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15. The Supreme Court, taking a review of law on the issue as also 5 Chandrasekhar Singh v. Siya Ram Singh, (1979) 3 SCC 118 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 666 6 Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 2 SCC 378 7 Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v. Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala, (1988) 1 SCC 155 8 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (2000) 6 SCC 213 9 Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, (2004) 3 SCC 682 pvr/psv 14 wp 5483-21-final.odt considering the principles of law as laid down in the decision of the seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar10 in paragraphs 27 and 28 held that the order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and in a given situation can be interfered under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution, being a constitutional provision. However, the Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation. The observations in paragraphs 27 and 28 are required to be noted:

27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the principle laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra) still holds the field.

Order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation.

37. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced.

20. It is also Mr. Kumbhakoni's submission that the observations in regard to the reference to civil proceedings are required to be considered as an obiter and are not the ratio of the decision as according to him, the ratio of the decision would be as to what was held by the Supreme Court in relation to an order framing charge whether was an interlocutory order, not liable to be interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and in such context the Supreme Court holding that the principle which was laid down in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) was holding the field namely that an order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and in a given situation can be interfered with under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. As also further observations that the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay was to be exercised only in an exceptional situation.