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Showing contexts for: Collusive decrees in Nagubai Ammal & Others vs B. Shama Rao & Others on 26 April, 1956Matching Fragments
While these proceedings were going on, Abdul Huq, the mortgagee, filed on 16-8-1921, O.S. No. 27 of 192122 against Keshavananda and his two brothers for recovery of arrears of rent due by them under the lease deed, and obtained a decree on 21-10-1921 but was unable to realise anything in execution thereof, and the execution petition was finally dismissed on 22-1-1926. He then filed a second suit against the mortgagors, O.S. No. 86 of 1931-32, for arrears of rent for a period subsequent to that covered by the decree in O.S. No. 27 of 1921-22 and for possession of the properties on the basis of the lease dated 3-9-1918, and obtained a decree on 22-3-1932 but was unable to get possession, as the properties were in the occupation of third parties under claims of right. Abdul Huq died on 20-3-1933, and thereafter, his legal representatives filed on 30-8-1933 O.S. No. 8 of 1933-34 to enforce their rights under the mortgage deed dated 1-9-1918. Among the defendants who were impleaded in this suit were the mortgagors Keshavananda and Madhavananda, Gururaja, son of Brabmananda who bad died, the Official Receiver and the purchasers of the mortgaged properties in execution of the maintenance decrees and the decree of Appalaraju. Devamma was the third defendant in this action. The plaint alleged that the mortgagors had failed to pay rent as provided in the lease deed dated 3-9-1918, and had suffered collusive decrees to be passed against them in the maintenance suits and other actions, and that properties had been sold fraudulently in execution of those decrees. On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for possession as against the purchasers including Devamma, and for a sum of Rs. 5,000 as damages. In the alternative, they prayed for a decree for sale of the mort- gaged properties for the amount due under the mortgage. The suit was contested, and issues raised as to whether the sales were collusive, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to possession and damages, and alternatively, as to what amounts were payable under the mortgage and to what reliefs the plaintiffs were entitled. At the trial, the plaintiffs abandoned the relief as to possession and damages, and it accordingly became unnecessary to go into the question as to the collusive character of the maintenance decrees and the execution sales. On 26-9-1935 a decree was passed determining the amount payable to the plaintiffs on redemption, providing for payment thereof on or before 26th January 1936, and in default, directing the sale of the properties. In execution of this decree, the properties were sold in court-auction sometime in 1936, and purchased by one Chapman, and possession was taken by him through court on 18-2-1937. On 25-1-1938, Saldhana, who was the agent of Chapman, and became his executor on his death, sold the building sites now in dispute and forming part of the properties purchased in court auction, to Krishna Rao, the plaintiff in the present action. When Krishna Rao attempted to take possession of the sites, he was obstructed by one Garudachar, claiming title under a sale deed dated 1- 12-1932 executed by one Lokiah, the husband of Srikantamma, sister of Devamma, and be accordingly filed O.S. No. 92 of 1938-39 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Bangalore for establishing his title to the suit properties, and for an injunction restraining Garudachar from interfering with his possession. The suit was decreed on 23-7-1940, and the matter having been taken in appeal to the High Court by Garudachar, the parties entered into a compromise, and a decree, Exhibit E-1, was passed in terms thereof on 18-9-1942. Under this decree., the title of the plaintiff to the suit properties was recognised. After obtaining this decree, Krishna Rao started building on the sites, when he met with fresh obstruction, this time from the appellants who set up that they were in possession under a claim of title. Under the partition deed entered into by the mortgagors on 6-9-1918 (Exhibit K), Keshavananda was allotted two plots, Nos. 3 and 4 to the west of East Lal Bagh Road in the plan, Exhibit G. These are the very plots, which form the subject- matter of the present suit. On 30-1-1920 Keshavananda con- veyed these properties to Dr. Nanjunda Rao under a deed of sale, Exhibit VI. There was on the same date a sale by Brahmananda of plots Nos. 1 and 2 to Dr. Nanjunda Rao, but those properties are not involved in this litigation. On the death of Dr. Nanjunda Rao, his sons partitioned the properties, and in the division the suit properties fell to the share of one Raghunatha Rao, and on his death in 1938) his estate devolved on his widow, Nagubai, who is the first appellant. On 28-5-1939 she executed a trust deed settling a moiety of these properties on the Anjaneyaswami Temple at Karaikal, and the trustees of that institution are the other appellants in this appeal. In view of their obstruction, Krishna Rao instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration of his title to the sites in question, and for an injunction restraining the defen- dants from interfering with his possession, or in the alternative, for a decree in ejectment if they were held to be in possession. The claim made in the plaint is a simple one. It is that the title of Chapman as purchaser in execution of the decree passed on the mortgage dated 1-9- 1918 prevailed against all titles created subsequent to that date, and that accordingly Dr. Nanjunda Rao and his successors acquired under the sale deed dated 30-1-1920 no title which could be set up as against that of the plaintiff. The defendants contested the suit on the ground, firstly, that as they were not impleaded as parties in the suit on the mortgage, O.S. No. 8 of 1933-34, their right of redemption remained unaffected by the decree passed therein or the sale in execution thereof; and secondly, that the suit was barred by limitation, because the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of the suit, and also because the defendants had acquired title to the suit properties by adverse possession for over 20 years.