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[Cites 9, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sharomani Gurdwara Parbandhak ... vs Nahar Singh And Ors. on 26 May, 1997

Equivalent citations: (1997)117PLR123

Author: S.C. Malte

Bench: S.C. Malte

JUDGMENT
 

S.C. Malte, J.
 

1. All these three Civil Revisions are being disposed of by this common judgment because these are against the same order passed by the District Judge, Bhatinda, dated 15.10.1980, while exercising the powers of executing Court as per Section 12(x) of the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925. All these petitions involve common questions of law and facts.

2. Facts giving rise to these revision petitions can be briefly summaried as follows:

The petitioner before me is the Sikh Gurdwara Dera Bhai Ram Singhwala, Kot Fatta, District Bathinda. The papers before me indicate that steps were taken before a Tribunal established under the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925, for an adjudication that certain property including the agricultural land involved in this litigation was the property of Sikh Gurdwara. Papers before me do not clearly indicate the nature of litigation thus initiated. However, the decree which ultimately came to be passed in suit under Section 25-A of the said Act, indicates that during that litigation before the Tribunal, there was a settlement between the two contesting parties. The contesting parties in that litigation were present petitioner/s on one hand and on the other hand, Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh who are impleaded in these revision petitions as respondents. It is pertinent to note that, admittedly, other respondents, except Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh, were not parties to the aforesaid litigation that had commenced before the Tribunal. The decree thus came to be passed in the suit was sought to be executed by filing an execution before the District Judge. It may be mentioned that as per Section 12(x) of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, the decrees or orders passed by the Tribunals under the said Act are to be executed by filing a petition before the District Judge, and the District Judge would execute it as if a decree passed by such Court. The prayer made in the execution petition was for putting the petitioners in actual physical possession of certain agricultural land as covered by the execution petition. The third persons, who are respondents respectively in these three petitions, raised an objection to the handing over of the physical possession. In nutshell, their contention was that they are tenants in possession since many years. Respondent Nahar Singh (objector) contended that he was inducted as tenant by Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh Since 1971. Respondent Jalaur Singh (objector) claimed that he was thus indicated on some piece of land since 1969. Respondent Gurjant Singh (objector) claimed that he was thus inducted by Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh since prior to 1962.

3. In view of the objections thus raised by the persons who claimed to be tenant in possession of the land of which possession was sought by the petitioners, the District Judge proceeded to consider the matter.

4. Before the District Judge, the learned counsel for the present petitioners conceded that these objector/respondents appeared to be tenant on the land in question. The contention by him was that since these objectors had not raised such an objection before the tribunal under the Sikh Gurdwara Act, they are not entitled to resist the execution of a decree for possession by putting forward such claim of tenancy rights. That submission did not find favour with the District Judge in view of the ruling reported in Thakur Singh v. Managing Committee, Gurdwara Hari Mander Sahib, AIR 1930 Lahore 607. That ruling indicates that during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal under the said Act, the question would be limited to the title of the Sikh Gurdwara over the property in question, and, therefore, the rights of the tenants are not under challenge, and no question of adjudication of such rights would arise in such proceedings. That ruling further observes that the remedy would be to get relief from the concerned revenue authorities. In that view he issued a warrant of symbolic possession of these lands in respect of which these objectors/respondents had claimed the tenancy rights. Against that order dated 15.10.1980 these three revisions are filed.

4. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the Tribunal gave an adjudication that the property belongs to Sikh Gurdwara, the petitioner Sikh Gurdwara is entitled to approach the District Court for getting immediate possession, and the District Court should have granted a warrant for actual physical possession because these objectors had never raised their claim for tenancy rights when the matter was before the tribunal under the Act.

5. On behalf of the objector/respondents it was submitted that since these objectors were never impleaded as party in proceedings before the Tribunal, it was neither obligatory, nor possible, to raise the contention of their tenancy rights over the property. Further it was claimed that in proceedings before the Tribunal, the question pertained to only ownership rights of the Gurdwara over these properties, and there was no question or contest regarding the adjudication of tenancy rights. It was submitted that in view of the reported ruling referred to by the lower Court, only symbolic possession can be given to the Gurdwara, leaving the remedies available to Gurdwara by filing appropriate petition before the revenue authorities.

6. In reply, the counsel for petitioner submitted that since the respondents Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh against whom proceedings had been initiated before the Tribunal, had conceded to the claim of the Gurdwara by arriving at the settlement, they cannot be said to be persons authorised to induct the tenant. On this premise, it was contended that the claim of tenancy rights cannot be sustained. Further it was submitted that since these objectors had not raised contention before the Tribunal, they are barred from raising the claim now first time during the execution. It was submitted that since the decree for possession was against respondents Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh, who are said to be the lessors of the land to these objectors, these objectors are also bound by that decree, and these objectors would not be entitled to claim anything better than Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh would be entitled to.

7. A perusal of Section 7 of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, clearly shows that provision is meant for a petition before Tribunal in order to get a declaration that a Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara. Along with the application, a list of the property claimed to be belonging to the Gurdwara is to be attached. Section 7 further calls upon the person making such application to supply the name of the persons in possession of any right, title or interest in the said property which is said to be belonging to the Gurdwara. On receiving such petition, it is published in order to give notice to the persons concerned. Besides that, notice by registered post is also required to be addressed to each of the persons named in the petition who is shown to have some claim of right, title or interest in the property included in the list attached with such petition. In this case such a petition under Section 7 of the said Act had been submitted. All the same, it is an admitted position that the present objector/respondents were not made as a party in the said petition. It is also pertinent to note that these objector/respondents were not a party to a decree that consequently came to be passed under Section 25-A of the said Act 5. Section 25-A indicates that if a property is declared to be belonging to a Gurdwara, such Gurdwara within a period of one year from the date of decision or the date of constitution of the Committee, whichever is later, institute a suit before a Tribunal claiming to be awarded possession of the right, title or interest in the immoveablc property in question as against the parties to the previous petition. It is to be noted that such a suit under Section 25-A is to be instituted "as against parties to the previous petition". Since admittedly the objector/respondents were not parties to the previous litigation, they were not parties to the decree also that consequently came to be passed in that suit. The short question, therefore, would be whether now they can raise the contention of their tenancy rights to protect their possession.

8. It may be recalled that when the matter was in the lower Court, the counsel for the petitioner has conceded that these objector/respondents appeared to be tenants on the land in question. Assuming such a situation in the trial Court, the Counsel for the petitioner rested his argument solely on the ground that since these objectors had not come forward before the Tribunal to raise objection as per Section 10 of the said Act, they were not entitled to resist the execution of a decree which entitled the petitioner to get actual physical possession of the land. In view of that it becomes necessary to consider the provisions of Section 10 of the Act. Briefly stated, it contemplates that after the publication of the list of the properties as per Section 7, on the basis of the petition filed under that Section, any person claiming a right, title or interest in the property may submit his objection within 90 days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 7(3). The provisions of Section 10 should be read with Section 7 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 contemplates that a service of a registered notice on every individual who is shown as a person claiming some right, title or interest in the property included in the list attached with the petition under Section 7. Since the objector/respondents were not the persons thus shown in the petition under Section 7, no such notice was ever issued to them. Further, the nature of the suit under Section 25-A indicates that it was against other two respondents, namely, Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh who had opposed the claim that the property belongs to the Gurdwara. The decree for possession under Section 25-A of the Act was passed on 14.9.1976. On tracing back the events I find that the petition before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal was submitted in 1963. Thereafter by petition No. 298 of 1963 the present respondents Lakhvinder Singh and Balvinder Singh submitted their claim under Section 8 of the said Act. That claim is decided on 30.9.1974. It is obvious that thereafter the suit under Section 25-A was filed within one year from the date of decision or the date of constitution of the Committee whichever was later. Since in this case the decree now sought to be executed was passed on 14.9.1976, it can be safely said that the suit under Section 25-A of the Act was filed prior to that. The sequence of events also show that notification under Section 7(3) of the Act was issued on 21.12.1962. The objector/respondents were on the land during the litigation before the Tribunal and also thereafter.

9. The contention on behalf of the petitioner that the decision by the Tribunal under Section 7 was a judgment in rem and would be operative against the persons claiming to be tenants of Balvinder Singh and Lakhvinder Singh, does not appeal for the simple reason that a decree passed in such cases cannot be executed against the tenants who were not parties to the litigation unless their rights are appropriately adjudicated. In this respect I am supported by the case of Thakur Singh (supra). In that case their Lordships observed that a proceeding under Section 5 of the Sikh Gurdwara Act pertained to be claim of proprietory right only and there was no occasion to decide upon the tenancy rights. In view of that it was observed that tenants cannot be evicted until their occupancy rights are properly adjudicated upon by the revenue authorities. The observations made in that case would also apply to the present case because provisions under Sections 5 and 7, ultimately, pertained to the claim of right, title or interest in the property included in the list. Only difference is that Section 5 comes into play after the consolidation of list of the properties is published under Section 3(2), whereas Section 7 makes a provision for submission of petition by 50 or more worshippers to get a declaration that a Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara. Section 3 makes a provision regarding forwarding a list of property which is claimed to be belonging to the Gurdwara. That list should further give the names of the person in possession of any right, title or interest. Briefly stated, therefore, the points raised by filing a petition under Section 7 could not be different from the points raised in the petition on the occasion of forwarding a list of properties with a view to get a declaration regarding the rights of Gurdwara vis-a-vis the person interested. In both such proceedings the details to be supplied are the same. In my opinion, therefore, the observations made in the case of Thakar Singh (supra) would cover the present case also. I, therefore, find no substance in these revisions. Consequently, these revisions are dismissed.