Central Administrative Tribunal - Jabalpur
Hari Prasad Koli vs M/O Communications on 15 July, 2025
1 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014
Reserved
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR BENCH
JABALPUR
Original Applications Nos.200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014
Jabalpur, this Tuesday, the 15th day of July, 2025
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AKHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE SMT. MALLIKA ARYA, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
Hari Prasad Bariaya, Son of Shri Radhelal Baraiya, aged about 58
years, working as Part Time Gramin Dak Sewak (G.D.S.), Sub
Record Office, R.M.S., M.P. Mandal Itarsi, District Hoshangabad
(M.P.) - 461111, Resident of Gwal Toli, Hoshangabad, District
Hoshangabad (M.P.) - 461111.
-Applicant in OA 200/459/2014
Hari Prasad Koli, Son of Shri Biharilal Koli, aged about 50 years,
working as Waterman-cum-Farras, C.R.C., R.M.S., M.P. Mandal
Bhopal (M.P.) - 462012, Resident of House No.B/4, Bag
Umraodulla, Indra Colony, Bhopal (M.P.) - 462012.
-Applicant in OA 200/459/2014
(By Advocate - Shri N.K. Agrawal)
Versus
1. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Telecommunication,
Department of Posts, Dak Bhawan, Parliament Street, Sansad Marg,
New Delhi - 110001.
2. Chief Post Master General, M.P. Circle, Bhopal (M.P.) - 462012.
3. Director, Post Office Services (Head Quarter), Office of Chief
P.M.G., M.P. Circle, Bhopal (M.P.) - 462012.
- Common respondents Nos.1 to 3 in both OAs
4. Pradhan Abhilekh Adhikari, Rail Mail Service, M.P. Mandal,
Bhopal (M.P.) - 462001.
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2 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014
5. Sub Record Officer, S.R.O., R.M.S., M.P. Mandal, Itarsi, District
Hoshangabad (M.P.) - 461111.
- Respondents Nos.4 & 5 in OA 200/459/2014
4. Head Record Officer, Rail Mail Service, M.P. Mandal, Bhopal
(M.P.) - 462001.
5. Superintendent, R.M.S., M.P. Mandal, Bhopal (M.P.) - 462001.
- Respondents Nos.4 & 5 in OA 200/461/2014
(By Advocate -Shri D.S. Baghel in OA No.200/459/2014 and Shri
S.K. Patel, proxy counsel of Shri A.P. Khare in OA
No.200/461/2014)
(Date of reserving the order:- 02.07.2025)
COMMON ORDER
By Akhil Kumar Srivastava, JM;
The applicants are seeking direction to the respondents for regularisation of their services from their initial date of appointment in any Group 'D' post with all consequential benefits. Since the issue involved in both these Original Applications is identical, we propose to decide both these OAs by way of a common order.
2. The applicant in OA 200/459/2014 states that he is working as Part Time Gramin Dak Sewak in the office of respondent No.5 since 10.07.1986. The applicant in OA 200/461/2014 is working as Waterman-cum-Farras in the office of City Scrutiny Office, Bhopal since 02.02.1987. Their name was duly sponsored by the Page 2 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 3 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 Employment Exchange. They submit that they are discharging their duties for eight hours in every day and continuing since 1986 and 1987 respectively without any break. The circular dated 28.04.1997 issued by Assistant Director General (SPN), Department of Posts provides that part time casual labours are to be provided full time employment. Therefore, as per this circular, the applicants are entitled to be provided full time employment. In a similar circumstances, the Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal vide order dated 02.07.2012 passed in OA No.344/2011 has directed to regularize the services of employees of Part Time Sweeper/Waterman.
Further, as per circular dated 12.04.1991 (Annexure A-6), the applicants are entitled for permanent status and regularization as they have rendered 240 days service in a year without any break.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the documents available on record.
4. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that similar issue has recently been decided by this Tribunal in OA No.200/537/2014 on 24.06.2025. They state that since the relief sought for in these OAs is identical to that of OA No.200/537/2014, Page 3 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 4 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 the applicants are not entitled for any benefit in terms of the order passed in the aforesaid OA.
5. On perusal of the order passed in OA No.200/537/2014 (supra), we agree that the claim of the applicants is exactly similar to the prayer made by the applicant in OA No.200/537/2014 (supra). While declining the relief to regularise the services of the applicant therein, this Tribunal vide order dated 24.06.2025 has observed as under:
"5. The issue of absorption/regularisation of temporarily engaged casual/daily rated employees has been extensively dealt with by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Secretary, State of Karnataka & others vs. Uma Devi(3) and others. The relevant paragraphs of the above judgment for the purposes of the issue involved in this Original Application are reproduced as under:
"44. The concept of "equal pay for equal work" is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us Page 4 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 5 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after Dharwad decision(1990)2 SCC 396 the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arm's length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable Page 5 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30'
6 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularised since the decisions in Dharwad, (1990) 2 SCC 396 Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 Jacob (1991) 1 SCC 28 and Gujarat Agricultural University (2001) 3 SCC 574 and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularised. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. [See Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service 1985 AC 374, National Page 6 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 7 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan (1998) 7 SCC 66 and Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 3 SCC 485] There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the department concerned while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after Dharwad decision (supra), Though, there is a case that the State had made regularisations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularisations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some cases by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularised in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularisation of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to Page 7 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 8 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.
48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the department concerned on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled."
6. However, in paragraph 53 of the judgment it has been clarified that the cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V.Narayanappa AIR 1967 SC 1071 and R.N.Nanjundappa (1972) 1 SCC 409 and Page 8 of 10 ANUPAM2025.07.16 11:17:59 MISHRA +05'30' 9 OA 200/459/2014 & 200/461/2014 B.N.Nagarajan (1979)4 SCC 507, of duly qualified persons against duly sanctioned post have been made, and such employees have worked for 10 years or more, without intervention of the orders of the court or of the Tribunals, the Union of India, the State Government and their instrumentalities have been directed to take steps to regularise, as a one time measures, the services of such irregularly appointed persons. sons. Para 53 of the said order read thus:
"53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071 R.N. Nanjundappa (1972) 1 SCC 409 and B.N. Nagarajan (1979)4 SCC 507, and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one- time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme".
7. In the aforesaid judgment in Uma Devi's case (supra) in paragraph 54 has already been clarified that all those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in the said decision, or in which direction any counter to what has been held in the decision, shall stand deleted of their status as a precedent.
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8. Further referring to its earlier decision in B.N. Nagarajan vs. State of Karnatak, (1979) 4 SCC 509 with approval, it was observed that only such procedural irregularities are curable, which are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments, however, where rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularization is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. Keeping in view the proposition initiated above in the above decision, it has been observed that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection, which does not go to route of progress, can be regularised and that it alone can be regularised.
9. No relevant order/letter/document was enclosed to substantiate the claim of the applicant for regularisation. The applicant has also not annexed any appointment order to establish that he was appointed by a competent authority against the sanctioned vacancy as on 1989. Also there is no record to suggest that his engagement was against a duly sanctioned post, which was vacant at that time. The fact that the applicant has not produced any document to establish that his engagement at the inception was as per constitutional scheme by a competent authority against the sanctioned vacancy, the respondent cannot be compelled to regularise his services.
10. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in this Original Application. The same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to costs."
6. In view of the aforesaid position, both these Original Applications are dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Mallika Arya) (Akhil Kumar Srivastava)
Administrative Member Judicial Member
am
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