Gujarat High Court
Janak Pramodbhai Patel & vs Sepcial Recovery Officer & on 28 September, 2017
Author: N.V.Anjaria
Bench: N.V.Anjaria
C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 419 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1260 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1081 of 2016
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1098 of 2016
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
to see the judgment ? No
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of
the judgment ? No
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of No
India or any order made thereunder ?
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JANAK PRAMODBHAI PATEL & 1....Petitioner(s)
Versus
SEPCIAL RECOVERY OFFICER & 1....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR CHINMAY M GANDHI, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 - 2
MR MB GANDHI, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 - 2
MR NANDISH CHUDGAR FOR NANAVATI ASSOCIATES, ADVOCATE for the
Respondent(s) No. 2
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
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HC-NIC Page 1 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017
C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 28/09/2017
CAV JUDGMENT
The facts involved in all the captioned petitions are same, so is the issue. They thus constituted a group. They are being disposed of by this common order.
2. The petitioners, who are the guarantors to a loan transaction, have made the following prayers, common in all petitions.
(i) to issue direction against respondent No.1 - Special Recovery Officer of respondent No.2 Bank, not to act upon notice dated 16th November, 2015 or the previous notice dated 12th February, 2011;
(ii) to hold that the second notice could not have been issued and the Bank could not have enforced its claim under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and enforcement under the Act was deemed to be closed;
(iii) alternatively, to hold that one security of the judgment debtor was lost because of negligency of the Bank, the guarantor stood discharged. A further alternative prayer made is to hold that the decree dated 30th June, 2003 in the Lavad Suit on the basis of which recovery proceedings Page 2 of 17 HC-NIC Page 2 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT under the SERFAESI Act were initiated was unenforceable;
(iv) it was prayed that since Official Liquidator was not joined as party in the proceedings at the time of winding-up order dated 15th January, 2013 was passed, decree obtained in absence of Official Liquidator was illegal and not enforceable.
2.1 In other words, the petitioners are aggrieved by the action on part of the respondent No.2 Bank which proceeded against the petitioners for recovery of the amount as per the decree passed in the Lavad Suit. The main relief asked for is for setting aside notices issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SERFAESI). In the other attendant prayers, petitioners have questioned the legality and enforceability of the said decree by raising various contentions in the petition on that score.
3. The relevant facts may be stated in a nutshell. One Minal Oil & Agro Industries Limited, a private limited company had taken financial assistance for running its business from respondent No.2 Kalupur Commercial Co-operative Bank to the tune of Rs.250 lakhs. The amount of loan was not repaid and respondent No.2 Bank instituted Lavad Suit being 1886 of 2002. Award and decree came to be passed in the said Lavad Suit by the Board of Nominee, Ahmedabad, on 30th June, 2003. In the said Lavad Suit, respondent Page 3 of 17 HC-NIC Page 3 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT No.2 Bank was the plaintiff whereas Minal Oil & Agro Industries Private Limited was loanee - defendant No.1; defendant Nos.2 to 6 were the guarantors whom included petitioner of Special Civil Application No.419 of 2016 as defendant No.6, petitioner of Special Civil Application No.1260 of 2016 as defendant No.3, petitioner of Special Civil Application No.1081 of 2016 as defendant No.4 and petitioner of Special Civil Application No.1098 of 2016 as defendant No.5.
3.1 As per the decree of the Board of Nominee, the plaintiff - Bank was permitted to recover the total amount of Rs.02,64,15,012.34 Ps. with interest thereon as well as cost of the suit, by selling movable and immovable properties mortgaged or hypothicated. It was on the basis of the said decree that the plaintiff - Bank invoked provisions of the SERFAESI Act and proceeded to take the steps in law.
3.2 Notice dated 12th February, 2011 came to be issued under Section 13(2) of the SERFAESI Act. The amount claimed therein was Rs.05,89,34,549/- with running interest. It appears that notice was also issued on 10th July, 2012 under Section 152 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code demanding from all the defendants, amount decreed by the Board of Nominee. It appears that correspondence ensued between the parties. The amount remained unpaid. Another notice dated 16th November, 2015 under Section 13(2) of the SERFAESI Act came to be issued. The mortgaged property was described as office premises No.802, 8th Floor at Popular House Association, Ashram Road, Ahmedabad, Page 4 of 17 HC-NIC Page 4 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT admeasuring approximately 2100 sq. ft. It is these notices under Section 13(2) which are brought under challenge by the petitioners.
4. Learned advocate for the petitioners wanted to assail the said notices and the action taken by the respondent Bank by submitting firstly that the action was taken by the Bank on the basis of decree passed of the Board of Nominee in the year 2003, Board of Nominee, therefore the same was not executable and action under the SERFAESI Act to recover the amount could not be allowed to continue. It was further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, against the liability of Rs.250 lakhs, machineries and Salt Purification Plant of the value of Rs.286 lakhs was given in pledge but respondent No.2 Bank did not take any steps because of which the said property was lost for want of carte and precaution by the Bank and that since the Bank remained negligent, the petitioners who are the guarantors, stood discharged from their obligation by virtue of operation of Section 139 and Section 142 of the Contract Act. It was also submitted that notice under Section 13(2) was once already issued in the year 2012, therefore, such notice was not competent for the second time.
4.1 By pressing into service certain decisions including in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh [AIR 2001 SC 279] it was submitted that in the present case also, the decree was rendered unenforceable in view of passage of time and that the limitation provided under Page 5 of 17 HC-NIC Page 5 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 had expired.
4.2 The respondent filed their affidavit-in- reply and contested the petition by raising preliminary objection. Learned advocate Mr.Nandish Chudgar for the respondents submitted that the petitioners have remedy under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act by filing Appeal and that they are required to be relegated to the said remedy by this Court, instead of entertaining the present petition straightway filed by-passing the said remedy.
4.3 In furtherance of this submission, learned advocate relied on the following decisions - (i) United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010 8 SCC 110] [paras 55 and 56]; (ii) Om Shiv Lumbers Private Limited v. Corporation Bank being Special Civil Application No.2337 of 2017 [paras 4.2 to 7]; (iii) Smt.Jayshreeben Amitkumar Chauhan v. Jashwantlal Bhulabhai Parmar being Special Civil Application No.7676 of 2016 [paras 5.2 to 7]; (iv) Ketanbhai Umedsinh Padhiar v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited being Special Civil Application No.11377 of 2015 [paras 5.1 to 7], (v) MK Stone v. Dena Bank being Special Civil Application No.7172 of 2016 [paras 1 to 4]; (vi) Anand Niketan Education Trust v. HUDCO being Special Civil Application No.4694 of 2016 [paras 5 and 6],
(vii) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] [paras 37 and 38], (viii) Guimpex (Private Limited) v. The Deputy Director of Mines and Geology [MANU/AP/1101/2001] [para 21] and (ix) Neel Oil Page 6 of 17 HC-NIC Page 6 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT Industries v. Union of India being Special Civil Application No.1012 of 2014 [paras 37 to 43]. 4.4 Seeking to counter the submission on the score of alternative remedy by pressing into service decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mihir Textiles Limited v. Jt. Commissioner of Income Tax [2010 (3) GLH 15] it was submitted that alternative remedy was not the bar for invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court when the facts so warrant. For similar proposition, another decision of Division Bench of this Court in Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited v. District Consumer Redressal Forum, Bhuj [2011 (3) GLH 2286] was relied on. Decision in Prahladbhai Shivrambhai Patel v. Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance [1998 (1) GLH 95] and other decisions were relied on to emphasise the submission that the Court may exercise the writ jurisdiction notwithstanding availability of the alternative remedy. It was contended that the notice could be said to be without jurisdiction.
4.5 By pressing into service decisions in N.K. Karangia v. State of Gujarat [2012 (5) GLR 4296], it was submitted that once the petition is admitted, plea about availability of alternative remedy could not be entertained. In order to support the contention that where the goods lost due to Bank's negligency, surety would be discharged to the extent of the security lost, decision in State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan Rangnath Raja [AIR 1980 SC 1528] as well as decision in State of M. P. v. Kaluram [AIR 1967 SC 1105], and still another decision in Amrit Lal Page 7 of 17 HC-NIC Page 7 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT Goverdhan Lalan (dead) by his legal representative v. State Bank of Travancore [AIR 1968 SC 1432] were relied on, on the aspect of guarantors' rights and liabilities, decision in Industrial Investment Bank of India v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala [(2009) 9 SC 478] was relied on. Also relied on decision in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India [AIR 2004 SC 2371] for what was laid down in paragraphs 59, 60 and 64 of the judgment.
5. Now, Section 17 of the Act which is an alternative remedy of appeal, reads as under.
"17. Application against measures to recover secured debts.- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken:
PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.
(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.
(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-
section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
Page 8 of 17HC-NIC Page 8 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order, -
(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and
(b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and
(c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.
(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub- section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt.
(4A) Where -
(i) any person, in any application under sub- section 91), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy, -
(a) has expired or stood determined; or
(b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or Page 9 of 17 HC-NIC Page 9 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT
(c) is contrary to terms or mortgage; or
(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act; and
(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-
clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
(5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application:
PROVIDED that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any part to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made thereunder."
5.1 There is thus no gainsaying that Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act provides for a statutory remedy of Appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. It is a Page 10 of 17 HC-NIC Page 10 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT statutory alternative recourse available. The petitioners are the 'aggrieved person' within the meaning for the purpose of Section 17 of the Act.
5.2 It was the submission that the impugned notices were without jurisdiction, which could not be countenanced. The petitioners may have several grounds to challenge to be considered in accordance with law in respect of the impugned notices which are issued under the SERFAESI Act, because of the said grounds raised, it could not be said that the notices were without jurisdiction. The Bank was entitled to invoke the provisions of the SERFAESI Act to recover the debt. The merits in law in Bank's action cannot be equated with absence or otherwise of the jurisdiction to take such action. Merely because certain grounds are raised to challenge notices under Section 13(2) of the SERFAESI Act, it is not possible to conclude that the action was without jurisdiction. The Bank was empowered to invoke the jurisdiction of the Act, therefore the plea could not be countenanced that on the ground of Bank's action being without jurisdiction, the writ petition was required to be entertained directly eventhough the petitioner has a remedy as stated above under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act.
5.3 Various contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners about the legality of the notices, about the Bank's conduct or about the discharge of the petitioners - guarantors or sureties are the questions which could be agitated before the Debts Recovery Page 11 of 17 HC-NIC Page 11 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT Tribunal in the alternative remedy of Appeal before it. These are the questions which require factual inquiry and leading of evidence which could be better done in the appeal proceedings before the Tribunal. In that view also, the remedy of Appeal is proper, efficacious and appropriate remedy, required to be resorted to by the petitioners. Though the prayers are couched in different language, they all are centripetal in nature to the validity of notices under Section 13(2) of the SERFAESI Act, for which there is a specific statutory alternative efficacious remedy with the petitioner under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act.
5.4 It is a cardinal principle that the High Court would be loath to exercise discretion in favour of entertaining a writ petition where the Legislature has provided alternative statutory remedy. In the present case, a special forum is available in form of Debts Recovery Tribunal where appeal would lie. In the matters involving commercial disputes, it is trite that rule of availing alternative remedy should be adhered to steadfast. The principle on this aspect is unequivocal.
6. In Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill [(2009) 8 SCC 366], the Apex Court held that remedy by way of appeal under Section 17 is available not only upto the stage referable to Section 13(4), but even in respect of measures taken post- 13(4) stage. In the present case, the stage at which the petitioner is beset with, is such stage.
Page 12 of 17HC-NIC Page 12 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT 6.1 In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 2 SCC 782], the Supreme Court has stated that the measures under Section 14 constitutes the action taken after the stage of Section 13(4) and a remedy of appeal under Section 17 would be available. In that case, refusal by the High Court to entertain the writ petition was held to be fully justified.
6.2 In Satyawati Tondon (supra) the Court observed in paragraph 17 that the party must exhaust the remedy under Section 17. it was further observed, "the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute."
6.2.1 The Apex Court stated, "...despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. It is hoped and trusted that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection."
Page 13 of 17HC-NIC Page 13 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT 6.3 Lastly coming to the submission that once the petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, such proposition has not been accepted by the Apex Court. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] it was ruled by the Court with respect to the aspect of maintainability of the petition under Article 226 that its dismissal after admission is not barred on the ground of existence of alternative remedy. Dealing with the case under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Supreme Court ruled that where no retrenchment as proposed had been taken place, the writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court. Reasoning also that there were questions of fact involved to be established, the Supreme Court found the petition to be at a premature stage in wake of alternative remedy available.
6.4 It was held that dismissal of the petition would be permissible eventhough rule nisi was issued or interim orders were passed. The Apex Court observed and held thus, " ... ... ... it is neither the legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that in the 'head note' of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that "petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal". But it has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court. The relevant paragraph 2 of the decision reads thus:
(Suresh Chandra Tewari Case (1998) 6 SCC 549, AIR
331), Page 14 of 17 HC-NIC Page 14 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT "2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question, as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore, before approaching this Court the petitioner should have approached the appellate authority. Though there is much substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having regard to the fact that the petition has been entertained and an interim order passed".
(emphasis supplied) Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided by a writ-Court. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court has entertained a writ-petition albeit wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner." (Para 38) 6.5 The above dictum of law by the Apex Court completely takes care of and answers the submission on behalf of the petitioners that as rule is issued in the petitions, alternative remedy aspect was not permissible to be urged. Looking to the settled proposition of law on this count as emanating from aforementioned decisions, kind of contentions and the nature of of dispute, appeal under Section 17 of the Act is proper remedy.
7. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, only on the ground that the petitioners have got alternative statutory remedy as above, these Page 15 of 17 HC-NIC Page 15 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT petitions, without entering into any other aspects of merits of either side, are not entertained. The petitioners are relegated to approach Debts Recovery Tribunal by preferring an Appeal under Section 17 of the SERFAESI Act.
8. The petitioners as well as respondents, are at liberty to raise all their contentions in the appeal proceedings as may be available in law.
9. The impugned notice issued on 16th November, 2015 and the petitions were filed on 23rd December, 2015 and this Court granted interim order directing that there shall be no further steps pursuant to the impugned notice, which relief has continued so far. In this view, it is observed while dismissing the petitions as above, that if the petitioners file Appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within a period of six weeks from today, the same shall be accepted by the Tribunal.
9.1 As the interim relief was granted and continued during the pendency of the present petitions, the same is ordered to be further continued for a period of six weeks or till the date when the Appeals, if any, preferred by the petitioners are placed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal for the first time, whichever is earlier.
10. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into merits of the case of the either side. If the Appeals are filed, the Tribunal shall decide the same in accordance with law and on the basis of evidence Page 16 of 17 HC-NIC Page 16 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017 C/SCA/419/2016 CAV JUDGMENT adduced.
11. Petitions are dismissed subject to above permission and directions. Rule stands discharged accordingly in each of the petition.
(N.V.ANJARIA, J.) Anup Page 17 of 17 HC-NIC Page 17 of 17 Created On Mon Oct 02 03:13:43 IST 2017