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It is true that the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in relation to the effect of repeal do not apply to a temporary Act. As observed by Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 301, the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. That is why the legislature can, and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
To the same effect is the decision in the cases of Patel Kana Kachra v. Jadeja Bhikhubha Pathubha AIR 1953 Sau 195, Commissioner of H.R. and C.E v. P.R. Jeer AIR 1974 Mad 129 and the King v. Rogers 103 ER 891. These decisions, though given in different contexts in relation to temporary statutes, amending provisions of parent Act, are in principle against the contentions of Mr. Shrinath Singh.

26. The Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (as he then was) may also be usefully referred to. It has been observed at page 339 (Second Edition), while dealing with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as follows :