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11. In L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) among the issues which fell for consideration was whether the power conferred upon Parliament and State Legislatures, by Article 323-A(2)(d) or 323-B (3)(d) of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of "Courts" except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes referred to in Clause (1) of Article 323-A or with regard to any of the matters specified in Article 323-B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held that the power of judicial review, vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, was an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure and that ordinarily the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. The Supreme Court held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Courts and Tribunals, within their respective jurisdiction, was also part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that a situation where the High Courts are divested of all judicial functions, apart from that of constitutional interpretation, was to be avoided. The Supreme Court held that while the subordinate judiciary or Tribunals, created under ordinary legislation, could not exercise the power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, there was no constitutional prohibition against their performing a supplemental as opposed to a substitutional role in this respect and as long as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227, and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32, was retained there was no reason why the power to test the validity of legislative action, against the provisions of the Constitution, could not be conferred upon the Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or by the Tribunals created under Article 323-B of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Tribunal would be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the Court under whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls and thereby two purposes would be served (1) The power of judicial review of legislative action would vest in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and (2) it would ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal and the High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which would be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved party would be entitled to move the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the decisions of the Tribunals and, from the decision of the Bench of the High Court, to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra), summarized its conclusions thus:

.... (emphasis supplied).

12. The Supreme Court held that questions involving vires of statutory provisions or rules should be decided by a Bench of the Tribunal consisting at least two members one of whom should be a judicial member. In conclusion the Supreme Court held at Paragraph 99 thus:

In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated....
It is true that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India's case (supra), this Court has held that it will not be open to the employees to directly approach the High Court even where the question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged. However, this ratio is required to be appreciated in context of the question which was decided by this Court wherein it was sought to be contended that once the Tribunals are established under Article 323-A or Article 323-B, jurisdiction of the High Court would be excluded. Negativing said contention, this Court made it clear that jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and it cannot be said that such Tribunals are an effective substitute of the High Courts in discharging powers of judicial review. It is also an established principle that where there is an alternative, effective, efficacious remedy available under the law, the High Court would not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and that has been reiterated by holding that the litigants must first approach the Tribunals which act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and therefore, it will not be open to the litigants to directly approach the High Court even where the question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged....

21. The question, which we must decide, is whether a person aggrieved is disentitled from directly invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to challenge the order of the Tribunal, merely because he was not a party to the proceedings before it, and has not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal "in the first instance" before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

22. The power of judicial review, over administrative and legislative action, vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power to exercise judicial superintendence, over decisions of Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction, is part of the basic feature/structure of the Constitution of India and, ordinarily, such a power vested in the High Courts can never be ousted or excluded. A situation where the High Courts are held to be divested of these powers, apart from that of constitutional interpretation, has to be avoided. Administrative Tribunals, created under Article 323-A of the Constitution, perform a supplemental role. While they are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules and to act as Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they are constituted, their decisions are nonetheless subject to scrutiny by the Division Bench of the High Court. As held by the Larger Bench of this Court, in G. Lakshmi Reddy's case while the power of judicial review is a constituent power and cannot be abdicated by a judicial process of interpretation, nonetheless the Supreme Court can lay down a law prescribing the manner in which such a power is to be exercised. It, however, needs no emphasis that, since the constituent power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is part of the basic feature/structure of the Constitution of India, any limitation on the manner of its exercise, beyond what has been specifically laid down by the Supreme Court, should not be readily inferred. Since the Apex Court, in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra) did not specifically exclude exercise of the power of judicial review by the High Court, of orders of the Tribunal at the instance of a person aggrieved thereby, on the ground that he was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, there is no reason to infer any such limitation.