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1. The Petitioner claims that a large and valuable immovable property in South Mumbai is the property of a private family trust established by his father. He says he is a beneficiary of the trust. He filed the Trust Petition against some of his half-brothers and others seeking an injunction against them from acting as trustees, and the appointment of a receiver of the property. His lawyer amended the 1st March 2019 HARISHCHANDRA A PURI V VIJAY KUMAR A PURI & ORS CHS799-18-TP-1-2017-F.doc petition in 2017, dropped the two principal defendants, deleted some prayers and added prayers for dissolution of the trust and its distribution. A year on, the Petitioner sought to undo that amendment by filing this Chamber Summons. In it, he says said his lawyer sought the 2017 amendment without first consulting him. He also says the 2017 amendment violates a legal doctrine, 'once a trust, always a trust'. Should the Petitioner be allowed to revert his petition to a state before its amendment? Is such a claim permissible in law?
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner seeks leave to delete Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 from the cause title of the petition and also seeks to amend the trust petition by incorporating the relief for dissolution of the trust and distribution of the trust property between the beneficiaries.
Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are, accordingly, deleted from the cause title of the petition. Leave to amend is granted to the Petitioner for incorporating the relief for dissolution of the trust and distribution of he trust property by adding a prayer in the petition and also making appropriate averments in the body of the petition.

36. This takes us to the next question, which is what is it exactly that the amendment did. If we look at the petition as it stood before and after the amendment, and of the wording of Gupte J's order, the amendment was clearly to meet a question of law: that of maintainability, and of seeking appropriate relief. To take this sequentially: First, Gupte J's order allowed the deletion of the names of Pravinkumar and Sunilkumar and also leave to amend to seek 1st March 2019 HARISHCHANDRA A PURI V VIJAY KUMAR A PURI & ORS CHS799-18-TP-1-2017-F.doc dissolution of the trust and distribution of the trust property. The original petition sought no such relief of dissolution and distribution. It sought only to restrain Pravinkumar and Sunilkumar from acting as trustees, and the appointment of a Court Receiver. That order of receivership could never be a final order in itself. It would have to be a step in aid of some final relief; and there was no final relief to which that order could have been tied. Post- amendment, the receivership prayer remained, but it was now tied to a final relief for dissolution of the trust and distribution of the trust property. Second, the amendment for the first time sought a substantive final relief (for dissolution and distribution), a result manifestly in Harishchandra's interest. Both are matters of law and of the frame of the Trust Petition. Neither is a question of fact. In this context, it is worth recalling that Pravinkumar and Sunilkumar did not claim to be acting as trustees in regard to Curzon House. That would have implied their acceptance that Curzon House was, in fact, trust property, a position they have consistently denied and contested. Therefore, it was logical to seek what was to all intents and purposes a declaration that Curzon House was indeed trust property and then seek dissolution of the trust and the distribution of the trust property among named beneficiaries. I am wholly unable to understand what it is that Harishchandra could have said to this in any consultation or deliberation.

42. Harishchandra's entire cause, with or without the amendment, is that Curzon House is indeed trust property. That is his starting premise, and that is what he must establish in the trust petition. But assuming he does so -- what then? Is he, on the invocation of this 'trite' principle, entitled to a continuance of the property as trust property for all time to come? Is that all to which he is entitled? Or is he, as the amendment clearly posits, entitled to rather more, viz., a dissolution of the trust, and a passing of title to a portion of the trust property to his name as a beneficiary? To succeed in this Chamber Summons, Harishchandra must show that he is not entitled, as a matter of law, to the relief of dissolution and distribution. That is not done, and it cannot be done.