Allahabad High Court
Smt. Vrinda Gujarati And Others vs Bareilly Development Authority And ... on 14 May, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997ALL107, AIR 1997 ALLAHABAD 107, 1997 ALL. L. J. 543, 1996 (2) UPLBEC 1064, 1996 (3) ALL WC 1737, 1996 (2) ALL RENTCAS 383
Author: R.K. Mahajan
Bench: R.K. Mahajan
ORDER
1. These two writ petitions are being disposed of by an order as we would like to lay down the principle regarding the escalation of price with respect to the houses constructed by the Bareilly Development Authority and the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.
2. It is to be mentioned that social schemes for providing houses to various type of groups i.e. High Income Group (HIG); Middle Income Group (MIG) and Lower Income Group (LIG) have been evolved. The houses are constructed by the State functionaries after acquiring the land. Since the citizens are not able to construct the houses on account of so many factors, the State wants through its instrumentalities to construct developed planned colonies of houses at reasonable rate and also to fulfil the obligation to provide shelter, under the Constitution of India.
3. The question which has been cropped up for consideration is that much lime is elapsed between the registration of the applications for allotment of houses and the actual construction and delivery of possession thereafter. It is often seen that tentative period mentioned is three or five years but in actual practice, it takes long period ranging from five to ten years or so. The question which arises that who should be responsible for the escalation of prices which occurred on account of inordinate delay. The tentative period mentioned is three or five years. The citizen, in the ordinary course of thing cannol be made to suffer for the negligence of the performance of duties in the construction of the houses. Reasonable period of delay in some circumstances, if the authorities jusified, can be accepted as a valid explanation for the delay caused. It is within the special knowledge of the authorities who are instrumentalities of the State to explain otherwise instrumentalities of the State as well as other functionaries would be liable for acts of misfeasance in the execution of the project. The negligence concept recently has been expanded by the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, See (1994) 1 SCC 243 : (AIR 1994 SC 787), to such extent that the authorities had been made liable for the misfeasance of the duties and they are liable to pay compensation. The concept has been further expanded that the State and its instrumentality would be liable for the illegal acts done by its function-aries. If the aulhorities failed to justify the circumstances or causes which lay to delay, they would not be discharging the onus of proof under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. It isexpected that the instrumemality of the State should have performed the duties within reasonable time, and reasonableness principle has been expanded to the performance of contractual statutory duties.
4. A judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution of India and the contracts which originate from the statutes or rules, can be subject to the judicial review. Recently this aspect was examined in the case of L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, 1995 4 JT (SC) 366 : (AIR 1995 SC 1811). We would like to quote two clauses quoted in paragraphs 37 and 38 at page 390 (of JT (SC) : (at p. 1825 Paras 36 and 37) as under:--
"The purpose of contract law is not simply to create conditions of liabiliiy but also to respond to the social process of promising."
"Over the last fifteen years, however, there have been slrong indications that the principle of unconscionabilily authorises a review of ele-ments well beyond unfair surprise, including, in appropriate cases, fairness of terms."
5. So taking into consideration, the Supreme Court in the judgment held that even clause of the contract is unconstitutional and unreasonable, it can be subject to the judicial review. It was further observed that even in contractual relations the public authority must have constitutional conscience and it must meet the lest of Article 14, and judicial review strikes an arbitrary action. Without quoting in extenso, the authority has to act under the "Rule of Law' and since the judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution, the aulhorities have to act fairly and reasonably and its act is subject to scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
6. The examination of the escalation also came into consideration in Indore Development Authority v. Smt. Sadhana Agrawal, (1995) 3 JT (SC) 1 : (1995 AIR SCW 1613), and in mis case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court has a power to go into the fairness of the prices if the same are arbitrary. This question was also examined in Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain, (1994) 6 JT (SC) 292 : (AIR 1995 SC 1). In this judgment, the Supreme Court observed that iherc was no inordinate delay between the draw of lots and the despatch of allotment-cum-demand letter as it took hardly three months. Considering the ratio of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), when there can be judicial review of the contractual clauses and fairness price, it would be unfair and unjust on the part of the authorities to go on escalating the price without any rhyme or reason and justification for the same.
7. Writ Petition No. 36735 of 1995 relaies to Bareilly Development Authority. The petitioners have filed this writ petition praying that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the recovery proceedings and citation dated 4/5-12-1995 contained in Annexure-14 to the writ petition. It was further prayed that the recovery proceedings may be quashed.
8. It appears that the Bareilly Development Authority is an autonomous body and creation of statutes. It is instrumentality of State. In May 1990, the respondent No. I floated a housing scheme namely Pushpanjali Deluxe and Kusumanjali Deluxe four storeycd apartment housing scheme. Both the schemes were meant for citizens of middle income group. The covered area of Pushpanjali Deluxe Apartment was 67.85 sq. metres and the costs of ground floor, first floor and second floor and third floor apartment are Rs. 2,50,000/-; Rs. 2,37,000/-; Rs. 2,25,000/- and Rs. 2,15,000/- respectively whereas the covered area of Kusumanjali Deluxe four storeyed apartment was 57.10 sq. metres and the costs of ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor are Rs. 2,10,000/-: 2,00,000/-; Rs. 1,90,000/- and Rs. 1,80,000/- respectively. The Development Authority proposed to construct 40 flats in Pushpanjali and 52 flats in Kusumanjali Deluxe. Prior to May 1990, the respondents authority had advertised the scheme and the costs of flats in Pushpanjali as well as Kusumanjali scheme were much less than the costs shown in the advertisement. According to the brochure the aforesaid Housing Scheme is a self-financing scheme wherein the allottees were to pay the costs of the houses in quarterly instalments. The aforesaid scheme was formulated for the persons of middle income group. The allotment of houses was to be made by draw of lottery. The houses were to be given to the allottee on a lease of 90 years and the lease rent was payable al the rate of 10% of the total costs of the land. The authority reserved the right to amend any term and condition of the scheme till the time of allotment.
9. The petitioners belong to middle income group and have limited resources, the scheme announced by respondent No. 1 appeared to be within their reach and means, the petitioners after depositing the requisite registration fee of Rs. 21,000/- each submitted the application for allotment of flats in Kusurnanjali in Priyadarshni Nagar, Bareilly.
10. The allotment of apartment was made on 25-2-91 by draw of lottery. The respondent No. 1 vide allotment letters dated 10/12-12-1991 informed the petitioners that they have been allotted a flat each in Kusumanjali Self financing Scheme Yojna and the cost thereof would be Rs. 2,10,000/-. It was desired that each allottee has to deposit the allotment money of Rs. 21,000/- (10% of the costs of the house) within 30 days from the date of allotment. But later on after the allotment Rs. 71,000/- was raised i.e. from Rs. 2,10,000/- to Rs. 2,81,000/-. The petitioners being aggrieved by this escalation amount of Rs. 71,000/- approached this Court. Their grievance is that after the allotment Rs. 71,000/- cannot be increased. The petitioners further averred that they have paid five instalments as under:--
Ist instalment Rs. 33,600/- paid on 10-3-1992.
IInd instalment Rs. 33,600/- paid on 10-6-1992.
IIIrd instalment Rs. 33,600/- paid on 10-9-1992.
IVth instalment Rs. 33,600/- paid on 10-12-1992.
Vth instalment Rs. 33,600/- paid on 10-3-1993.
11. In short the grievance of the petitioners is that they have been discriminated in the charge of price. The action of respondent authority in charging Rs. 1,028A per square meter from an allottee of Pushpanjali scheme and Rs. 1,976/- per square meter from an allottee of Kusumanjali scheme is discriminatory and arbitrary and as such it is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, there is also discrimination in charging the costs of constructions i.e. Rs. 2,135/- per sq. meter for Pushpanjali scheme and Rs. 2,737/- per sq. meter for Kusumanjali scheme. The grievance of the petitioners further is that the covered area of a flat in Pushpanjali scheme in 67.85 sq. meters whereas in Kusumanjali scheme it is only 57.10 sq. meters. The flats in both the schemes are almost idenlical and the construction commenced at the same time. The allotment and possession in the said two schemes were made at the same time hence the price of a flat how assessed by respondents authority for a flat in Kusumanjali scheme having a lesser covcred area of 57.10 sq. meters in comparison to the price of a flat in Pushpanjali scheme having a covered area of 67.85 sq. meters and on the face of if shows that the subsequent demand of Rs. 82,782/- levied upon the petitioners is arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable inasmuch as the letters of allotment were issued on 10-12-1991 and the possession was delivered on 22-7-1993 increasing the price arbitrarily without any fault of the petitioners though they have been depositing the entire amount as stipulated.
12. The respondents have their own story to tell. It is alleged that the price was tentative and according to the area and increase in the costs of material, the total value of each flat is to be worked out. The price was initially increased. The possession was delivered only when they accepted the final cost. It is alleged that the cost was increased on account of so many factors and it is alleged that this matter cannot be agitated by means of the writ petition.
13. The facts of another writ petition No. 12116 of 1995 are these: It appears that some time in 1978-79, applications were invited for allotment of houses in lower income group and other groups by the respondents. At the time of floating the scheme, the approximate price of a flat was expected to be Rs. 18,000/- and Rs.20,000/-. The initial amount to be deposited was Rs. 3,000/- and the balance in 15 years i.e. in 180 monthly instalments which worked out to be equal instalment including interest at the rate of 8% and the amount of Rs. 145/- to Rs. 185/- per month. It was further mentioned that a flat would be consisting of two small rooms, a kitchen and bath room. It was further averred that the proper civic facility will be provided. The time schedule for the completion of the scheme was mentioned three years. The scheme was Tamna and it will be completed within three years.
14. It appears that underSection 28 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 notification for the said scheme was issued which is equivalent to Section 4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act proposing to acquire land. Notification of Section 32 of Adhiniyam, which is equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, took place on 17-8-1977. The possession of 56.08 acres was taken on 19-8-1979; 27-2-1982 and 31-3-1983. The scheme for registration was open from 26-12-1978 to 28-2-1979. Some exter-nal development in the scheme started in 1983. It may be mentioned that the constructions of the houses were to be started in phases and not in one go"
15. The grievance of the petitioner is that intially the value was fixed for a house at Rs. 18,000/- to Rs. 22,000/- and ultimately it has been enhanced from lime to time. On 28-10-1988, construction of 78 LIG houses were completed and the first allotment was made @ Rs. 67400/-per house. Again in 1991, costing of 60 LIG houses was sanctioned and its price was approved @ 91,600/-. On 26-5-1992 construction of 86 LIG houses were completed and the second allotment was made @ Rs. 1,05,000/- per house.
16. It may be mentioned that the award was given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 22-9-1986 whereas the judgment by the District Judge was given on 4-1 -1992.
17. The procedure for allotment of the houses was that after the registration of the applications and construction of the houses, there was drawal of lottery and allotment was made thereafter. The first allotment took place as mentioned and its price was worked out at Rs. 1,10,400/-. The second allotment took place on 26-5-1992 and its estimated price was Rs. 90,753.49 P. The third allotment took place and its price was worked out at Rs. 19008/-. The petitioner now alleges that the authority concerned has taken inordinate time to construct the house and the rate of interest has been increased from 8% to 13% and the number of instalments have been reduced from 125 to 82. Since the petitioners belong to lower income group, they cannot pay instalments at the rale of Rs. 1180/- or 1144/- or Rs. 1455/- per month and interest at the rate of 13%. The grievance of the petilioner is that the houses are not upto the standard as mentioned in the plan and instead of sewerage system, septic tanks system has been provided. They have challenged the citation of recovery enhancing the amount issued by the respondents. It is also alleged that the petitioners have made representation but of no avail. The petitioners have described the enhancement and recovery of the same as arbitrary and illegal.
18. The respondents have contested the matter and asserted that this matter is not entertainable in writ petition. It is alleged that the cost of the land was increased by the award of the District Judge and there was also increase in the price of the material. The respondents' described the enhance-ment of price as fair and just.
19. We would like to deal firstly the case of Smt. Vrinda Gujrati and others v. Bareilly Development Authority and others, regarding their relief entitlement. The learned counsel for the Development Authority-respondents has placed some material on record for justifying the price and delay. It may be mentioned that the scheme was a self-financing and according toctause 13 of the scheme the possession of the house shall be given to allottee only after the full amount has been deposited by him/her in self financing scheme. In case houses are ready before all the instalments are due, the allottee has to pay the balance instalments in lump-sum.
20. As mentioned earlier, the house would be given to the allottee under Clause-12 on a lease of 90 years and the lease rent shall be payable @ 10% of the total cost of the land. This scheme was floated somewhere in May, 1990 and the allotment letters were issued on 10/12-12-1991 after the draw of lot on 25-9-1991 and the possession was delivered to the petitioners on different dates i.e. on 2I-5-1994, 19-6-1993, 13-7-1994 and 25-6-1993 when the houses were ready. It means in 1991 by allolment tetters the petitioners paid instalments, as mentioned in the brochure on 10-3-1992, 10-6-1992, 10-9-1992, 10-12-1992 and 10-3-1993 consisting of Rs. 33,600/-. They also paid Rs. 21,000/- i.e. 10% of the cost of the house. At the time of registration the petitioners also paid the necessary amounts for registration of prospective allottees. As soon as the allolment is made and the petitioners have deposited the amount and the respondents were bound to deliver the possession according to terms and conditions of the brochure. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is no delay in delivery of possession and there is no increase in cost as explained in synopsis given to the Court. It is admitted fact that firstly four storeyed house was advised but later on it was converted into two storeyed on account of dispute with the contractor or some other difficulty. It is further submitted by him that there is increase in escalation of prices which was beyond the control of the respondent and at the time of the floating of scheme condition is mentioned in the brochure that estimated cost will be prepared by the committee consisting of expert etc. and price would be mentioned at the lime of allotment letter. Generally at the time of floating of advertisement the estimated cost of the house has been mentioned. In the brochure, area of house, size of rooms etc. were also mentioned.
21. Now coming to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the matter cannot be agitated by means of writ petition, we may point out that law in this regard is well settled. Undoubtedly, where the disputed questions of fact require investigation by the Court, the same cannot be gone into by writ Courts but where on the basis of facts on record only broad principles are required to be settled, writ Courts are not lugging behind in settling the principles. Therefore, in the instant case on the basis of facts on record we have to settle the broad principle and examine whether the price hike is reasonable or arbitrary and whether despite stay order of the Court interest can be charged and in self financing scheme registration fee also can be charged and the same have been answared by us mainly based on settled principle of law which can indeed be decided in writ jurisdiction.
22. It may be mentioned that the allottees deposited the instalments under the hope and trust that they will get the flats within the time schedule advertised at the initial stage. There may be certaincases where the allot tees might be residing in rented houses and they might have managed their financial positions in such a manner that after deposit of instalments, they will get flat of their own and thereafter they will be free from the payment of rent as then they will shift fromrented houses to allotted flats but on account of inordinate delay in delivery of possession of allotted flats, their financial calculations and legitimate expectations stand frustrated causing various types of financial losses to them. On the other hand once the authorities made offers and same were accepted by allottees with legitimate expectations, the statutory obligation cast upon the authorities is to complete the same within the time schedule mentioned in the offer and if they fail to discharge the same, the affected allottees are entitled to the interest for delayed delivery of possession, as the allottees have parted with the money which was earning interest. To that extent for the delayed period, the allottees are entitled to interest which will be in accordance with the principles of equity.
23. We are of the considered view that the petitioners are entitled to get 18% interest for the delayed delivery of the possession on the amount deposited by them till the actual date of delivery of possession. The interest would be given on the total amount from the date of last instalment deposited by them till the date of delivery of possession as the authorities also charge 18% interest on delay in deposit of instalment. They cannot make a turn about or blow hot and cold that they could not pay interest for the late delivery of possession. We are of the considered opinion that the respondent will have to pay interest @ 18% after one month of the issue of allotment letter which is reasonable period to complete the for-malities.
24. We issue direction that the interst at the rate of 18% be paid on the total amount deposited tncluding the registration fee and allowance of this amount be given in deduction of the price and to this extent recovery certificate has to be modified and direction is issued accordingly.
25. It has been contended by the counsel for the petitioner that there is extreme harshness regarding the barges of registration fee for execution of instrument for convening the title of the petitioners. Since the scheme is of self-financing nature and the petitioners contribute the entire money for the construction of the house in all reasonableness and fairness, the registration fee should be charged on the price of land and not on the price of the house and to this extent we issue, order that the registration fee is only payable and chargeable on the price of the land as the entire construction cost is contributed by the pelition-ers.
26. It is also contended that from the date of stay till stay is vacatedor final decision no interest can be charged pendente lite. This Court on 20-12-1995 granted stay of the recovery of the amount subject to petitioners depositing a sum of Rs. 45,000/- (Rs. forty five thousand) on or before 3lst January, 1996, the realisation of the rest of the amount shall remain stayed. Therefore, from the date of stay i.e. 20-12-1995 no interest can be charged so long the principal amount itself is not detennined finally and held payable by the Court, question of charging any interest thereon does not arise.
27. No doubt if the payability of the principal amount itself is arrested under the order of the Court dated 20-12-1995 no interest can be charged thereon for the period during which order of the Court dated 20-12-1995 remains operative. In Ramgopal v. State of U.P. 1992 All LJ 237, Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Hon'ble the Chief Justice Jeevan Reddy, as he then was (now a Judge of the Supreme Court) and Hon'ble Justice R. B. Mehrotra ruled that the word "payable" should be interpreted to mean "legally enforceable" and is not capable of any other interpretation due to the interim order passed by the Court staying the recovery. Thus the amount of licence fee was not legally enforceable against the petitioners, as the petitoners were saved from paying it due to the interim slay order passed by this Court.
28. Therefore, we are of the opinion that only when the principal amount becomes payable, after the decision of the Court and then the peti-
tioner becomes liable to pay interest from the date of the decision of the writ petition and not from the earlier date as the principal amount itself was under dispute and was not finally determined by the Court and thus its payability was arrested by the Court in passing the stay order. Hence, interest only can be charged on the principal amount after the determination by the Court but certainly not during the pendency of the petition i.e. from the date of stay order till either the stay order is vacated or petition is finally decided.
29. Similarly, in Slate of Rajasthan v. Ghosilal, AIR 1965 SC 1454, it is ruled that till the tax payable is ascertained by the authority concerned no tax can be said to be due, only till then a liability to be assessed to tax may be there. Thus, the question of paying any interest does not arise. This being so, if the payability is arrested there is no assessed sum on which the interest can be charged.
30. Recently the Apex Court in, J.K. Synthetics Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer. AIR 1994 SC 2393, ruled that "it is difficult to hold that the law envisages the assessee to predicate the final assessment and expect him to pay interest, that would be asking him to do the mere impossible."
31. Another Division Bench of this Court in C.M.W.P. No. 2007 of 1990 decided on 10-1-1996 Hindalco Industries Limited v. State of U.P. (Allahabad Weekly Cases Vol. 35 Part 13 Page 504) it is ruled that petitioner is not liable to pay interest from the date of interim order till it operates.
32. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the law requires that first the final order in respect of principal amount has to be passed and till the principal amounl is not determined and the stay granted on 20-12-1995 operates from this date no interesl can be charged as no finality is attached to the principal amounl w.e.f. 20-12-1995. Hence the principal amount itself being in dispute in this petition and its payability having been arrested by the order of this Court dated 20-12-1996, no question of charging any interest by the respondent arises thereon during pendente lite.
33. Shri Sudhir Jaiswal, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the possession was given with the conseni of the allotlees and after having complied the terms of the brochure. The liabilities have been fixed on the petitioners.
This argument is not tenable as there is delay in giving the possession to the petitioners and the petitioners are at the disadvantageous condition. They are at the receiving end. They accept whatever is offered under compulsion and necessity. But it does not mean that the Court cannot examine the fairness of the action of the respondent. The liability has gone to higher extent. The conditions and terms of the agreement can be examined and if they are found unconscionable, they can be struck down.
34. We arc also of the considered opinion that had the possession been given in time, the petitioners could have used the house and therefore, the respondents are liable to pay compensation at least to the tune of Rs. 10,000/- to the petitioners and issue direction that this amount be adjusted towards price.
35. We are also of the opinion that since the urea has been increased and there is no initiative of issuance of tetter of allotment and in the fact and circumstances of the case the hike in price is not justified and we allow the writ petition with the direction that recovery certificate is quashed and respondents are required to re-determine the price in view of the observations made above and to issue notice for the realisation of the amount afresh in the light of observations made.
36. Now coming over to writ petition No. 12116 of 1995 Radhika Vihar Nagrik Sudhar Samiti v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others. It is admitted fact that the possession had been taken of the land from 1979 to 1983 of 56.08 acres, as mentioned in earlier part of judgment. The submission of the counsel for the respondent Shri Pankaj Mittal is that delay took place in execution of project on account of financial loan which is sanctioned by the HUDCO and other financial institutions. It is further submitted by him that there was increase in the award given by the Special Land Acquisition Collector on 22-9-1986 by the District Judge dated 4-1-1992. Now it is settled taw that the allottees have to bear the price of the increase in compensation by judicial authorities as it is not within the control of the respondent. The increase has been shown in Annexure No. 7 of the synopsis. It comes to Rs. 55.01 paise per square yard. This matter was settled by the Apex Court recently in a case of Himachal Pradesh High Court regarding the payment of price of land by allottee.
37. In this case, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the project was to be completed within three years according to advertisement but it took inordinate delay and the price escalation was result of the delay. It is further submitted that it is not within their power now to pay five times increase in price and even that amount by less instalments.
38. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the increase in price has been justified in the synopsis. The date of allotments have been given in the earlier part of judgment i.e. which starts from 28-10-1988 and ended on 26-5-1992. Definitely there is inordinate delay in execution of project. The money of the petitioner was also blocked and in the legitimate expectation they may not have built any other house. In this case there is delay ranging between 12 years to 9 years from the date of taking possession. Even from external development there is delay of five years in first allotment and first allotment which took place in 1991 there is delay of eight years andnine years from IIIrd instalment i.e. 26-5-1992. The concept of this extreme inaction or say failure to perform the duly to complete the project has not been explained except that lot of money was blocked and the project could not have been completed and the authority has to depend on the loan.
39. So far enhancement of the compensation of the award is concerned it has no relevance as there was no stay order. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can cer-tainly go into the question of maladministration of the authorities and statutory negligence which relates to public functions and duties and it can correct the maladministration.
40. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the word "other purpose" has been used, which covers such occasions. Moreover Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta. (AIR 1994 SC 787) (supra), of course is a case of deficiency of services to the consumer but a very healthy principle was laid down of public accountability by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the changing society in order to correct administration and fix public accountability. It was laid down that action of public functionary should be for the sake of society, and if they arc arbitrary, capricious or oppressive, may harm an individual personally and they produce worse impact on the society and therefore it looses its individual char-
acter and assumes social significance.
41. So on this dictum which has been explained and discussed earlier to give a relief to the citizen against the misfeasance of performance of duiies. As mentioned earlier, the authorities are not absolute in powers and their inaction has to be regulated otherwise there would not be any con-trol in increase of price.
42. So we are of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case reasonable delay can be excused or condoned in executing the project. After giving allowance of reasonable time from the dale of taking possession as the prudent builders lake time, therefore, the respondent would be responsible for increase in the price and we give direction that the price would be re-determined after giving reasonable allowance.
43. We are further of the view that the petitioners are also entitled to interest on the registration amount given at the time of application. We have already given finding on the registration fees in Writ Petition No. 367.15 of 1995 and this would be als6 applicable in this case.
44. Before parting with the case, we would like to mention that in these cases Shri Ravikant learned senior counsel of this Court appeared as amicus curiae and enlightened this Court, by his able and valuable arguments, in arriving at the appropriate conclusions. We appreciate the assistance extended by Shri Ravikant and bring the same on record.
45. In view of the foregoing discussions and observations, both the petitions are remanded back to the authorities concerned for determining the reasonable price of the flats keeping in view the hike of price in the cost of land and building materials, labour charges and other miscellaneous expenses incurred on the construction of flats after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the allottees and thereafter to fix the fresh price of the flats in the light of observations made above so as to maintain the concept of transparency within three months and then to fix a reasonable time schedule for payment of the same and to give notices accordingly to the respective allottees. Thereafter in case the petitioners or allottees fail to pay the amount, the same may be realised in accordance with law along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
46. With these directions, both the petitions are disposed of finally.
47. Order accordingly.