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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal 1645 of 1966. Appeals from the judgment and order dated February, 7, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 114 of 1965. A. N. Sinha and P. K. Mukherjee, for the appellant. B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In this appeal by certificate two questions of law arise namely (1) whether on the facts of this case the mare "'Jury Maid" can be considered as a "pet animal" within the meaning of that expression in the notification issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Import Trade Control Public Notice No. 1 I.T.C.(PN)/61 dated 2nd January 1961 and (2) whether the expression "prohibition" contained in S. 111 (d) of the Customs Act 1962 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) includes prohibition of imports coupled with a power to permit importation under certain conditions.

The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the points in issue are not many. They may now be stated. The appellant, Sheikh Mohd. Omer, as found by the High Court was a dealer 'in horses especially in racing horses. He was breeding horses out of mares owned by him. He owned two stallions by name "Pieta" and "Rontgen". He claimed to have had a considerable reputation as race horse owner and for racing with horses bred by him races. In September, 1964, the appellant went to Europe. While he wasin Switzerland he received a letter from M/s. British Blood-stock Agency Ltd., London informing him that one- of its clients was interested in obtaining a foal by stallion "Pieta" from the said client's Brood Mare. After some correspondence it was agreed that the Glasgow Stud Farm would lease a brown English mare to the appellant which would be shipped to India and would be kept there pending her producing two foals by the appellant's breeding race hot-se "Pieta" after which the mare will be returned to with on,,- foal. The appellant returned to Calcutta on November 7, 1964 by air. At the Dum Dum Airport he gave a declaration showing that his seven unaccompanied bagages will follow by sea or by air. 'Eventually, "Jury Maid" was shipped to Calcutta by s.s 'Chinkoa" which reached Calcutta port on December 25, 1964. When the appellant tried to take delivery of the same, the Customs authorities objected on the ground that the mare had been imported in contravention of the provisions of the imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. After due enquiry the Customs authorities confiscated the mare. At this stage, it may be mentioned that when the mare came to India, it was pregant. After its arrival in India it gave: birth to a foal and thereafter it died. The foal given birth by it is alive.

"Any animal that is domesticated or tamed and kept as a favourite or treated with fondness, esp. applied to a lamb reared by hand."

The same word is explained in Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary thus "Any animal, tamed and fondled."

There is no evidence to show that "Jury Maid" was tamed. That apart the "Jury Maid" was not fondled or treated with fondness by the appellant. He obtained that animal on lease for certain specified purpose. In respect of that animal he had only a business connection. Rejecting the contention of the appellant that "Jury Maid" is a pet animal, the learned judges of the appellate bench of the Calcutta High Court observed :

We entirely agree with those observations and reject the contention of the appellant that "Jury Maid" was a pet animal.

This takes us to the question whether by importing the mare "Jury Maid" the appellant contravened S. 111(d) read with s. 125 of the Act. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that expression "prohibition" in s. 111(d) must be considered as a total prohibition and that expression does not bring within its fold the restrictions imposed by cl. (3) of the Imports Control Order, 1955. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant cl. (3) of that order deals with the restrictions of import of certain goods. Such a restriction cannot be considered as a prohibition under s. 111 (d) I of the Act. While elaborating his argument the learned Counsel invited our attention to the fact that while s. 111 (d) of the Act uses the word "prohibition", s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 takes in not merely prohibition of imports and exports, it also includes "restrictions or otherwise controlling" all imports and exports. According to him restrictions cannot be considered as prohibition more particularly under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 IIs that statute deals with "restrictions or otherwise contfolling" separately from prohibitions. We are not impressed with this argument. What cl. (d) of s. 111 says is that any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported contrary to "any prohibition imposed by any law for the time being in force in this country" is liable to be confiscated. "Any prohibition" referred to III that section applies to every type of prohibition". That prohibition may be complete or partial. Any restriction on import or export is to an extent a prohibition. The expression "any prohibition" in s. III (d) of the Customs Act, 1962 includes restrictions. Merely because s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 uses three different expressions "prohibiting" "restricting" or "otherwise controlling", we cannot cut down the amplitude of the word "any prohibition"