Uttarakhand High Court
Asha Devi And Ors. vs U.P. State Road Transport Corporation ... on 28 July, 2003
Equivalent citations: I(2004)ACC195, 2005ACJ517
Author: Rajesh Tandon
Bench: Rajesh Tandon
JUDGMENT Rajesh Tandon, J.
1. This appeal has been filed by the claimants against the order dated 22.12.1981 passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pithoragarh, rejecting the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this appeal are that a claim petition had been filed by the appellants before M.A.C.T., Pithoragarh, in the year 1980. Date was fixed for filing written statement on 21.12.1980 which was Sunday. The case was taken up on 22.12.1980 and it was dismissed in default on that date. The present restoration application had been filed by the claimant on 28.1.1981 stating therein that from 19.12.1980 to 21.1.1981 the counsel for the claimant was out of station. Further, it was stated in the application that from 23.1.1981 to 27.1.1981 the counsel for the applicant was unwell and application for restoration was filed on 28.1.1981. The counsel for the applicant has stated that for the aforesaid reasons the claimants could not present the application within time and as such five days delay in filing of the application may be condoned. The application was opposed by the respondents.
3. I have heard Mr. C.K. Sharma for the appellant and Mr. A.N. Sharma, the counsel for the respondents.
4. It is established law that rules of limitation are not meant to deprive the parties from claiming their rights. The claimants have been deprived of their rights to claim compensation because of the fact that there was a delay due to the illness of the counsel from 23.1.1981 to 27.1.1981.
5. The expression 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act came up for interpretation before the Apex Court from time to time. In the case of State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Apex Court has held as under:
"From the above observations it is clear that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party."
6. Relying upon the decision in Re: N. Balkrishan, (1988) 7 SCC 123, it has been held in Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, as under:
"Thus it becomes plain that the expression 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22, Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party."
7. The counsel for the respondents Mr. A.N. Sharma has raised an objection that no appeal lies against the order dated 2.5.1981. I have also heard the Standing Counsel on the aforesaid objection. In my opinion such a plea is not available to the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as the matter has been delayed for at least 23 years when the claimant is running from door to door. Moreover, there is nothing on record to substantiate such objection. Award made by the Tribunal is the order passed by it either rejecting or allowing the claim and the same has been made appealable under Section 110-D of the old Act and under Section 173 of the new Act. The words 'aggrieved person' have been used in Section 173 are wide enough to include any person whose claim has been rejected. In the case of Captain Komal Charan v. State of U.P., 1971 ACJ 320 (Allahabad), the Division Bench has held as under:
"An inquiry under Section 110-B culminates in an award. The award terminates the proceedings before the Tribunal and disposes of the application for compensation. The termination may come about as a result of findings on all issues including preliminary issue. It can equally happen on a finding on a preliminary issue like limitation. The Tribunal may find that the application for compensation is barred by time and that there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The resulting order would effectively terminate the proceedings and dispose of the application for compensation. Such an order will be an 'award', appealable under Section 110-D."
8. In my opinion technicalities should not come in the way of dispensation of justice. Allahabad High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 2005 ACJ 470 (Allahabad), has held as under:
"In Stella v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, 1989 ACJ 181 (Kerala), it was held that even in the absence of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres in every Tribunal, of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, to adopt modalities necessary to achieve requirements of natural justice and fair play and even when Order IX of the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the given facts of the case, the Tribunal does have the power to restore a claim petition that has been dismissed for default by using its inherent powers, in which Rules of 1998 or Order IX, Civil Procedure Code has been made applicable and thus the Tribunal has power to restore the claim petition."
9. In view of the above there is no merit in the argument of Mr. A.N. Sharma and the same, therefore, cannot be accepted.
10. However, after the amendment in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, by deletion of Sub-section (3) by Act 54 of 1994, there is no time limit to file the claim petition.
11. In the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, 1996 ACJ 1013 (SC), it has been held as under:
"According to us, in its wisdom Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition."
12. It is really unfortunate that appellant has been deprived to pursue the claim petition because of 5 days delay only.
13. In view of the aforesaid reasons the appeal is allowed and the order dated 22.12.1981 is set aside. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is directed to decide the petition within three months after filing of the certified copy of the order.