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2. The first point urged by Mr. Krishnaswamy Iyer for the appellant is that the income derived from a permanently settled estate is outside the scope of the Income Tax Act by reason of the Permanent Settlement Regulation XXV of 1802 and the sanad issued under the Act, and, the act of the Income Tax Officer being ultra vires, he is entitled to a refund of the amount paid by him. In the view we take of the next point, it is unnecessary to discuss all the authorities bearing on this point in detail. In Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 a Full Bench of this Court held that, where the peshcush of a permanently settled estate was fixed in commutation, not only of the rentals of the cultivated lands but also of all income which might be derived from forests or fisheries, both under the terms of the sanad and of Section 1 of Regulation XXV of 1802, these incomes were exempt from further taxation by the Government, and Section 3 of the Income Tax Act did not abrogate this exemption. The learned Judges considered the effect of the Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1802 and the terms of the grant to which the grant in the present case is similar and came to the conclusion that the income derived from forests and fisheries, in the permanently settled estate was not liable to be taxed under the Income Tax Act. The learned Government Pleader attacks the correctness of this decision and contends that income from forests and fisheries is taxable unless it comes within the exceptions provided in the Income Tax Act. He urges that there must be specific legislation exempting such income and that it cannot be exempted by implication. Sitting as a Division Bench, we are bound by the decision of the Full Bench. We may observe that we entirely concur with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Judges who were members of the Fall Bench. Reliance is placed by the learned Government Pleader on Probhat Chandra Barua v. Emperor 84 Ind. Cas. 31 : 51 C. 504 : A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 668 Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar 95 Ind. Cas. 539 : 53 C. 524 : 30 C.W.N. 524 : A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 819 : 44 C.L.J. 427 Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Baruah 102 Ind. Cas. 845 : 54 C. 863 : 45 C.L.J. 323 : A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 432 : 31 C.W.N. 765 and Maharaj Dhiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income Tax 78 Ind. Cas. 783 : 3 Pat. 470 : 2 Pat. L.R. 25 Cr. : (1924) Pat. 69 : 5 P.L.T. 459 : A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 474 as supporting his contention that Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 325 was not correctly decided. In Probhat Chandra Barua v. Emperor 84 Ind. Cas. 31 : 51 C. 504 : A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 668 there was a difference of opinion between Rankin, J., and Page, J., Page, J, approving of the decision in Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madaas v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar 95 Ind. Cas. 539 :30 C.W.N. 524 : A.I.R.1926 Cal.819 : 44 C.L.J. 427 Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 and Maharaj Dhiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income Tax 78 Ind. Cas. 783 : 3 Pat. 470 : 2 Pat. L.R. 25 Cr. : (1924) Pat. 69 : 5 P.L.T. 459 : A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 474 were followed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Baruah 102 Ind. Cas. 845 : 54 C. 863 : 45 C.L.J. 323 : A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 432 : 31 C.W.N. 765 there was a difference of opinion, two Judges approving the Madras view and three Judges following the view of Rankin, J., in Probhat Chandra Barua v. Emperor 84 Ind. Cas. 31 : 51 C. 504 : A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 668 In Maharaj Dhiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income Tax 78 Ind. Cas. 783 : 3 Pat. 470 : 2 Pat. L.R. 25 Cr. : (1924) Pat. 69 : 5 P.L.T. 459 : A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 474 Dawson Miller, C.J., after an exhaustive examination of the Permanent Settlement Regulation and its effect observed: "I see no reason to take a different view from that held by the Madras High Court," while Mullick, J, took a different view. We find this point in favour of the appellant.

5. It is well established that a payment made under a mistake of law cannot be recovered, but it is urged for the appellant that the payment was made under duress or coercion and, therefore, the amount is recoverable. The decision in Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 was on 21st February, 1922. The assessment notice was dated 31st March, 1922, and payment was made on 2lst April, 1922. The Rajah of Ramnad in his return of taxable in come made in pursuance of the Income Tax Act included wrongly the items of income derived from forests and fisheries; He says this return was made owing to a mistake, and, on the figures submitted by the Rajah, the Income Tax Officer assessed the income under the Income Tax Act. The question is whether the payment was made under duress in order to take it out of the principle that payments under mistake of law cannot be recovered. It is contended for the appellant that the sending of notice by the taxing authority and his assessment amount to duress or coercion in law. The Rajah, of his own accord, and, it may be owing to ignorance of law, included, in the items shown as taxable under the Income Tax Act, the income from fisheries and forests and the Income Tax Officer on the basis of that return made the assessment under the Act. There is no evidence that the Income Tax Officer required the appellant to make a return of the income from forests and fisheries. The appellant like all other assessees was required to make a return of his income for purposes of Income Tax Act and if he chose to include in the return an item of income which was not assessable under the Act and if on the basis of that return the Income Tax Officer assessed the income, and, on notice being given, the assessee paid the tax it cannot be said that it was paid under dure Sections In Whitley Ltd. v. Reg (1910) 101 L.T. 741 : 26 T.L.R. 19 the facts were: William Whitley, Ltd. who carried on a large business in which they employed a large number of assistants who had all their meals on the premises and for the service of those meals they employed a large number of men as cooks, and waiters on the suggestion of the Inland Revenue authorities that the waiters were 'male servants' in respect of whom duties were payable paid for a number of years the duties in respect of such waiters. From 1903 they paid the duties with a protest that the waiters were not 'male servants' within the meaning of the Act. In 1906 they refused to pay and upon proceedings being taken for penalties, the Divisional Court held that the waiters were not 'male servants' and that the duties were not payable. They then preferred a petition of right to recover, back the moneys so paid. Walton, J, held that the moneys having been paid under a mistake, not of fact, but of law, could not be recovered back either on the ground that they were paid under duress or compulsion or on the ground that they were paid in discharge of a demand illegally made under colour of an office. At page 745 page of (1910) 101 L.T.- [Ed.] he observes; "The suppliants knew all the facts. They had present to their minds plainly, when these payments were made, that there was a question as to whether upon such servants as those in question duty was payable. They themselves raised that question and they paid the duties. They could have resisted payment. They must have known that if proceedings were taken for penalties it would be open to them in such proceedings to raise the question as to whether the duties were payable or not as they did, in fact, in 1906...I think the most that took place was this, that the Officer of Inland Revenue told the' suppliants that in his opinion and in the opinion of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue the duties were payable." With regard to the case of duress, the learned Judge observes after referring to certain passages in Leake on Contracts: "In all those cases in order to have that done which the person making the payment was entitled to have done without a payment, he had to make the payment, and some one who was bound to do something which the person paying the money desired to have done, refused to do his duty unless he was paid the money. If in those circumstances money is paid, then it can be recovered back. There is there an element of duress". The appellant made the return thinking that he was liable. Whatever might have been the state of the law before 21st February, 1922, after the decision in Secretary of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 it could not be said that there was any doubt as to the non-liability of income from forests and fisheries arising out of permanently settled estates. The notice of assessment was on 31st March, 1922. The appellant could have preferred an objection to the assessment on the strength of Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 and could have refused to pay the amount, even if he was unsuccessful in his representation on to the Income Tax authorities that the income from forests and fisheries was not liable to be assessed under the Income Tax Act, and he chose to do none of these things but paid the amount on 21st April, 1922, i.e., two months after the decision in Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zemindar of Singampatti 70 Ind. Cas. 504 : 45 M. 518 : 15 L.W. 496 : (1922) M.W.N. 353 : 31 M.L.T. 21 : A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 325 In Slater v. Burnley Corporation (1888) 59 L.T. 635 : 36 W.R. 831 : 53 J.P. 70 & 535 the facts were: A water rate £ 8-15-4 for one quarter's rate in respect of certain houses, was demanded by the defendants, the sanitary authority and paid by the plaintiff, such sum being 5 per cent. on the gross rental of the houses. After this payment, the defendants altered their basis of assessment, from gross rental to rateable value as the proper basis of assessment, they being entitled to charge 5 percent, on the annual value. If the rate had been calculated on the reteable value it would have been £ 7-3-10. The plaintiff brought an action in a County Court to recover the overcharge of £ 1-11-6, the difference between the two sums, as being paid under compulsion. There was no power to distrain for these rates (except when they did not exceed £ 1 a quarter which did not apply to the present case) but the defendants had the power to cut off the water supply on non-payment of the rate. The County Court Judges held the payment to be a compulsory one, as the defendants had the power to cut off water and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Cave and Wills, JJ., held that the payment was a voluntary payment and could not be recovered back. Cave, J., observed at page 639 page of (1897) 59 L.T. "There is no case which lays it down that a payment under these circumstances is a compulsory payment. If it were so, the consequences would be very far-reaching, if that were so, no payment of rent to a landlord would be a voluntary payment," Wills, J., observed: "It seems to me in these circumstances that it is idle to say that there is anything like--duress there was nothing in the nature of a threat used; it is simply the ordinary case of a person raising a contention when a demand is made upon him. This is not sufficient to constitute duress, so as to prevent a payment being a voluntary one."