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" Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise...... The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient...... The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy.........
toothers "--vide Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 29.

10. I shall now proceed to consider the contentions of Mr. Raghavachari which were as follows : In the first place, it was pointed out that the punishment under Section 276B of the Act is for failure to deduct or failure to pay the tax deducted as required by Chap. XVII-B. Hence, a complaint under this section for delay in paying a tax deducted is incompetent and ultra vires of the section. As Section 276B is now worded, no prosecution can lie for making delayed payment. Section 200 which is comprised in Chap. XVII-B requires that a person, deducting any sum, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 192, 194, 194A and 194B shall pay, within the prescribed time, the sums so deducted, to the credit of the Central Govt. or as the Board directs. Section 276B, however, does not refer to payment being made within the prescribed time, but only refers to the failure, without reasonable cause, to deduct the tax or, after deduction, to pay the tax so deducted. Wherever the statute has contemplated a punishment for delay, as for example, in the filing of a return or payment of tax, there is a specific reference to the delay and punishment is also clearly prescribed for the delay, as would be obvious by a reference to the provisions of Sections 276, 271, 221, etc. There being no specific reference in Section 276B to any delay in payment, it is clear the Legislature had not contemplated any punishment for belated payment under Section 276B The punishment stipulated under Section 276B is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and also imposition of fine at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum on the amount of tax from the date on which such tax was deductible to the date on which such tax is actually paid. Having regard to the stringent punishment that has been provided, the section should be construed strictly and not liberally, because, in the latter case, even a delay of one day in making the payment will automatically entail prosecution leading to imprisonment and imposition of heavy fine. On the other hand it can be seen that in such cases of delayed payment, the Act contemplates only the levy of interest at 12 per cent. per annum from the date on which the tax is deductible to the date on which the tax is actually paid. This may be seen from Section 201(1A). Section 201(1A) and Section 276B deal with the consequences of failure to deduct or failure to pay tax after deduction. The former deals with the delay in paying the tax deducted, whereas the latter speaks only of a person who fails to deduct or, after deduction, fails to pay the tax. It will, therefore, be reasonable to hold that for belated payment of tax collected the consequences under Section 201(1A), viz., levy of interest will ensue, whereas if there is a total failure to collect or total failure to pay the tax collected, more serious consequences, viz., prosecution and punishment specified in Section 276B will ensue. A combined reading of Sections 200 and 201(1A) will make it clear that the provisions thereof apply only to cases of belated payment, and not to total failure to pay. A charge of not paying the tax within the prescribed time can be made only against a person who has paid the tax belatedly and not against a person who has not paid the tax at all. It, therefore, follows that for all cases of belated payment, only interest can be charged and a prosecution cannot be launched.

12. Section 276B refers to failure to pay the tax as required by Chap. XVII-B. The time within which the tax deducted is to be paid is a requirement of the Rules framed under the Act and not a requirement of Chap. XVII-B itself. Section 276B does not refer to the Rules prescribed, or to the time within which the tax has to be paid. In so far as the Rules framed under the Act cannot be said to be a requirement of Chap. XVII-B, no offence under Section 276B has been committed.

13. Wherever a prosecution for violation of the Rules is also contemplated, there is a reference to the Rules in the sections concerned (vide Section 277). In the absence of such a reference in Section 276B it is clear that any violation of a rule is not contemplated by Section 276B and a prosecution under the section, on the ground of a violation of the rule is not maintainable.

24. Then, taking up the argument that the phrase " a person ", used in Section 276B, would mean that prosecution can be launched only against the company and not against a principal officer of the company like the second petitioner herein, the contention fails to take note of the words contained in Sections 192 and 200 of the Act. Section 192 says that " any person responsible for paying......salaries shall, at the time of payment, deduct income-tax on the amount payable". Section 200 lays down that "any person deducting any sum in accordance with the provisions of sections 192 to194......shall pay, within the prescribed time, the sum so deducted to the credit of the Central Government or as the Board directs ". Therefore, the words " a person " occurring in Section 276B must be construed in juxtaposition to the word " person " mentioned in Section 192 and Section 200 of the Act. If so construed, there is no scope for the argument that the words " a person " occurring in Section 276B have reference only to a proprietary concern and not to a company as the first petitioner or its principal officer, the second petitioner. Similarly, the argument that since a company cannot be punished with imprisonment, a prosecution under Section 276B will not lie against a company, has to fall to the ground, because none of the sections, namely, Sections 192, 200 and 276B, uses the word "company ". They only use the words " a person " . Merely because the word " person " has been defined to include, among others, a company also, the petitioners cannot contend that the words " a person " occurring in Section 276B have reference only to a company and, since a company cannot be punished as indicated in Section 276B, that section will have no application to contraventions committed by a company.

25. Hence, none of the contentions raised by the petitioners' counsel to assail the complaint under Section 276B can be countenanced. The ratio laid down in the various cases cited by the petitioners' counsel is not attracted, because the section is not ambiguous or equivocal in its terms, nor does it lay itself open to a plurality of constructions.

26. The second ground on which a quashing of the complaint is sought for, is with reference to the liability of the second petitioner to answer a charge under Section 276B of the Act. The contentions of the second petitioner in this behalf are as set out below : The " principal officer " of a company, cannot be proceeded against, under Section 276B of the Act, since the phrase " principal officer " or " person responsible to pay " is omitted in Section 276B. In view of the omission of the expression, " person responsible for paying " in Section 276B and the non-inclusion of Section 276B under Section 204, the " principal officer" of a company does not come under the mischief of this section, and he is clearly beyond its purview. The expression used in Section 276B is " a person ", the definition of which does not encompass the " principal officer " or " the person responsible for paying ". The offence under Section 276B can attach itself only to a person demonstrated to be actually in charge of and responsible for deducting and paying the tax and such a person alone is liable to be prosecuted and proceeded against. The managing director of a company, not being the principal officer of the company, the complaint against the second petitioner under Section 276B is ex jade invalid and ought to be quashed. The second petitioner, being the managing director of the first petitioner, cannot be termed its principal officer, because the Act makes a distinction between " principal officer " and " director ". Even in the definition of the term, " principal officer " in Section 2(35) the term " director " is not included. Wherever the statute has intended to make the director or the managing director of a company responsible for an act, there is a specific reference to the director or managing director in the sections concerned. Similarly, wherever the statute has sought to impose an obligation or liability on the "principal officer" of a company, there is a specific reference to the said officer in the concerned section itself. Hence the complaint cannot be filed against the second petitioner. In support of these contentions, Mr. Raghavachari placed reliance on 1TO v. Joseph [1972] 83 ITR 362 (Ker) and Kapurchand Shrimal v. TRO .