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X X X X It has, indeed, been held that whether (whatever?) is said, however, false or injurious to the character or interests of a complainant, by Judges upon the Bench, whether in the Superior Courts of law or equity, or in County Courts, or Sessions of the Peace, by counsel "at the bar in pleading causes, or by witnesses in giving evidence, or by members of the legislature in either House of Parliament, or by ministers of the Crown in advising the Sovereign, is absolutely privileged, and cannot be inquired into in an action at-law for defamation.'' The law of absolute privilege concerning the judicial proceedings is summed up under the heading Judicial privilege' at pages 348-349 of the 12th edition of the well-known book 'Salmond on Torts'. The following few lines need be quoted here:-

The principle and extent of absolute privilege relating to Judicial proceedings is lucidly stated at pages 765-768 of the 11th edition of 'Clerk and Lindsell on Torts' thus--

"It is impossible that litigation and public business, can be carded on without the character of individuals being constantly called in question. If everyone thus impeached were permitted to pursue his legal remedy, not merely would freedom of communication in matters where it is vitally necessary be rendered impossible, but a perennial source of litigation would be opened. Accordingly, on occasions absolutely privileged not merely are those protected who act in the honest discharge of their legal right or duty, but also those who abuse the opportunity with malacious motive and deliberate untruthfulness to malign their neighbours; and this because it, is impossible to devise a shield sufficiently broad to cover the former without also including the latter .'............ With regard to Judicial proceedings, "neither party witness, counsel, Jury, or Judge can be put to answer civilly, or criminally, For words spoken in office'. The authorities are clear, uniform, and conclusive that no action of slander or libel lies whether against judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties, for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceeding before any court or tribunal recognised by law' ............. It is not merely with respect to the hearing in open court that there is absolute privilege but also with regard to every step taken in the conduct of legal proceeding. For instance, an affidavit filed in support of as interlocutory application can in no case give a cause of action, and the same applies to the report of an official receiver under Section 8 (2) of the Companies Winding-up Act, 1890.'' At page 767, the learned authors have further observed;-
In my opinion, therefore reading these provisions of the Code, it is clear that the appellant's statements in the communication to the police was a report which would properly be considered as a step in judicial proceedings'. The mere fact that a final report was submitted in the case, in my opinion, would not make any difference. Judicial proceedings might start or might not The question as to whether the statement made in an information given to the police of a cognizable offence is absolutely privileged or not would not depend upon the future event of the starting of the judicial proceedings. Even after starting of such proceedings, it may be found that the case was false and that the information was given out of malice. This point of distinction made out in some of the Indian cases does not commend to me and I am of the view that such a statement confined in a communication to the police or made before a police officer with the object of string, or in relation to, judicial proceedings is absolutely privileged. If that be not so, no body giving information to the police would be safe for he will have to run the risk of being civilly liable for the information. It may well be that if the information is found to be false and to have been actuated by malice, the informant is criminally liable for defamation under the Indian law as embodied in section 499 of the Penal Code or even civilly liable under certain circumstances to pay damages ges for malicious prosecution but he must be held to enjoy the absolute privilege and protected from civil liability for defamation on such a statement.
"In our opinion, the older view of treating communication like the one in question under the head of qualified privilege ought to be the rule of justice, equity and good conscience ....
Therefore the defendants cannot escape liability for their wrongful act, unless it is proved that in so doing they were not actuated by malice."

The learned Judge came to this conclusion however, by observing at page 167--

"Unless therefore a communication is made to a solicitor in connection with a judicial proceeding or in connection with a necessary step preliminary thereto or with reference to an act incidental to the proper initiation thereof, (Bottomley v. Brougham (1908) 1 KB 584 at pages 588 and 589), it would not be absolutely privileged and therefore prima facie the communication made by defendants 1 and 2 to Mr. Krishnamachari in connection with the reply notice dated 9th of May would not he protected by the absolute immunity from liability to an action. But in 1928 the Court, of Appeal in England seems to have extended the doctrine of absolute privilege even to communications between a solicitor and a client though not connected with any judicial proceeding or a necessary step preliminary thereto."