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“32-A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted.”
9. In Dadu’s case, the three-Judge Bench scanning the provisions have laid down that:-
“13. A perusal of the section would indicate that it deals with three different matters, namely, suspension, remission and commutation of the sentences. Prohibition contained in the section is referable to Sections 389, 432 and 433 of the Code. Section 432 of the Code provides that when any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced in the manner and according to the procedure prescribed therein.”
10. After so stating, the Court referred to Section 433 CrPC, which empowers the Appropriate Government to commute the sentence. Thereafter, deliberation centered on Section 389 of CrPC. The Bench referred to the decision in Maktool Singh v. State of Punjab[3] and in that context opined:-
“… The distinction of the convicts under the Act and under other statutes, insofar as it relates to the exercise of executive powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code is concerned, cannot be termed to be either arbitrary or discriminatory being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such deprivation of the executive can also not be stretched to hold that the right to life of a person has been taken away except, according to the procedure established by law. It is not contended on behalf of the petitioners that the procedure prescribed under the Act for holding the trial is not reasonable, fair and just. The offending section, insofar as it relates to the executive in the matter of suspension, remission and commutation of sentence, after conviction, does not, in any way, encroach upon the personal liberty of the convict tried fairly and sentenced under the Act. The procedure prescribed for holding the trial under the Act cannot be termed to be arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful.

14. Having appreciated the analysis made in the aforesaid verdict, we may advert to the statutory scheme pertaining to suspension, remission and commutation of sentence under the CrPC. Section 432 deals with power to suspend or remit sentences. Section 433 deals with power to commute sentences. Section 433-A lays the postulate for restrictions on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases. The said provision reads as follows:-

“433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where the sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
“As has been stated by this Court in Maru Ram (supra) by the Constitution Bench, that the Constitutional power of remission provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution will always remain untouched, inasmuch as, though the statutory power of remission, etc., as compared to Constitution power under Articles 72 and 161 looks similar, they are not the same. Therefore, we confine ourselves to the implication of statutory power of remission, etc., provided under the Criminal Procedure Code entrusted with the Executive of the State as against the well thought out judicial decisions in the imposition of sentence for the related grievous crimes for which either capital punishment or a life sentence is provided for. When the said distinction can be clearly ascertained, it must be held that there is a vast difference between an executive action for the grant of commutation, remission etc., as against a judicial decision. Time and again, it is held that judicial action forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. We can state with certain amount of confidence and certainty, that there will be no match for a judicial decision by any of the authority other than Constitutional Authority, though in the form of an executive action, having regard to the higher pedestal in which such Constitutional Heads are placed whose action will remain unquestionable except for lack of certain basic features which has also been noted in the various decisions of this Court including Maru Ram (supra)”.