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(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any disputes to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted.

Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. Provided also that I1o has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18."

(The rest of the provision is not necessary for purpose of this petition).

(4) Reading these provisions, it is manifest that the Collector, which term, as defined under the Act, includes the Land Acquisition Officer specifically appointed by the Government to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act, shall make an award under Section 11 and tender payment of the compensation unless the person or persons interested shall not consent to receive the payment. The person interested might also receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. If the payment is refused, then the Collector shall deposit the amount in the Court to which a reference will be submitted. It is also provided that where the person interested received payment without protest, he shall not be entitled to make an application requiring a reference. The Land Acquisition Officer in his case rejected the application under the second proviso.

(5) The contention before us in that the proviso is attracted only when the person interested receives the amount and not merely the bill on the treasury for the amount awarded. The learned counsel argues that the first proviso makes mention for receipt of payment under protest, whereas the second proviso contemplates receipt of amount otherwise than under protest. In other words his argument is that the receipt of a bill drawn on the treasury for the amount of compensation is not the same as the receipt of the amount in coin or currency notes. He equated the bill drawn on the treasury to an order to pay, in the nature of a cheque drawn on a bank. He cited Ex Parte The Trustee v. Kensington Borough Council, 1951-1 Ch. 85 as supporting his argument that until the money was drawn in cash, there was no payment. He cited Palaniappa Chetty v. Arunachellam Chetty, (1911) 21 Mad LJ 432 where the learned judges observed that the established rule was that a ange or hundi given for a debt operated only as a conditional discharge of the debt although it might be proved that in any particular case it was taken unconditionally in satisfaction of a debt.

(7) The distinction sought to the made between the terms 'receipt of payment' and 'receipt of amount' is without difference. If this artificial distinction is accepted, no significance can be attached to the receipt of payment under protest. A protest is contemplated at the time of the receipt of payment. It would not fit in with the scheme of the Act to say that a payment could be received today by a bill drawn on the Government treasury and the person could take his own time to draw the money from the treasury and in the process have for himself the intervening period at his disposal to lodge his protest. For one thing it cannot be said that he had received payment by bill under protest. For another it cannot be said that he is to lodge his protest at the treasury when receiving the amount. Be it noted that the section postulates a tender a payment of the compensation awarded by the land acquisition officer. The proviso contemplates the acceptance of the tender by receipt of payment under protest or otherwise. The second proviso postulatt of acceptance of the tender without protest. The intendment and the scope of the provision is perfectly intelligible and poses no ambiguity. The protest must necessarily be made to the land acquisition officer who tenders payment of compensation, and by necessary implication at the time when he so tenders the payment. The interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from being artificial, leads to needless complications and impinges on the other provisions of the Act, one of which is the period of limitation prescribed for making an application under Section 18.