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25. Tne next important question to be considered is the construction of the Will. We have already set out the translation of the Will. The operative portion in the Will is this:

Leaving out the property given to P.W. 2 and the Mariamman Temple, this means that after the lifetime of the testator and Sowbagyammal, half of the remaining property should go to the plaintiff absolutely and the other half to Muthuthandava, Natesa and the first defendant absolutely. This means that Sowbagyammal was given a life estate and the vested remainder was given to the plaintiff (half), Muthuthandava (1/6th), Natesa (1/6th) and the first defendant (1/6th). The bequest to the plaintiff, Muthuthandava, Natesa and the first defendant is a vested remainder within the meaning of Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Incidentally we may straightaway dispose of a minor contention that there were no specific terms of bequest in favour of the plaintiff is respect of the half. Reading the Will it is clear that the plaintiff was to get a half because, otherwise there would be intestacy in respect of a half. The word applies both to the half which was given to the plaintiff and the half which was given to Muthuthandava, Natesa and the first defendant.
Ranganayaki entered into possession of the property on the death of the testator. In 1928, she settled the maintenance claim of the daughter-in-law Lakshmiammal and that was by executing an agreement Stipulating to pay her a sum of Rs. 240 per annum. The daughter Ramalakshmi died in 1938 during the lifetime of the widow, leaving as her heir her husband. In 1945, the widow of the testator describing herself to be the absolute owner of the properties of her husband sold some items of the properties to the second defendant and executed settlement deeds in respect of other defendants. Ramalakshmi's husband instituted the suit contending that Ramalakshmi had obtained a vested interest. The defendants contended that the widow was entitled under the Will to an absolute estate or at least she was to take an estate analogous to a widow's estate, that the daughter's interest was only in the nature of a contingent remainder and the suit was therefore not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit decreed the suit. That was affirmed in appeal by the High Court. That again was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships pointed out that the widow got only a life estate and that Ramalakshmi Ammal, the daughter took a vested remainder. We shall have to refer to this decision in detail later.

28. In Ramachandra Skenoy v. Hilda Brita (1964) 2 S.C.R. 722 : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1323 the testator Mrs. Mary Magdelena Coelho provided by her Will thus:

All these (properties) my eldest daughter shall after my lifetime enjoy and after her lifetime her male children also shall enjoy permanently and with absolute right....
It was held that the daughter got only a life estate and her male children got the vested remainder.

29. The contention of Mr. Gopalaswamy Iyengar is primarily that under the Will there were no words of disposition at all in favour of the widow, that therefore she got nothing under the Will and she inherited her husband's properties under law in the usual course as if he had died intestate. The further step in the argument is that the Hindu widow's estate became enlarged under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 into a full absolute estate. This contention is based on the fact that no express words of disposition are used conferring a life estate on the widow. But that was clearly implied in the Will. The Will states in two places that the dispositions in favour of the plaintiff, Muthuthandava, Natesa and the first defendant would come into effect after his life time and the life time of his widow. Of course, every Will would come into effect only after the testator's life time and therefore no special significance can be attached to that provision, but significance has to be attached to the provision that the provisions would come into effect after the life time of his widow. It could not be that the testator wanted the estate to hang in the air during the life time of the widow. That is the negative aspect. The positive aspect of it is that he could not have intended to give nothing to his widow which is what the contention of Mr. Gopalaswamy Iyengar really amounts to. It should be noted that the contention of Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar involves not merely that the widow herself got nothing under the Will but also that there was no immediate gift to the plaintiff and the other three persons, Muthuthandava, Natesa and the first defendant. That would be ignoring the specific bequests made to them. It is clear that the testator intended to give a life estate to the widow by necessary implication and a vested remainder expressly to the plaintiff and the other three persons.

(2) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift,. will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property .

Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar contends that in order that Section 14(2) of the Act may apply, the terms of the Will themselves should specifically say that only a restricted estate, that is a life estate, was given to the widow. We do not agree. The word ' prescribe' merely means that there must be something in writing and in order that Section 14(2) should apply it is enough that on a construction of the terms of the Will, the Court finds that what was given to the widow was only a restricted estate, that is a life estate with a vested remainder to others. The intention displayed by the Legislature is that where a vested remainder is given to persons other than the widow, that should not be taken away.