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1. By means of this Revision Petition, the petitioner seeks to impugn the order passed by the Subordinate Judge First Class, Chandigarh, on January 14, 1981, in execution proceedings which had been launched by the respondent-landlords against the petitioner-tenant. The facts may be, briefly, noticed.

2. In a petition for ejectment filed by the landlords, an ex parte order was passed by the Rent Controller on Nov. 3, 1977, directing the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute, which is House No. 64, Section 16-A. Chandigarh. The petitioner was allowed fifteen days time to vacate the premises. However, he did not do so. The decree-holder-landlords then filed an execution application to enforce eviction of the petitioner on the basis of the ex parte decree. On April 12, 1980, warrants for the possession of the property were issued executable for June 5, 1980. In the meantime, the petitioner filed an objection petition under Section 47, read with Section 151, Civil P. C., impugning the execution of the decree against him on certain grounds. Inter alia, he pleaded that he had not been served in the ejectment proceedings. As noticed by the executing Court in the impugned order, it is common ground between the parties that after the passing of the ex parte eviction order, an application was moved by the petitioner under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil P. C. to set aside the aforesaid ex parte order, but the said application was dismissed for default on April 19, 1979. Some other proceedings between the parties for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute were also pending and in these proceedings the ejectment application has been dismissed by the Rent Controller on May 21, 1976. The responders, however, went up in appeal, which was accepted with a finding that the tender of rent made by the petitioner was invalid, as the same had not been made on the first date of hearing. The petitioner was, therefore, ordered to be evicted in that case. However, he came up in Revision before this Court and on Oct. 3, 1977, an order was passed to the effect that if the petitioner deposited the arrears of rent by a certain date, the interim stay of dispossession granted to him shall stand confirmed. According to the petitioner, he deposited the rent due on the said date, i. e., Nov. 14, 1977. It also transpires that after the dismissal of the Revision Petition by the High Court, that matter went up to the Supreme Court and the petitioner obtained a stay of dispossession on the condition that he pays the arrears of rent to the landlords within two months from the date of the order.

3. In the objection petition, the plea of the petitioner-judgment-debtor is that he had paid the arrears of rent and has been paying the current rent regularly. As such, it is contended that the landlords are estopped by their conduct from continuing the execution proceedings. The stand of the respondent-landlords, however, is that the orders regarding stay of eviction passed by this Court and later on by the Supreme Court are applicable only to the case in which the said orders were passed. These orders would have no application to any other proceedings which may be pending against the petitioner separately. The executing Court went into the respective contentions of the parties and accepted the contention of the landlords and held that the stay granted by the Supreme Court had no bearing on the present execution proceedings which permitted to a different decree for ejectment passed against the petitioner. The objection petition was, therefore, dismissed. It is against this order of the executing Court, that the present Revision Petition has been filed.

5. In so far as the present Revision Petitioner is concerned, the challenge is to the impugned order passed by the Subordinate Judge First Class in his capacity as an executing Court. This order was passed on an objection petition filed by the petitioner against the execution of the ex parte decree for ejectment granted by the Rent Controller on Nov. 3, 1977. The said decree was passed in Ejectment Application No. 118/76 filed on July 16, 1976. As already noticed (and there is no dispute in regard to this fact), an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed on Nov. 17, 1977, which was dismissed for default of appearance of the petitioner on April 19, 1979, with the result that the ejectment order against the petitioner became final for all intents and purposes. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, tried to wriggle out of this situation by submitting that as the arrears of rent had been cleared in consequence of the orders obtained in a different ejectment application, the claim of the landlords for the eviction of the petitioner on the ground of default as made in the present case should be deemed to have become infructuous. I am afraid, the argument is without substance. When a separate application for ejectment is filed on a different cause of action and the arrears of rent are not paid or deposited on the first date of hearing in the said application, (in fact that application was not even defended), any tender or deposit of rent made in another proceeding, after the first date of hearing in the present case cannot absolve the tenant from his liability, nor can he resist his eviction on that score. The learned lower Court was, therefore, quite correct in holding that the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the other litigation would have no bearing in so far as the present case-is concerned. Once a decree for ejectment, even though ex parte, was passed against the petitioner in the present case and his application for setting aside the ex parte decree had also failed, the decree became final and the petitioner is liable to be ejected in execution of the same. The contention of the learned counsel has, therefore, to be repelled.

6. The only other submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that while deciding the objection petition under Section 47, Civil P. C. the executing Court did not frame issues, the argument being that such an objection application ought to have been dealt with as a regular suit and should not have been disposed of summarily. The argument is without substance. It may be observed here that under sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Code as it existed before its amendment, the Court was authorised to treat the proceedings under his section as a suit and vice versa. However, sub-section (2) of Section 47 has since been deleted from the Code, with effect from Feb. 1, 1977. This circumstances indicates that the proper conferred upon the Court to treat an application under Section 47 as a suit has been specifically withdrawn. This apart, no objection as put forward now, in regard to the objection petition being treated as a suit or the non-framing of issues was ever raised before the executing Court. The Court was, thus, within its jurisdiction to proceed to decide the objection petition summarily and while doing so, it committed no illegality. Further more, the facts being almost a matter of record, there was hardly any purpose in farming issues and deciding the matter as a suit, which, a tenant under orders of ejectment, would naturally prefer from the very nature of things. It may also be observed held that in execution of a decree for ejectment, the question of the objection petition being treated as a suit, would not arise at all as the Rent Controller Act bars the grant of any relief in regard to the ejectment of a tenant by means of a suit.