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2. The controversy involved in the present case is : whether the powers of the High Court under Section 389, Cr. P.C. for suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal, have been taken away by Section 32A of the Act or they have been preserved by Section 36B of the Act? Section 32A and Section 36B of the Act are two provisions in the Act, which deal with the powers regarding suspension of sentence and read as under:-

"Section 32A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Section 77) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted".

3. Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the powers of the appropriate government to suspend or remit the sentence when any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, while Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the powers of the appropriate government to commute the sentence. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the powers of the appellate Court to suspend the sentence pending the appeal and to release the appellant on bail. There is an essential difference between the general powers of suspension, remission or commutation vested in the State Government under Sections 432 and 433, Cr. P.C. and the powers of the appellate Court to suspend the sentence under Section 389, Cr. P.C. in criminal appeals, pending before the High Court. The first is an exclusively executive power vested in the appropriate government and the field covered by it is exclusively subject to the exercise of the said executive powers, while Section 389, Cr. P.C. deals with the judicial powers of the appellate Court to suspend the sentence during the pendency of the appeal. These are two separate powers -one is to be exercised by the judiciary and the other by the executive. So far as the powers of remission or commutation of any sentence awarded is concerned, these powers are not conferred upon the Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure but they along with the powers of suspension, have been conferred upon the appropriate government under Sections 432 and 433, Cr. P.C, When no powers have been conferred upon the Courts regarding the remission or commutation then there is no question of taking away those powers by the Legislature. Moreover, it can never be the intention of the Legislature to give powers by one provision and to takeaway the same by another provision. The provisions of one Section of the statute can never be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. So far as the Courts are concerned, Section 386, Cr. P.C. deals with the powers of the appellate Court. According to Section 386, Cr. P.C., the appellate Court, in an appeal from conviction, can reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried or alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature or the extent of sentence, but not so as to enhance the same. A close reading of the provisions of Section 386, Cr. P.C. clearly shows that there is no power of suspension, remission or commutation as such, conferred on the High Court, except to suspend the sentence temporarily pending the appeal, as postulated under Section 389, Cr. P.C.

4. A close reading of Section 32A of the Act with Sections 432 and 433, Cr. P.C., clearly shows that Section 32A of the Act has been enacted with an intention to abrogate the powers of the appropriate government vested in it and not to curtail the powers of the High Court. Section 32A of the Act refers only to the appropriate government and not to the Court. By imposing a bar under Section 32A of the Act, the Parliament, in fact, intended to curtail the unlimited powers of the government to suspend, remit or commute the sentence, in order to avoid political interference in the way of curbing the notorious activities in drugs trafficing. Section 36B of the Act empowers the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal or revision, to exercise all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 389, Cr. P.C., which deals with the powers of suspension of sentence pending the appeal, finds place in Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The powers of the High Court regarding suspension of sentence under Section 389, Cr. P.C., are, thus, not curtailed by Section 32A of the Act, rather Section 32A of the Act does not deal with the power of the High Court but it deals with the powers of the appropriate Government only and has no connection whatsoever so far as the judicial powers of the High Court are concerned. The Legislature, by enacting Section 32A of the Act, never intended to take-away the judicial powers and the discretion of the High Court regarding suspension of sentence, and, in fact, has taken away the executive power of the State of suspension, remission or commutation. There is an essential difference between the exercise of judicial powers and the executive powers by the State. The power of the Court to suspend the sentence, is to be exercised on judicial consideration while the executive, in the exercise of the powers, do not necessarily act on the same principle and do not take the same matter under consideration. The Executive exercises the power on the ground that public good will be as well or better promoted by suspension as by the execution. The exercise of this power lies in the discretion of the authority, in whom it is vested. Both the provisions have to be harmonised so that there may not be any conflict between them and they can be harmonised without any difficulty, if Section 36B of the Act is held to be dealing-with the power of the appellate Court of suspension of sentence passed by the Court below during the pendency of the appeal while Section 32A of the Act, which puts restriction on the powers dealing with the powers of the appropriate Government regarding the suspension, remission or communtation of the sentence after conviction. This power of the State with respect to suspension, remission or commutation has been taken-away by Section 32A of the Act, while the judicial powers of the appellate Court under Section 36B of the Act have been preserved. Both these Sections, i.e, Section 32A and Section 36B of the Act, thus, do not operate in the same field and operate in different fields. Section 32A of the Act deals with the Executive powers of the appropriate Government while Section 36B of the Act deals with the judicial powers of the Courts. Even as per the Rule of Statutory Construction, if two Sections of the statute are repugnant in any way to the first, the latter provision will prevail, for it stands last in the enactment and speaks the last intention of the makers. Even on this Statutory Rule of Interpretation, powers under Section 389, Cr. P.C. of the appellate Court regarding suspension of sentence, have been preserved by Section 36B of the Act, as it appears that Section 32A of the Act and both the provisions were enacted together.