Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

6. Per contra, Mr. T.N. Vallinayagam, learned Counsel for the first respondent, contended that in as much as by the order made in contempt application 507 of 1992, respondents 2 to 4 herein were discharged and nobody was punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order of the learned single Judge is not maintainable, learned Counsel for the first respondent, further contended that by the order dated 14.2.1992 in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 the learned single Judge has modified the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P. No. 12450 of 1989, by extending the time for sand quarrying by the first respondent for the period from 15.2.1992 to 31.5.1992 or for a period of 3 1/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent, that the said order of the learned single Judge made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 has been confirmed in W.A. No. 1422 of 1992, that as per the said orders, the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent and therefore, the learned single Judge while disposing of the contempt application is justified in directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993. The learned Counsel also contended that the order of the learned single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 is in accordance with law equity and good conscience and therefore, it is not liable to be interfered with in this L.P.A.

8. The next question we have to examine is, whether the learned single Judge is right in issuing directions to respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993, while disposing of Contempt Application No. 507 of 1992. It is seen from the order in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989, originally, the second respondent in his order dated 15.6.1987 granted a lease in favour of the first respondent to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for the period from 1.7.1987 to 30.6.1988. The learned single Judge while dismissing W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 filed by the first respondent, for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents therein not to interfere with his quarry operations in Amaravathi river Poramboke during faslis 1399 and 1400, directed extension of lease till the end of June, 1990 as a special case. By the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989, the learned single Judge has further observed that it is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of the said order and that extension is granted by way of concession as a special case. Again by the order dated 14.2.1992, made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 the learned single Judge modified the original order made in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 and directed the extension of lease in favour of the first respondent, for quarrying sand, for the period from 15.2.1992 to 31.5.1992. The. said order made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 was confirmed in W.A. No. 1422 of 1992. Since the order in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 has been confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 1422 of 1992, we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of the learned single Judge made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 modifying the period specified in the original order made in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989. However, the question is, in the contempt application, which is in the nature of a miscellaneous petition, can the learned single Judge reopen the issue whether the first respondent is entitled to further extension of the lease for sand quarrying for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 and grant such relief to the first respondent. As already stated, the case of the first respondent in the contempt application is that, though the second respondent gave an order in favour of the first respondent for quarrying sand on 21.8.1992, certain private parties who were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in the contempt application by their acts of omission and commission and by initiating legal proceedings against the first respondent prevented him from quarrying sand in the area in question for the period of 3 1/2 months, as per the orders of this Court. The grievance of the first respondent against the third parties is stated in paragraph 13 of the affidavit filed in support of such application 133 of 1992 in Contempt Application No. 507 of 1992 in the following terms:

The learned single Judge also found that the first respondent could not quarry sand pursuant to the orders of this Court on account of obstructions by the third parties. Even assuming the third parties have interfered with the quarrying operations of the first respondent, and prevented him from carrying on his quarrying operations during the relevant period, the proper course open to the first respondent is to take appropriate legal action against the third parties before appropriate forum. In fact, Bakthavatsalam, J. while dismissing the W.P. No. 15116 of 1991 has observed that it is open for the first respondent herein to take any other suitable action against the petitioner in W.P. No. 15116 of 1991 or the Government for any loss he had incurred in view of the pendency of W.P. No. 15116 of 1991. As already pointed out, the first respondent also filed Sub Application 133 of 1992 to implead the third parties who obstructed the 1st respondent from quarrying sand, as parties in the contempt application, but however, the first respondent gave them up subsequently on the ground that they were not parties to the order dated 14.2.1992. In these circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant, there is absolutely no justification for the learned single Judge to grant further extension of lease and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 particularly, when the learned single Judge has found that respondents 2 to 4 have not disobeyed any order of the court. Again the order of the learned single Judge dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 extending the quarry lease in favour of the first respondent, till 30.6.1990 has become final after the said order was confirmed in W.A. No. 365 of 1990. Similarly, the order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 extending the period of lease upto 31.5.1992 has also become final when the said order was confirmed in W.A. No. 1422 of 1992. When the said proceedings stand terminated by the final disposal of W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 and by the modification order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 as confirmed in W.A. No. 1422 of 1992, it was not at all permissible in law for the learned single Judge to reopen the issue whether the first respondent was entitled to further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months for sand quarrying, in the contempt application and acceding to the request of the first respondent, which was based on a separate cause of action, i.e., the inability of the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months on account of obstruction by third parties and directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 31/2 months from 1.5.1993.

Applying the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that when the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 12459 of 1989 as modified in W.M.P. No. 2822 of 1992 has become final as such in law, it was not at all open to the learned single Judge to reopen the issue in the Contempt Application or for that matter even by way of W.M.P. and consider whether the 1st respondent is entitled to a further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 for sand quarrying and granting such a relief to the first respondent on the ground that he could not quarry sand as per the earlier orders of this Court on account of obstruction by third pa r lies, particularly when the learned single Judge has found that respondents 2 to 4 have not disobeyed any order of the court. Therefore, the order of the learned single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 is liable to be set aside. On the facts and circumstances, of the case, we are also not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent that the order of the learned single Judge is in accordance with the equity and good conscience and therefore it is not liable to be interfered with in this Letters Patent Appeal, as the order passed by the learned single Judge is not permissible in law.