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21. Feeling aggrieved by the above order of the learned lower appellate Court Nagpur refusing to grant temporary injunction the plaintiffs/appellants preferred an appeal against the said order in this Court registered as A.O. No. 76 of 89. The Contempt petitioners and Dineshkumar and Padam Seth who were noticed and heard by the learned lower appellate Court Nagpur in view of the order of the Supreme Court referred to above also preferred an appeal in this Court against its order refusing to grant temporary injunction registered as A.O. No. 77 of 1989. In these appeals against the order, the appellants in both these appeals preferred separate applications for temporary injunction in this Court pending decision of their appeals against order viz. A.O. 76 of 89 and AO 77 of 1989. In the said applications, the appellants in both these appeals claimed temporary injunction pending their appeals in these terms :-

37. The reasoning advanced on behalf of the contempt petitioners as regards the applicability to the Jabalpur property of the order of status-quo pending decision in Reg. C.A. No. 16 of 87 by the District Court, Nagpur passed finally on 6-2-91 in A.O. Nos. 76 and 77 of 1989 is that originally by an order dated 21-12-89, passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid appeals against order, an ex parte interim injunction as prayed for was granted in terms of the prayer clause in the application for temporary injunction preferred in the said appeals against order pending their decision. Perusal of the prayer clause in the said application for temporary injunction shows that pending decision of the appeals against order, a temporary injunction was claimed to restrain the defendant i.e. the contemner Amiruddin, his agents, servants, employees or any one claiming through him in any capacity whatsoever, or acting in his name and on his behalf from dealing, selling alienating, transferring, constructing over the properties covered by the Deed of Settlement (Ex. 554) and the Relinquishment Deed (Ex. 249) at Jabalpur and at Nagpur. The submission therefore on behalf of the contempt petitioners is that the temporary injunction granted ex-parte by the learned single Judge of this Court on 21-12-89 in terms of the above prayer clause was applicable in respect of the Jabalpur property also. The further submission on their behalf is that when on hearing both sides on 7'2'1990 the learned single Judge of this Court, directed the parties to maintain status-quo till the decision of the above appeals against order, the said order of status-quo operated in respect of the Jabalpur property too. The reasoning advanced on their behalf thus is that when an order of status-quo pending decision of the Reg. C.A. No. 16 of 87 was passed on 6-2-91 by the learned single Judge of this Court while finally disposing of the above appeals against order, the said order of status quo operated in regard to the Jabalpur property also with the result that dealing with, transferring, alienating, selling or constructing over the said property would be in breach of the said status quo order dated 6-2-1991. It is therefore, urged on behalf of the contempt petitioners that by proceeding to lease out the shops in Akash Ganga shopping complex Sadar Bazar, Jabalpur, there is breach of the above order of status'quo dated 6-2-91 because at any rate it amounts to dealing with the said property, if not alienating or transferring it.

62. For all these reason, it is urged on behalf of the contempt petitioners in Contempt Petition No. 53 of 1991 who are the plaintiffs in Special C.S. No. 143 of 1967 that all the properties of the alleged trust in the instant case including the properties at Jabalpur are the subject matter of the suit and therefore, the order of the status quo dated 6-2-1991 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court operated in respect of the Jabalpur property in question also.

62A. It is also urged that initially the ex parte order of temporary injunction issued by the learned single Judge of this Court pending decision of AO Nos. 76 and 77 of 1989 passed on 21-12-1989 clearly operated in respect of Jabalpur properties which were expressly included in the prayer clause in the application for temporary injunction in terms of which the ex parte injunction order was issued. It is then brought to our notice that when the rule was heard upon the application for temporary injunction, this Court by its order dated 7-2-1990 directed the parties to maintain status quo pending decision of the above appeals against order which according to the learned counsel for the above contempt petitioners meant that the status quo operated in respect of all the properties in regard to which ex parte temporary injunction operated. Upon the same reasoning it is also urged that it is this status quo pending decision of the above appeals against order which is directed to be continued pending decision of the Reg. C.A. No. 16 of 1987 by the order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 6-2-1991 which would therefore, cover Jabalpur properties also. The learned counsel for the contemners have opposed the above reasoning and have urged that when the status quo order is passed, it has been and can be passed in respect of the subject matter of the suit which is Mehdibagh property at Nagpur only.

70. As regards the question of construction of the status quo order dated 6-2-1991, it is pertinent to see that the "status quo" is a word of ambiguity and at times raises doubt and difficulty as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Limited v. State of Bihar, which was also a judgment in the contempt proceedings. As observed by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid judgment, the word "status quo" in its legal connotation implies an existing state of things at any given point of time. In the instant case the order of status quo passed on 6-2-1991 is vague as regards the properties covered by the said order as also the point of time regarding the state of things existing at which time were to continue till the decision of the appeal in the District Court (Reg. C.A. No. 16 of 1987). It may be seen that although the ex parte order of temporary injunction passed on 21-2-1989 pending decision in AO Nos. 76 and 77 of 1989 is specific in relation to the properties in regard to which it operates, the status quo order passed thereafter on 7-2-1991 pending decision in the above appeals against order as well as the final order of status quo passed on 6-2-1991 in the above appeals against order pending decision of the Reg. C.A. No. 16 of 1989 are not specific about the properties in relation to which it should operate.