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19. In the aforesaid circumstances the short issue which arises for our consideration is :- whether the appellant can be called upon to pay penal charges for failure to construct a superstructure in accordance with condition No. I(ii) of the lease deed due to the intercession of ULCRA?
20. The formulation of the issue answers for us at least one part of query, which is, that after the date of repeal of ULCRA, the appellant is not entitled to a waiver of penalty on the stated ground, i.e., for the period 22.03.1999 onwards. However, this still leaves _________________________________________________________________________________________ unanswered as to what would be the position for the period 01.07.1977 to 22.03.1999. The learned counsel for the appellant has not articulated before us the legal principle on which he would have us peg his submission seeking effacement or waiver of penalty. One of the conditions of the lease, i.e., condition No. I(ii) required the lessee to build a superstructure within 24 months, on the lines prescribed therein. The appellant says that he stood relieved of this burden and consequences of its breach since ULCRA interceded in the meanwhile.

26. The broad scheme of ULCRA, therefore, seems to indicate that it is not as if on the said statute coming into force the appellant had lost the right to make use of the land. More specifically, there was no prohibition in carrying out construction on the land in issue, as sought to be contended immediately on ULCRA being enacted.

27. The scheme of ULCRA came up for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srinivasa Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 APLJ 174. Briefly the facts obtaining in the _________________________________________________________________________________________ said case were as follows. The petitioner who had sought permission to construct flats/dwelling units on land owned by it was denied permission by the municipal corporation in view of the provisions of ULCRA being triggered. The petitioner challenged the denial of permission on various grounds, including the ground that the municipal corporation while granting permission was not fettered by the provisions of the central Act in particular Section 3 of ULCRA. The official respondents opposed the relief sought for in the writ petition on the ground that on the enactment of ULCRA, the petitioner by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of ULCRA Act was not entitled to hold any land in excess of the permissible limits and, therefore, as a necessary consequence was not entitled to carry out any construction on such land. The court repelled the submission of official respondents and while doing so made the following crucial observation:-

31. As per the appellant‟s own averments made in the writ petition, order under Section 9 of the ULCRA was passed on 05.06.1980. An appeal against the said order was dismissed on 01.04.1981. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Section 20 of the ULCRA, on 30.03.1981. The ostensible ground for seeking exemption was that the petitioner had a proposal for implementing a group housing scheme on the land in issue; which as per the prevailing guidelines for exemption was a route available to holders having in their possession land in excess of _________________________________________________________________________________________ 600 sq. yards. The application filed under Section 20 was, however, dismissed on 06.07.1987. The notification under Section 10(1) of the ULCRA was issued only on 21.09.1992. Against, the notification issued under Section 10(1), the appellant filed objections on 12.10.1992. It appears without those objections being decided, the Delhi Administration, Department of Land & Building issued a notification under Section 10(3) of the ULCRA, on 02.12.1992. Since the appellants became aware of the fact that similarly placed persons had obtained exemptions, they filed a writ petition bearing no. 4529/1992; laying a challenge to order dated 06.07.1987 whereby, his application for exemption under Section 20 of ULCRA was rejected by the Lt. Governor. As per the appellants own showing, notice in the application was issued on 06.01.1993. By the very same order, the official respondents were directed to maintain status quo. As per the appellants averment made in the writ petition, on 20.01.1994 rule was issued in the aforementioned writ petition, and a direction was _________________________________________________________________________________________ made that interim orders passed earlier would continue to operate till the disposal of the writ petition.

35. The appellant on his own showing approached the L&DO for issuance of a No-Objection Certificate (in _________________________________________________________________________________________ short N.O.C.) for the first time on 09.11.2000. There was no attempt by the appellant to approach the L&DO either before the enactment of ULCRA or even prior to the issuance of notification under Section 10(1) of the ULCRA. In these circumstances, could it be said that the appellant, who was already in breach of the condition I(ii) of the lease, even prior to the enactment of the ULCRA, was impeded in complying with the said condition because of the enactment. The answer to this would, as is obvious, be in the negative. We started by posing a question as to the legal principle on which such a submission made on behalf of the appellant could be pegged on. To our minds, no party can get away from a bargain made, which is enforceable in law, whether it be a private party or a statutory authority. A bargain made gives the promisee a right to seek performance. In law, a promisor is obliged to fulfill his part of the obligation unless the performance is excused by law. There is no such mandate of the law, in the present case, as has been examined by us hereinabove. Only other _________________________________________________________________________________________ situation in which perhaps a promisor need not fulfill his part of the bargain is when a contract is discharged or it is novated. The appellant in this case is not claiming novation but is perhaps claiming a partial discharge of his obligation under the lease during the period ULCRA remained on the statute book. The appellants cannot claim a complete discharge of the lease, as that would perish their rights along with the obligations under the lease. A clue as to whether under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (in short, „Contract Act‟) a partial discharge can be claimed is available in illustration (e) of Section 56 of the Contract Act. The same is extracted herein-below for ready reference:-