Allahabad High Court
Raj Kumar Madhesiya vs Hon Ble Highcourt Of Judicature At ... on 30 January, 2023
Author: Sangeeta Chandra
Bench: Sangeeta Chandra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved on 29.08.2022 Delivered on 30.01.2023 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 9223 of 2005 Petitioner :- Raj Kumar Madhesiya Respondent :- Hon Ble Highcourt Of Judicature At Allahabad And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Arvind Kumar Shukla,Arvind Kumar Shukla Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Bushra Maryam,K.R. Sirohi,Pradeep Kumar Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra,J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging his dismissal order dated 23.05.2003 and the order passed in Appeal dated 02.09.2004, also praying for consequential benefits.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as a Process Server/Class IV employee by an order dated 03.06.2000, on the basis of a selection held for District Judgeship Kushinagar at Padrauna. He was confirmed by an order dated 27.06.2001 issued by the District Judge. Although he was appointed as a Process Server, but he was forced to work as Electrician, as there was no sanctioned post of Electrician in Kushinagar Judgeship. While he was doing some repair work at the residence of the District Judge Kushinagar, he received an electric shock and fell down from the first floor and broke his shoulder. The petitioner being a very poor employee started his treatment at fracture clinic at Padrauna under a trained Doctor from IMS, BHU, but later on could not afford his treatment and got himself treated by a neighbourhood physician. As soon as he suffered the accident, he had applied for sanction of medical leave on 12.08.2002 for fifteen days. He could not rejoin because of his illness and the respondents issued a chargesheet to the petitioner for being unauthorisedly absent for a period of more than 60 days and he was suspended on 07.12.2002 and Administrative Enquiry No.5 of 2002 was initiated against the petitioner and the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who issued a chargesheet on 13.03.2003 to the petitioner. It contained a single charge of unauthorised absence with effect from 12.08.2002 up to the date of issuance of chargesheet. The petitioner replied to the chargesheet saying that he was undergoing treatment for constant pain in his shoulder and further informed that as and when he gets well, he will resume duties and that further medical leave be sanctioned to him. He also prayed that he was facing financial hardships and his dues upto August be paid.
3. It has been argued that the Enquiry Officer submitted a report without fixing any date time and place of hearing but finding the petitioner guilty of unauthorised absence. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 01.05.2003 by the District Judge proposing dismissal from service. The petitioner replied to the said show cause notice indicating therein that he was confined to bed and the treating doctor had given a medical certificate in this regard. However, the petitioner was dismissed by an order dated 23.05.2003. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ petition which was disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to file an Appeal. The petitioner filed the Appeal before the Administrative Judge which was rejected on 02.09.2004. Hence this petition.
4. Ms. Bushra Mariyam, learned counsel appearing for the District Judgeship, has referred to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Nos.2 and 3. It refers to appointment of the petitioner in pursuance of a select list dated 03.05.2000 as a Class IV employee. It also refers to the District Judgeship of Kushinagar being only a temporary Judgeship, whose tenure was being extended from time to time by various Government Orders. There were no sanctioned permanent post of Process Server, therefore, the confirmation order could not have been passed by the then District Judge. The counter affidavit states that such confirmation order dated 26.06.2001 had been recalled by the Administrative Judge by his order dated 19.01.2005.
5. The enquiry report has been filed as Annexure CA-5 to the counter affidavit and Ms. Bushra Mariam argued that the treating doctor had also been examined by the Enquiry Officer. The doctor had found the petitioner fit to discharge his duties, but the petitioner did not join his duty and absented himself unauthorisedly.
6. In reply to such arguments, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was a confirmed employee and he was entitled to leave being sanctioned to him on medical grounds, which leave he had applied for but the application was not considered and no order was passed thereon. The petitioner had an unblemished service record from the time he was appointed up to the date of the accident when he fell down and broke his shoulder. Moreover, the petitioner being a low paid employee who was suffering medically also, was not given subsistence allowance during the suspension period and was forced to live hand to mouth and was prejudiced from placing his case before the Enquiry Officer effectively.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court through the appointment order of the petitioner and also the order of confirmation, where his name finds place at serial no.27. He has also referred to the reply submitted by the respondents in the counter affidavit to his averment that although he was appointed on the Class IV post, he was asked to work as an Electrician. He has referred to his application for medical leave to be sanctioned to him also. He argued that there is no denial from the respondents that he was appointed on a Class IV post but the work of Electrician was being taken from him. There is also no denial of his application for medical leave being submitted on 12.08.2002. However, no order had been passed on his application for medical leave till the date of his dismissal. In the chargesheet issued to the petitioner, there is no reference of the medical leave application being rejected. There is also no denial of the application of the petitioner for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension, but there is no mention of payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out to the order of dismissal which refers to continued absence with effect from 12.08.2002 up to 25.04.2003 the date of submission of Inquiry Report. He has referred to the fact that till the time of passing of the dismissal order on 23.05.2003, the petitioner's order of confirmation had not been set aside by the competent authority. He was a confirmed employee who was entitled for grant of leave on medical grounds. He was entitled to regular disciplinary proceedings being carried out to establish his alleged guilt of unauthorised absence however, except for issuance of chargesheet to him no date, time or place of enquiry was fixed. Even if the petitioner was accused of non-participation in the enquiry proceedings, the Enquiry Officer was duty-bound to conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice as laid down in several judgements of the Supreme Court.
In the counter affidavit there is reference of the petitioner being recruited on the basis of his special qualification as Electrician and being deputed to work as an Electrician accordingly. However, there is no denial of the fact that there was no post of Electrician sanctioned in the District Judgeship and there is no denial of the averment that the petitioner was not trained as there was no trade certificate submitted by him.
9. There is also an admission in the counter affidavit that the order of the Administrative Judge dated 02.09.2004 rejecting the Appeal of the petitioner was received in the Judgeship on 22.09.2004 and the order was seen by the then District Judge but there was no order to give information to the petitioner about the rejection of his Appeal. There is reference of a minor penalty being given to the petitioner by the then District Judge on 01.09.2001 and a fine of hundred rupees being imposed upon him for leaving the office before time. However, there is also an admission that the aforesaid minor penalty was canceled by the then District Judge on 11.09.2001, much before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for alleged unauthorised absence.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgements of the Supreme Court in the case of Captain M Paul Anthony versus Bharat Gold mines Ltd and another AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1416; and Jagdamba Prasad Shukla versus State of U.P. and others AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2806; to argue that in the absence of payment of subsistence allowance right from the date of suspension till his dismissal, the petitioner was severely prejudiced in participating in the departmental enquiry and the said enquiry stood vitiated for denial of grant of reasonable opportunity to him to appear and plead his case before the Enquiry Officer. The Supreme Court had observed in the case of M. Paul. Anthony (supra) that the order of suspension does not put an end to an employee's service and he continues to be a member of service, though he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary. It had observed thus:-
"If there is no provision in the rules applicable to a particular class of service for payment of salary at a reduced rate, that is, subsistence allowance during suspension, the employer would be liable to pay full salary even during the period of suspension. Suspension notwithstanding, non-payment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed under suspension, he is de-mobilised and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the name of subsistence allowance so that the employee may sustain himself."
11. The Supreme Court referred to judgement rendered by it in O.P. Gupta versus Union of India and others 1987 (4) SCC 328 , where the Court had Observed -
"An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his service under the government. He continues to be a member of Service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of suspension as explained by this Court in Khem Chand versus Union of India is that he continues to be a member of the government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance - generally called subsistence allowance - which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowance he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the Departmental enquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a government servant injuriously. The very expression subsistence allowance has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word ''subsist' as given Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (volume II at page 2171) is "to remain alive as on food: to continue to exist" "Subsistence" means a means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood"
12. The Court observed in paragraph 29 of its judgement in M. Paul Anthony (supra) that:-
"29. If therefore, even that amount is not paid, then the very object of paying the reduced salary to the employees during the period of suspension would be frustrated. The act of non-payment of subsistence allowance can be likened to slow poisoning as the employee, if not permitted to sustain himself on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance, would gradually starve himself to death."
In paragraph 30 the Court continued to observe thus-
"30. On joining government service, a person does not mortgage or barter away his basic rights as a human being, including his fundamental rights, in favour of the government. The government only because it has the power to appoint does not become the master of the body and soul of the employee. The government by providing job opportunities to its citizens only fulfils its obligations under the Constitution, including the Directive Principles of State Policy. The employee, on taking up an employment only agrees to subject himself to regulatory measures concerning his service. His association with the government or any other employer, like instrumentalities of the government, or statutory or autonomous corporations et cetera is regulated by the terms of contract of service or service rules made by the Central or the State Government under the proviso to Article 309 or other statutory rules including certified Standing Orders. The fundamental rights, including the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution or the basic human rights are not surrendered by the employee. The provision for payment of subsistence allowance made in the service rules only ensures non-violation of the right to life of the employee. That was the reason why this Court in the State of Maharashtra versus Chandrabhan, 1983 (3) SCR 337, struck down the service rule which provided for payment of a nominal amount of Rs.1 as subsistence allowance to an employee placed under suspension. This decision was followed in Fakeer Bhai Fula Bhai Solanki versus Presiding Officer and Another 1986 (3) SCC 131, it was held in that case that if an employee could not attend the departmental proceedings on account of financial stringencies caused by non-payment of subsistence allowance, and thereby could not undertake a journey away from his home to attend the departmental proceedings, the order of punishment, including the whole proceedings would stand vitiated. For this purpose, reliance was also placed on an earlier decision in Ghanshyam Dass Srivastava versus State of Madhya Pradesh 1978 (1) SCC 656".
13. The Supreme Court thereafter observed that the question that the appellant was unable to go and participate in the enquiry proceedings on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance may not have been raised before the Enquiry Officer, but it was positively raised before the High Court and was also raised before the Supreme Court. Since, it was not disputed that subsistence allowance was not paid to the appellant during the pendency of the departmental proceedings, more so when it was not suggested by the respondent that the appellant had any other source of income, and his medical certificates regarding his illness were also refused to be taken into account, the Court was of the opinion that the appellant had been punished in total violation of principles of natural justice and he was literally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. The appellant had put it before the High Court that on account of his penury occasioned by non-payment of subsistence allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer at such proceedings which were held ex-parte, stood vitiated. This argument ought not to have been ignored by the High Court. Supreme Court found the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner vitiated on this ground also besides other grounds mentioned in the judgement rendered in Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra).
14. In the case of Jagdamba Prasad Shukla (supra), the Supreme Court noticed that the respondents had not disputed the factual position that subsistence allowance had not been paid to the appellant, observed in paragraphs 6 and 7 that the High Court's observations rejecting the argument of the appellant regarding non-payment of subsistence allowance were incorrect. Factually, there were several correspondence available on record to show that the appellant had repeatedly requested for release of his salary and subsistence allowance in his communication to his superiors. He had expressed his inability to attend the disciplinary proceedings also before the tribunal in his claim petition. Moreover, the appellant could have furnished a certificate stating that he was not engaged in any other employment in compliance of Rule 53(2) of the Financial Handbook, had he been told at any stage that he had to furnish such a certificate and that he could not be paid subsistence allowance without it. It was not the case of the respondent that in response to the appellant's request for payment of subsistence allowance, he was asked to furnish such a certificate and since he did not furnish it, the amount of subsistence allowance was not paid to him. Both the reasons taken by the High Court for rejecting the appellant's contention regarding non-payment of subsistence allowance were rejected by the Supreme Court.
15. It observed in paragraph 8 thereafter as follows -
"8. The payment of subsistence allowance, in accordance with the rules, to an employee under suspension is not a bounty. It is a right. An employee is entitled to be paid subsistence allowance. No justifiable ground has been made out for non-payment of the subsistence allowance all through the period of suspension that is from suspension till removal. One of the reasons for not appearing in enquiry as intimated to the authorities was the financial crunch on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance and the other was the illness of the appellant. The appellant in reply to the show cause notice stated that even if he wanted to appear in enquiry against medical advice, he was unable to appear for want of funds on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is a clear case of breach of principles of natural justice on account of denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself in the departmental enquiry. Thus the departmental enquiry and the consequent order of removal from service are quashed."
16. The learned counsel for the respondent nos.2 and 3 has pointed out that this Court while staying the order of dismissal and the Appellate order had confined the issuance of notice only to the proportionality of the punishment in the impugned order. She has referred to judgements of the Supreme Court dealing with the scope of judicial interference in Disciplinary proceedings and in the quantum of punishment. They are -
1. B.C. Chaturvedi Versus Union of India and others AIR 1996 Supreme Court 484 (paragraph 18);
2. Union of India and another versus G Ganayutham AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3387 (paragraph 28, 30, 31);
3. State of Meghalaya and others Vs Mecken Singh N Marak 2008 (118) FLR 372 (SC)(Paragraph nine);
4. Union of India and others Versus P Gunasekaran 2015 (2) SCC 610; (paragraph12 and 13);
5. State Bank of India versus KS Vishwanath 2022 SCC online SC 667 (paragraph 11 to 14).
17. The Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) was considering earlier binding precedents and observed that it is the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct of the employee. The Courts should not normally substitute their own decision on penalty and impose some other penalty. It is only when the penalty imposed shocks the conscience they can appropriately mould the relief either directing the disciplinary/Appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
18. In G. Ganayutham (supra), the Supreme Court discussed the Doctrine of Proportionality as a ground to challenge an administrative action. It observed that in India when fundamental freedoms are affected by administrative action, the Courts would apply the principle of proportionality and assume a primary role. However, when no fundamental freedoms are involved, the Courts will only play a secondary role while the primary judgement as to the reasonableness will remain with the Executive or the Administrative Authority. It also observed that unless the Court/Tribunal finds in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury Or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be reverted back to the appropriate authority for its consideration. It is only in very rare cases that the Court might, to shorten litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority.
19. In State of Meghalaya and others Vs Mecken Singh N Marak (supra), the Supreme Court was again considering the possibility of interference in the quantum of punishment by the Courts. The Court or the Tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the approved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. It observed that the High Court also has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, it would not interfere unless there are sufficient reasons, therefore, the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate authority unless it is shocking to the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. There were several factors to be considered while interfering in the quantum of punishment which were also enumerated in paragraph 9 of the said judgement.
20. In Union of India and others versus P Gunasekaran (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the scope of judicial review/interference in disciplinary proceedings. It observed that the High Court cannot venture into re-appreciation of evidence or interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on which findings are based or to correct error of fact, however grave it may be, or go into the proportionality of punishment, unless it shocks the conscience of the Court.
21. In State Bank of India versus K.S. Vishwanath (supra), the Supreme Court while considering earlier judgements observed that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts whereas the Appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. It may interfere only when the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from a patent error on the face of the record what is based on no evidence at all. The Court will not act as Appellate authority and reassess the evidence. Even where a criminal Court subsequently acquitted the employee by giving him benefit of doubt, it will not in any way render disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of finding of guilt or consequential punishment as the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is different from the standard of proof required in Departmental enquiries. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision making process.
22. This Court has perused the counter affidavit and the documents filed along with it. It appears that the confirmation order passed by the then District Judge in 2001 had been cancelled by the Administrative Judge in 2005, but at the time when the petitioner was facing disciplinary proceedings, he was a confirmed employee. Also, the minor punishment order in September 2001 was recalled by the then District Judge on the Central Nazirs reporting that the work and conduct of the petitioner had remained satisfactory throughout. So it cannot be said that the petitioner was an indisciplined and negligent employee as presumed by the Enquiry Officer and the Appointing Authority. Also since there is no denial of the averment that the petitioner was not paid his subsistence allowance from the time of his suspension in December 2002 till date and therefore, he was suffering grave financial hardship and was unable to get himself treated by a proper orthopaedic surgeon but had gone to a local neighbourhood ayurvedic doctor could be said to be a plausible explanation submitted by the petitioner.
23. This Court has perused the enquiry report dated 25.04.2003, which has been filed as Annexure 5 to the counter affidavit. The Enquiry Officer has first referred to the report submitted by the Senior Administrative Officer of the Judgeship that the petitioner a Process Server, had applied for medical leave on 12.08.2002 up to 26.08.2002, however he had not joined duty with effect from 27.08.2002, but had sent an application for extension of leave on the ground that he was not feeling well. The Enquiry Officer also referred to the suspension order dated 07.12.2002 and the issuance of charge sheet to the delinquent employee and his reply dated 17.04.2003 through post, wherein he mentioned that he was still unwell. The Enquiry Officer has referred to the statements of the departmental witnesses, that is, the Senior Administrative Officer and the Doctor who was treating the petitioner. The Senior Administrative Officer complained that the petitioner was disobedient and an inefficient employee. He used to remain absent every now and then without prior intimation to the officer concerned. Also the Enquiry Officer mentioned the statement of Dr. D. K. Rai, the medical Doctor who was examined as Departmental witness No. 2. The doctor had stated that initially the petitioner was suffering from typhoid, but later on he started complaining of pain in his shoulder for which he was referred to an orthopaedic doctor for expert opinion. However, the petitioner did not return to his clinic after 26.08.2002. In reply to a query regarding fitness of the petitioner, the doctor concerned had stated that the petitioner was capable of walking and complained only of pain in his shoulder. The Enquiry Officer on consideration of statements made by the departmental witnesses came to a conclusion that the petitioner had remained absent without any proper reason as he was capable of walking and performing his duty as Process Server. Also, he had been directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer repeatedly but he avoided cooperating in the enquiry. Enquiry Officer mentioned that he being Civil Judge (Senior Division) and a judicial officer had repeatedly called the petitioner to appear for personal hearing and the petitioner had avoided the same, therefore, he could imagine the conduct of the petitioner before the Senior Administrative Officer, who had complained of the petitioner being a willful and disobedient employee. The Enquiry Officer also stated that Dr. D.K. Rai, the Doctor, who was treating him was not an MBBS doctor but had only a BAMS degree. The petitioner being a Class IV employee was earning enough to get himself treated by a proper medical doctor. His statement that because of poverty he got himself treated only by a local doctor was not worth believing. Therefore, he found the charge of unauthorised absence found proved against the petitioner.
24. This Court has also perused the order sheet and finds that when the writ petition was heard as fresh by this Court, it was pleased to stay the operation of the dismissal order and the appellate order and had issued notice regarding proportionality of punishment on 22.01.2005. After exchange of pleadings, this Court by its order dated 25.7.2022 had directed the counsel for the respondents to seek instructions as to whether the order dated 22.01.2005 passed by the then Administrative Judge annexed along with the counter affidavit had been challenged by any person, and as to whether the petitioner was working under the interim order granted earlier to him.
25. At the time of hearing, the counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 has produced before this Court a copy of the instructions sent by the current District Judge Kushinagar, which had also been sent to this Court via email on 16.8.2022 to the Litigation Section, and which has been placed on record by the office. It has come out that the petitioner is currently working in Kushinagar as a Class IV employee/Process Server and attached in the Central Nazarat of the Judgeship. It has also been reported that after the interim order passed by this Court on 22.02.2005, the petitioner was reinstated on 13.07.2006. He had submitted his resignation on 22.04.2008 but was allowed to withdraw the same by an order dated 21.01.2009 by the then District Judge Kushinagar in pursuance of which the petitioner re-joined his service on 22.01.2009 but was not paid salary for the period he did not work on the basis of "no work no pay". On 09.09.2016 the petitioner was confirmed along with several other Class IV employees by Administrative Order No.140/2016, and has been working satisfactorily as Process Server drawing salary of Rs 27,200 in the pay scale of Rs.5200 -20,200 with Grade Pay of Rs.1800/-.
26. Having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and for the respondent, this Court is of the opinion that the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt, lay down the correct position in law with regard to the scope of interference in disciplinary proceedings by Court/ tribunals in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative action and also the power of the Courts to interfere in the quantum of punishment given by the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate authority on the basis of findings recorded in department enquiries. However, such judgements related to general principles which are axiomatic in laying down the parameters to be observed by Court/Tribunal in dealing with disciplinary proceedings. The specific case of the petitioner, however, is that he was prevented from placing his case before the respondents as he suffered from illness and financial hardship caused due to non-payment of subsistence allowance to him during his suspension till the date of his dismissal. This Court has considered the reply submitted by the petitioner to the chargesheet and also to the show-cause notice issued by the District Judge. Both the replies of the petitioner, he had mentioned the hardship he was facing as a result of illness and as a result of non-payment of his suspension allowance. Because of non-payment of suspension allowance, he had pleaded that he was unable to consult qualified doctor and had to seek treatment from the doctor available in the neighbourhood. This Court is of the opinion that a low paid employee such as a Process Server would not have the wherewithal to fall back on his savings to undertake expensive medical treatment in the absence of subsistence allowance being paid to him.
27. This Court has also considered the fact that the petitioner has been allowed to continue in service on the basis of an interim order granted by this Court on 22.02.2005, on the basis of report submitted by the District Judgeship to the Litigation Section of this Court, which has been placed on record. It has come out that his service has been entirely satisfactory and even minor penalty that was given to him in 2001 had been cancelled by the then District Judge later on. He has been confirmed by an Administrative Order in 2016 along with several other Class IV employees.
28. This Court finds it an appropriate case to quash the order of dismissal and the order rejecting his Appeal, impugned in this petition. Hence, the orders dated 23.05.2003 and 20.09.2004 are quashed.
29. The petitioner has been working on the basis of an interim order. His absence from service of about eight months shall be regularized as medical leave or leave without pay. He shall be entitled to all consequential benefits including annual increments and seniority on the basis of his continued service.
30. The writ petition stands allowed.
Order Date :- 30 /01/2023 Rahul [Justice Sangeeta Chandra]