court misunderstood this position of law and misdirected itself.
28. In Bonder Singh & Others v. Nihal Singh & Others (2004-1-L.W. 706) and in K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd. ((2009) 2 MLJ 526 (SC) ) the very same position of law has been stated. In these cases, the Court also explained what is meant by collateral purpose.
29. 'Collateral' is not a magical word. It is for a limited purpose even an unregistered document which is required to be registered, which is not registered can be looked into. Under an unregistered document any right, title, interest, terms and conditions cannot be enforced. But under such a document, the manner of possession, the character of possession can be looked into. Further, from the date of the unregistered document a person in possession may be in hostile possession to the land owner, then it can be looked into to consider the nature of possession of such a person (animus possessendi).
30.Thus, what emerges from the above position of law is that if a document with respect to which stamp duty is not paid or insufficiently stamped and it is unregistered as per Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, then when such document is produced before the Court, the Court has to impound it, calculate the stamp duty and collect the same together with penalty, if any. If the parties refuse for it, then it has to be sent to the Collector for adjudication. Thereafter, only it has to be received in evidence. Even then by paying the stamp duty, in view of the bar in Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act a compulsory registerable document when not registered cannot be looked into for any purpose but after paying the stamp duty it can be looked into only for collateral purpose.
31. In Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat and another (2001 (3) SCC 1) in order to prevent the derailing of the trial of the cases in the middle on question as to admissibility of documents except payment of stamp duty, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
?13.It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or re-moulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings.
14.When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.
(However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed.)
15.The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when the same objection is re- canvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses.
16.We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence.?
32. Thus at the admission stage itself, the Court cannot refuse to admit the document merely because objections have been raised by the parties. Further, after collecting stamp duty and penalty, if any, the Court can note the objections including whether for a collateral purpose such document could looked into or not and defer its conclusions thereon to the judgment stage.
33.Payment of stamp duty, so also penalty can be calculated by the Court. But under certain circumstances, the Collector of Stamps can give some concession with regard to payment of penalty. In such a case what the Court has to do has been considered in Peteti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra ((2002) 10 SCC 427). The Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
?5. Chapter IV of the Indian Stamp Act contains provisions regarding ?instruments not duly stamped?. It is Section 35 which falls under the said chapter which empowered the trial court to direct the party (who wants the document to be acted upon) to pay the stamp duty (or the deficient portion) together with a penalty of rupees fifteen, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds fifteen rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion. This is for the purpose of enabling the document to be admitted in evidence. In such a situation the document would be admitted only on payment of the aforesaid sum. In a case where the party is not willing or he cannot afford to pay the said sum the court has to adopt the procedure envisaged in Section 38(2) of the Act. That sub-section is with reference to the action which the trial court is, perforce to adopt under Section 33(1) of the Act.
6. Mr M.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant cannot afford to pay the penalty now suggested as the amount is far beyond his capacity. But at the same time, he made a fervent plea that his suit cannot be allowed to be dismissed on the ground of inability to pay the huge penalty amount alone. We find some force in the said plea. In a case where the party fails to pay the penalty suggested by the court the document impounded has to be sent to the Collector for the purpose of taking further steps in respect of that document as provided in Section 40 of the Act. The Collector has the power to require the person concerned to pay the proper duty together with a penalty amount which the Collector has to fix in consideration of all aspects involved. The restriction imposed on the Collector in imposing the penalty amount is that under no circumstances the penalty amount shall go beyond ten times the duty or the deficient portion thereof. That is the farthest limit which meant only in very extreme situations the penalty need be imposed up to that limit. It is unnecessary for us to say that the Collector is not required by law to impose the maximum rate of penalty as a matter of course whenever an impounded document is sent to him. He has to take into account various aspects including the financial position of the person concerned.
7. In the aforesaid situation we set aside the impugned judgment passed by the trial court as well as the High Court. We direct the trial court to impound the document as indicated in Section 33(1) and forward the same to the Collector concerned as envisaged in Section 38(2) of the Act.
8. We also direct the Collector concerned to complete the proceedings envisaged in Section 40(1) of the Act within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the document. The trial court shall await the receipt of the certificate of the order passed by the Collector for proceeding further in the suit. In other words the suit will be revived only on receipt of such certificate and the copy of the order of the Collector so passed.?
34. Already the unregistered document dated 31.01.2001 has been impounded by the Trial Court. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since question as to stamp duty penalty arises, the document can be referred to Collector for adjudication.
35. The petitioner can show to the Trial Court that under the said unregistered sale deed dated 31.01.2001 his possession, his character of possession is legal, whether he has been in legal possession. To see his character of possession viz. for this collateral purpose the Court can refer to the unregistered document dated 31.01.2001. That question cannot be ruled out, now itself. Thus, the Court cannot refuse to permit him to pay stamp duty as per Rules and cannot now itself decide as to its admissibility on account of it being not registered under the Registration Act.
36. In the circumstances, the impugned fair order and decreetal order of the learned District Munsif, Sathankulam made in I.A.No.728 of 2011 in O.S.No.84 of 2010 on 13.02.2012 are set aside. The learned District Munsif shall forward the impounded unregistered sale deed dated 31.01.2001 to the concerned Collector (Stamps) for adjudication as envisaged under Section 38(2) of the Indian Stamp Act. The said Collector will complete the said proceedings within one month from the date of receipt of the document. The learned District Munsif shall await the receipt of the Certificate of the order passed by the Collector. Till such time, the suit shall be kept in abeyance. On receipt of the said certificate, the trial of the suit in O.S.No.84 of 2010 will be proceed further in accordance with law.
37.Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 stands closed.
To
1.The Principal District Judge, Thootukudi.
2. District Munsif, Sathankulam.
3.The Collector (Stamps), Thoothukudi District, Thoothukudi..