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8. The main contention of Mr. M. Balasubramanyam, learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit was filed in the year 2007 and that when the trial was half way through in the year 2017, the trial Court aborted the proceedings and found it a shortcut to dismiss the suit on the ground of maintainability in terms of Section 34 of the Securitisation Act, 2002. This, according to the learned counsel for 5 VRS, J & JUD, J A.S.No.1239 of 2017 & C.R.P.Nos.7245 & 7283 of 2017 the appellant, is contrary to law and the appellant ought to have been given a fair trial and the trial Court ought to have decided the suit with reference to all the issues.

Point No.1:

11. As seen from the judgment of the trial Court, the trial Court framed four issues for consideration. They are as follows:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to partition of plaint schedule property?

2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages as prayed for?

3) Whether the sale deed dated 25-04-2007 is not valid, binding on the plaintiff?

4) To what relief?

12. After framing the aforesaid issues, the trial Court did not proceed to answer any of the four issues. On the other hand, the trial Court held that the suit was not maintainable in view of the bar under Section 34 of the Securitisation Act, 2002. It is a pity that the trial 6 VRS, J & JUD, J A.S.No.1239 of 2017 & C.R.P.Nos.7245 & 7283 of 2017 Court did not even frame an issue relating to the maintainability of the suit. In other words, the bar under Section 34 of the Act was not even framed as one of the issues for consideration by the trial Court.

13. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant is justified in his contention that the manner in which the suit was disposed of, is not in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the Code. But that by itself will not entitle the appellant to a remedy before this Court, unless on merits, the appellant has established a case for the grant of relief. It is needless to point out that the powers of the First Appellate Court as enunciated in Section 107 CPC are as wide as that of the trial Court. In fact, sub-section (2) of Section 107 CPC uses two phrases which are of importance. The first is "same powers". The second is "same duties". Therefore, this Court has the same powers and also has the same duties as are conferred and imposed upon the courts of original jurisdiction. Hence, it is our duty to find out whether the suit was maintainable, in the light of a specific stand taken by the 5th respondent with regard to the maintainability of the suit in terms of Section 34 of the Securitisation Act.

18. From the very pleadings contained in the plaint, it is obvious that the suit was instituted for the purpose of attacking the proceedings under the Securitisation Act collaterally. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court that the suit was barred by Section 34 of the Securitisation Act cannot be taken exception to. Hence, we answer the additional issue that we have framed herein against the appellant and in favour of the respondents 4 and 5.

10 VRS, J & JUD, J A.S.No.1239 of 2017 & C.R.P.Nos.7245 & 7283 of 2017