Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rustamji Institute Of Technology vs Kamlish Kumar Gupta on 6 March, 2026
Author: Anand Pathak
Bench: Anand Pathak, Anil Verma
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
WRIT APPEAL NO.319/2026
RUSTAMJI INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY THROUGH BOARD OF
GOVERNORS/ CHAIRMAN, BSF ACADEMY, GWALIOR (M.P.)
Vs.
KAMLESH KUMAR GUPTA AND OTHERS
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APPEARANCE:
Shri Praveen Kumar Newaskar - Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Prashant Sharma and Shri Prashant Kaurav - Advocates for
respondent No.1 on Caveat.
Shri Ankur Mody - Additional Advocate General for respondents
no.2 and 3/ State.
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JUDGMENT
{Delivered on 06th March, 2026} Per: Justice Anand Pathak,
1. The instant Writ Appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is filed being crestfallen by order dated 05/01/2026 passed in Writ Petition No.45491/2025 by the learned Single Judge whereby petition preferred by the petitioner (respondent No.1) was allowed.
2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that appellant is Rustamji Institute of Technology situate at BSF Academy, Tekanpur, Gwalior and respondent No.1 is employee of appellant/ Institute. Before the Writ Court, respondent No.1 challenged the order dated 08/11/2025 whereby his services were terminated because of the reasons assigned in the impugned order. Appellant/ Institute is an Aided Institute and 2 as submitted, service conditions of respondent No.1 (petitioner before the Writ Court) are governed by the College Code Statue.
3. Appellant/ Institute is affiliated with the "Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidhyalaya", therefore, as per submission of learned counsel for the appellant, his service conditions were governed by College Code Statute No.30 i.e. Rajiv Gandhi Proudhyogiki Vishwavidyalaya (College Code Statute), 2007. Said College Code was formulated in exercise of powers under Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1998.
4. Learned Writ Court considered the rival submissions and held that the Writ Petition preferred by respondent No.1/employee against appellant/ Institute is maintainable and on merits it is found that without holding an enquiry only on the basis of show cause notice and its reply, services of respondent No.1 were terminated and the same are stigmatic in nature, therefore, termination order was set aside and appellant/ Institute was directed to reinstate respondent No.1 on his post and liberty was granted to take action in accordance with law. Therefore, appellant/ Institute is before this Court in Writ Appeal.
5. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant/ Institute that appellant/ Institute is a Self Financed Educational Private Institute as per the AICTE norms. The Institute is affiliated to Rajiv Gandhi Proudhyogiki Vishwavidhyalaya, Bhopal, therefore, State/ Central Government has no authority to interfere in the service affairs of the employees of the appellant/ Institute, therefore, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by respondent No.1/ employee was not maintainable.
6. It is further submitted that since respondent No.1 was involved in a 3 financial fraud of overlapping service for a period of 08 days at RJIT BSF Academy Gwalior and J.P. University Guna, therefore, an Inquiry was conducted by the Internal Board Officers of RJIT and it was found that respondent No.1 committed financial fraud and drawn salary from both the Institutions i.e. (RJIT BSF Academy Gwalior and J.P. University Guna). Thereafter, show cause notices were issued to respondent No.1 and reply thereof were filed by him and after considering the same, services of respondent No.1 were terminated. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the said aspects and passed the impugned order setting aside the termination order. He prays for setting aside the impugned order.
7. Learned counsel for respondent No.1/ employee submits that writ petition filed by him was maintainable because his service conditions are governed by Statute 20 of College Code and the College Code is framed by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 38 read with Section 37 of Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1998 and appellant/ Institute without following due process of law, terminated his service, which is against law. The writ Court after considering the attending facts and circumstances of the case, passed the impugned order, which needs no interference.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. Following are the dates and events material for adjudication of this case:-
Dates Events
01/07/05 Respondent No.1 was appointed
as Associate Professor in
4
appellant/ Institute,
06/07/10 Respondent No.1 joined at J.P.
University, Guna,
13/07/2010 Respondent No.1 resigned from
appellant/ Institute,
11/10/13 Respondent No.1 was appointed
as Associate Professor in
appellant/ Institute and his
services were regularized in the
year 2015,
20/09/2024 Appellants hold an inquiry with
regard to overlapping service of
respondent No.1 for period of 8
days from 06/07/2010 to
13/07/2010 as respondent No.1
though joined at J.P. University
and received salary from
appellant/ Institute.
Although on 20/09/2024,
respondent No.1 was given
charge of Principal with specific
direction to look at academic of
respondent No.3/ College,
02/04/25 Charge of Principal has been
taken from respondent No.1,
25/09/2025 A show cause notice has been
issued against respondent No.1
alleging that he misguided the
Board of Governors and
provided wrong advise. Due to
which three academic branches
were closed and 08 faculties
were terminated, however, later
on, their termination was
revoked. However, legal cases
were initiated against those
faculties.
08/10/25 Respondent No.1 submitted its
reply denying all the allegations.
5
Further, a defamation case was
filed by respondent No.1 against
the faculty.
14/10/2025 Appellant/ Institute issued
another show cause notice
against respondent No.1
alleging that he filed defamation
case against the faculty namely
(Yograja Sharma) by misusing
the documents of appellant/
Institute, which is against the
policy of Institute.
28/10/2025 Respondent No.1 submitted
specific reply elaborating all the
allegations against the faculty
Yograj Sharma.
08/11/25 Appellant/ Institute passed order
dated 08/11/2025 terminating
the services of respondent No.1.
10. So far as first question regarding maintainability of writ petition is concerned, position of law is discussed by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar Ramkrishna Jodh Vs. A.L. Pande, 1970 MPLJ
983.St., wherein it has been held that:-
"8. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the "'College Code" has been made by the University in exercise of statutory power conferred by s. 32 and under s. 6(6) of the Act. It is also conceded on behalf of the respondents that the "College Code" is intra vires of the powers of the University contained in s. 32 read with s. 6(6) of the Act. In our opinion, the provisions of Ordinance 20, otherwise called the "College Code' have the force of law. It confers legal rights on the teachers of the affiliated colleges and it is not a correct proposition to say that the "College Code" merely regulates the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. We do not agree 6 with the High Court that the provisions of the "College Code" constitute power of management. On the contrary we are of the view that the provisions of the "College Code" relating to the pay scale of teachers and their security of tenure properly fall within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act. It is true that Clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed in Sch. A but that does not mean that teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the Governing Body of the College. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the provisions of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers service conditions and, as we have already pointed out, the provisions of the "College Code" in this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the "College Code" creates legal rights in favour of teachers, of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous.
9. It was urged on behalf of the appellant in the next place that there was violation of the procedure prescribed in Clause 8 (vi)(a) of the College Code and the order of the Governing Body dated June 30, 1960 terminating the appellant's services was illegal and ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of writ in the nature of certiorari. Counsel for the respondents contended that there was no violation of the procedure prescribed under Clause 8(vi)(a) of the College Code and that the order of the Governing Body dated June 30, 1960 was not defective in law. Since the question has not been investigated by the High Court we consider that it is necessary that this case should go back on remand to the High Court for deciding the question whether there was a violation and whether the order of procedure prescribed under the Clause 8(vi)(a) of the College Code and whether the order of the Governing Body dated June 30,1960 is consequently illegal and ultra vires and whether the 7 appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."
11. The judgment of A.L. Pandey (supra) has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of St. Mary's Education Society and Another Vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and Others, (2023) 4 SCC 498, in which question was raised regarding any Aided Private School affiliated with CBSE falls within the ambit of 'State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. After discussing the issue in detail, the Apex Court summed up the conclusion as under:-
"75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:
75.1 An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
75.2 Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article
226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of "State" within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action 8 complained of has public law element.
75.3 It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a "public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.
75.4 Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether "A" or "B" is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered by the court. But such interference will be on the 9 ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty.
75.5 From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character."
12. Later on, in the case of Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi Vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma and Others, (2024) 16 SCC 598, the Apex Court has discussed the issue and held as under:-
"57. In view of the aforesaid, nothing more is required to be discussed in the present appeals. We are of the view that the High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondents herein holding that the appellant Society is "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the school run by the appellant Society imparts education. Imparting education involves public duty and therefore public law element could also be said to be involved. However, the relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant Society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents."
13. Another question involved in the case is whether service conditions of respondent No.1/ employee are governed by the College Code or not. Clause 12 sub clause 14(a)(iv) of the College Code provides that:-
" Clause 12:- xxxxxxxx
(iv) Appointment, promotion, suspension and punishment of the teachers of the college and any other action affecting their services.10
Provided that the Governing Body of "Grantee College" Shall take these actions in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ashasakiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon tatha Anya Karmchariyon Ke Vetan Ka Sandaya) Adhiniyam, 1978 and the rules framed there under.
Provided further that the services of a teacher of no-grantee college other than the one appointment on the in a leave vacancy or temporarily for a specified period shall not be terminated for any reason whatsoever without the prior approval of the Executive Council.
Provided also that the power of appointment shall be subject of the provision of clause (a) sub-statute (1) of Statute 10 of this Statute."
14. Similarly, Clause 14 of the College Code provides that:-
"14. The Governing Body may make rules consistent with the Provisions of the Adhiniyam, Statutes, Ordinances with regard to:
(a) the procedure to be observed at its meetings.
Provided that decision affecting the service conditions of teachers shall not be taken at a meeting of the Governing Body in which at least one teacher representative and one University representative are not present"
15. Clause 20 of the College Code provides for the procedure for appointment of teacher in the college whereas Chapter VI, Clause 34 to 36 provides for procedure for taking disciplinary action against the teachers of the college.
16. From perusal of the aforesaid clauses of the College Code, it is clear that appellant/ Institute is an Aided institute and affiliated with the Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidhyalaya, Bhopal and service conditions of respondent No.1/ employee are governed by College Code Statute No.30 i.e. Rajiv Gandhi Proudhyogiki Vishwavidyalaya (College Code Statute), 2007. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A.L. Pande (supra), writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by respondent No.1 was 11 very well maintainable. Learned Writ Court rightly passed the impugned order and held the writ petition maintainable.
17. The departmental authority, while passing the order of termination of services, committed a serious irregularity by not affording opportunity of hearing to respondent No.1. It is a settled principle of law that any authority exercising quasi-judicial powers, including departmental authority, is bound to adhere to the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem (no one shall be condemned unheard). In the present case, the departmental authority without giving opportunity of hearing to the delinquent or conducting departmental enquiry to explain his part of contention behind the lapse as alleged against him, terminated services of respondent No.1. Such action renders the order vitiated, illegal, and unsustainable in law.
18. The learned Writ Court considered this aspect and rightly held that departmental authority violated the principle of natural justice. However, when inquiry is vitiated then it ought to be started from the stage where deficiency in procedure is noticed. This aspect is discussed by the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others Vs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530. Relevant discussion is reproduced below:-
"16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary authority, for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide: ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya Vs. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls, (2002) 10 SCC 293; U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. Vs. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264; and Union of India Vs. Y.S. 12 Sandhu, AIR 2009 SC 161).
17. The second question involved herein, is also no longer res integra. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity, to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated, depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine, the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the aforementioned grounds.
18. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; Union of India Vs. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 180; Prohibition & Excise Department Vs. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28; and Ministry of Defence Vs. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 13 2012 SC 2250)".
19. Later on, the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank and others Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 also discussed the issue wherein guideline is given in following manner:
"8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand."
20. Therefore, order impugned deserves to be modified in view of the above settled proposition of law, hence, matter deserves to be remanded back from the stage where it got vitiated. Therefore, the impugned order dated 08/11/2025 passed by Additional Director of Appellant No.1/Institute whereby respondent No.1 was punished with dismissal from service, is hereby set aside and the order passed by learned Writ Court is modified to the effect that matter is relegated back to the departmental authority to conduct departmental enquiry, if required in accordance with law. The departmental authority shall provide due opportunity of hearing to respondent No.1/ employee and thereafter on the basis of documents and evidence available on record, ensure passing of appropriate order as per law.
21. Till conclusion of inquiry is completed, respondent No.1 shall not be 14 assigned any duty and shall be treated to be placed under suspension. After completion of inquiry, his fate shall be decided as per outcome of the inquiry.
22. All exercise shall be done by the authority within four months from the date of passing of this order and neither appellants/ authorities nor respondent No.1/ employee shall prolong the proceedings and shall not take any undue adjournments and same shall be decided without being influenced by any observation of this Court. Consequential benefits shall be considered after fate of departmental enquiry, if respondent No.1 is found entitled to. Order of learned Writ Court is modified to this extent.
23. Writ appeal stands allowed and disposed of in above terms.
(ANAND PATHAK) (ANIL VERMA)
vc JUDGE JUDGE
VARSHA
Digitally signed by VARSHA CHATURVEDI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=df59fbf0f5c7485addc8affe3edf20e67 CHATURVE d11d7f91045d81139f6792fbd4ae91f, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID - 7065094, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, DI serialNumber=652fe82bc5cae8153a1e34c3b8e fc095f5a0d144b089415f31342d1c8e2d3139, cn=VARSHA CHATURVEDI Date: 2026.03.07 11:33:56 +05'30'