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Mr. Ganesh, learned senior counsel for the Appellants, submitted that the essence of a sale of goods is that the parties must enter into a contract for the transfer of property in movables for a price. He submitted that such a contract may be a separate and distinct contract or it may be an inseparable part of a larger contract, such as a contract for the construction of a house with materials to be supplied by the contractor. He further submitted that prior to the 46th Amendment to the Constitution of India, it had been held by this Court in the Gannon Dunkerly's case [1959 SCR 379] that no sales tax could be levied on the transfer of property in goods in the case of such an inseverable contract. He further submitted that Article 366(29A)(b), inserted by the 46th Amendment, only enables an inseverable contract to be split up, so as to enable sales tax to be levied on that part of it which consists of a contract to transfer property in movables for a price. He submitted that Article 366(29A)(b) does not have the effect or consequence of converting what in law is not a sale of goods into a taxable sale of goods. He submitted that Article 366(29A)(b) does not make any departure from the basic concept of the parties having to enter into a contract for the transfer of property in movables for a price. He submitted that the statutory definitions of "Sale" (Sec. 2(k), "Taxable Turnover" (Sec. 2(u-1) and "Turnover" (Sec. 2(k), read with the charging Section 5B, in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, also indicate that there must be an agreement for transfer of property in certain goods for an identifiable price. He submitted that in a maintenance contract, the only obligation cast on the service provider is to keep the equipment in question in operating condition and to repair it if necessary and to replace a part only if found necessary. He submitted that a maintenance contract is thus not a contract which is entered into for a transfer of the property in any specific part or component for any identifiable price. He submitted that a maintenance contract, when entered into, is not an agreement for the sale of goods. He submitted that a maintenance contract does not get transformed into an agreement for the sale of goods merely by reason of the subsequent development of some parts or components being replaced by the service provider, as an integral part of the contractual obligation of keeping the equipment in good operating condition. He submitted that in a maintenance contract, the charge is paid for the service and not as a price for the replacement of any particular part or component. He submitted that when the contract is entered into, it is not even known whether any part or component will require replacement or not. He submitted that there is thus no nexus or correlation between the price paid for the contract and the value of any part or component which subsequently gets replaced, if at all, during the contract period. He further submitted that the basic and essential requisites of a contract of sale of goods are thus entirely missing in a maintenance contract, and the same are not created or brought into existence by the 46th Amendment. He submitted that the predominant and basic object of a maintenance contract is the rendering of a service and not the sale of any goods.