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3. In the appeal filed by the assessee before the AAC, it was contended that the return filed on December 14, 1964, having been filed beyond the time permitted under s. 139(2), it could only be treated as a return under s. 139(4), that the second return filed on October 5, 1968, could not be considered as a return under s. 139(5) since s. 139(5) is applicable only when the original return was filed within the time allowed under s. 139(1) or s. 139(2) and that the assessment made on September 22, 1969, was, therefore, barred by limitation under ss. 153(1)(a) and 153(1)(b). The AAC did not accept these submissions and, on further appeal, the Tribunal held that the return filed on December 14, 1964, could only be treated as a belated return under s. 139(1) or s. 139(2), that the revised return filed on October 5, 1968, furnished a starting point of limitation and that the assessment is required to be completed only within a period of one year from the revised return and was, therefore, valid. Thus, the assessee having failed before the Tribunal, the matter has been brought before this court under reference on the question set out above.

13. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. [1970] 77 ITR 518. In that case, the assessee filed voluntary returns disclosing loss. But, those returns were filed after the period contemplated by s. 22(1) or s. 22(2A) of the Indian I.T. Act of 1922. The assessee claimed that notwithstanding this delay in filing the return, it would be entitled to adjustment of the carried forward losses as the return filed should be treated to be a return under s. 22(1) read with s. 22(3). The Supreme Court by a majority accepted this submission of the assessee. It was held that s. 22(2A) of the 1922 Act simply provided that in order to get the benefit of s. 24(2) of that Act for the purpose of getting adjustment of the carried forward loss, the assessee must submit his loss return within the time specified in s. 22(1) and that that provision had to be read with s. 22(3) for the purpose of determining the time within which the return had to be submitted. Sub-s. (3) of s. 22 was construed to be merely a proviso to s. 22(1) and a return submitted at any time contemplated by s. 22(3) was taken to be a valid return. In other words, if s. 22(3) was complied with, then s. 22(1) should also be held, in their Lordship's view, to have been complied with and that if compliance had been made with. 22(1), then the requirements of s. 22(2A) would stand satisfied. This decision is useful to show that a return filed under s. 22(3) corresponding to s. 139(4) would be a return under s. 22(1). As that was a case of a voluntary return, it was necessary only to refer to s. 22(1). In the present case, the return is traceable to the notice issued by the ITO and would, therefore, be a returned under s. 139(2). Thus, jut as the return under s. 22(3) was treated as a return under s. 22(1), similarly, in the present case, the return under s. 139(4) is liable to be treated as a return under s. 139(2). If so much is granted, then the return under s. 139(5) would be a valid revised return so as to furnish the starting point of limitation contemplated by s. 153(1)(c) of the Act. Thus, this decision far from supporting the assessee's case would appear to be against it.

35. This argument of the learned counsel certainly enables the assessee to wriggle out of the situation under s. 139(5) of the Act. It enables the assessee to assert that the impelling motive for filing the so-called revised return was not the rectification of any inadvertent error or wrong statement but the supersession of an earlier return which deliberately understated the income. If this were so, then while the argument is valid to set at naught the validity of the revised return as one falling under s. 139(5) of the Act, that would not efface the earlier return filed under s. 139(4) of the Act. The assessee's case all along had been that his revised return should not be taken note of for one reason or the other. But it has always stood by its earlier return dated December 14, 1964. It stood by the validity of that return as the return properly filed under s. 139(4) of the Act and all it said was it was not a return under s. 139(2) but it never cared to deny that it was not the return under s. 139(4) of the Act. If so much is granted, namely, if the return dated December 14, 1964, is a return under s. 139(4), but that return was proved to be false by the assessee's own subsequent so-called revised return dated October 5, 1968, then the necessary ingredients for the application of s. 153(1)(b) would be present in this case. It is in view of this fact that while doing the assessment, the ITO has clearly mentioned that he was taking separate action for levy of penalty for concealment of income under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. It is now well settled and that is the law laid down by a Division Bench in CIT v. Subramania Chettiar [1977] 110 ITR 602, that the mere filing of a revised return will not absolve an assessee of liability to penalty where his original return had concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars about income. The result is that the provisions of s. 153(1)(b) also come into play in the assessee's case. If that is so, then it would be a necessary part of the inquiry into the bar of limitation in the present case to find out what the computation of the eight year period would be. There is not doubt that the eight year period would expire only on March 31, 1973. Thus, we have three expiry dates. The expiry of four year period under clause (a), namely, March 31, 1969, the expiry of eight year period under clause (b), namely, March 31, 1973, and the expiry of one year period from the date of the revised return, namely, October 5, 1969. Applying the rule in s. 153(1) that the time-limit is set by the latest amongst these three points of time, it must be held that the latest point is achieved by the application of clause (b) which yields March 31, 1973, as the last date. It follows, therefore, that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the latest expiry period of limitation would be yielded by application of s. 153(1)(c). Actually, it is s. 153(1)(b) as I have shown above.