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65. Bar of relief by suit under Section 9. Act I of 1877 :--
Possession of a tenancy or of any land comprised in a tenancy shall not be recoverable under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. 1877, by a tenant dispossessed thereof." "Chapter Ix
110. Application and proceedings cognizable by Revenue Officers :--
(1) The following applications and proceedings shall be disposed of by Revenue Officers as such, and no Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any such application or proceedings might be made or had :--
"Whether a Civil Suit filed by a tenant dispossessed with his consent from his tenancy or any part thereof is barred having regard to the provisions of Himachal Pradcsh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms act. 1953?"

12. Distinguishing the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Bhag Singh v. Jawahar Singh (1965) 67 Pun LR 226 : (AIR 1965 Punjab 321), mainly on the basis that there was material difference between Section 50, 50-A of the Punjab Tenancy Act and Section 62 of the Act of 1953, the learned Judges observed that :--

17. From the bare reading of Section 65 of the Act, it is clear that the provisions contained therein preserve the right of the possession of tenancy or of any land comprised in tenancy not recoverable under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act by a tenant dispossessed therefrom instead of destroying such rights.

18. As noticed above, the vested right of a holder of property or property rights to file a suit to establish his claim in respect of any land or part thereof is a common law remedy and right and the same is found preserved and protected under Section 92 which gives right to such person to establish his claim in the Civil Court having jurisdiction by a due process of law. The provision of a summary remedy under Section 62 is no substitute to the right of suit and there is nothing in the Act which disclose any intention to destroy such right of suit otherwise available to a person as an adjunct to his rights to or in immovable property.

19. After appraisal and assessment of the relevant provisions of law under the Act referred to above, we are of the considered view that the ratio of thejudgment of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Chuhary's case (1968 (4) Delhi LT 412) (supra) has rendered correct position of law holding that a civil suit filed by a tenant dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or part thereof, would not be barred if it is Instituted after the expiry of one year as provided in Section 62 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. The vested rights of the tenants in the property who have been dispossessed without their consent from their tenancies or a part thereof could not be infringed or taken away by summary proceedings conducted by the Revenue Officer under Section 62 of the Act. The right of a tenant who has been wrongfully dispossessed or ejected from the tenancy rights has vested right to the property dehors the interest in the immovable property and he has a right to file a suit independently of summary proceedings. The expiry of period of limitation for instituting summary proceedings under Section 62 of the Art ordinarily only bars the remedy and in the absence of any statutory provisions of the contrary does not extinguish the right of a tenant to file a Civil Suit to establish his rights under the common law within the period of limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 for the purpose. Moreover, there is no question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction and which are outside purview of the said Act. It is only in respect of matters which are covered by the Act that the decision of the Revenue Officer is binding on the parties. Obviously, matters which are not subject-matter of decision before such a Revenue Officer, cannot be considered as final or binding between the parties. Section 64 also provides for finality only in respect of decision of the Revenue Officer in respect of matters which are requested to be determined by him for the purpose of summary proceedings under Section 62 of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court, therefore, to determine title, right or interest to the lands in question or to determine whether the landlord has a right to evict the tenant from the lands wrongfully without his consent is not ousted in any manner by the Act in the teeth of the relevant provisions of the Sections extracted herelnabove. Therefore, in these peculiar facts and circumstances, we are afraid to accept the submission of Mr. K.D. Sood, learned counsel, that the ratio of the judgment of the Full Bench in Bhag Singh's case (AIR 1965 Punjab 321) (supra) will squarely apply to the facts of the cases on hand and not the settled proposition of law of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court.