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None of the Judges upheld the conclusion of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps that the appellant company is a nominee of the persons to whom the flats, offices and shops had been assigned; nor did they agree with his conclusion that if in a document, the value of the rights assigned is not mentioned, it is permissible, for the Revenue to assess their value independently.

The contention that the appellant company is a nominee of the various persons to whom flats, offices and shops had been assigned was not pressed before us; nor was it urged before us that the Revenue is competent to make an independent assessment of the value of the rights assigned. Though at one stage, it was feebly suggested that the Deed of Assignment may be considered as a gift but that contention was not elaborated; nor do we see any merit in that contention because in the first place, it does not purport to be a gift; secondly, the valuation of "gift" under Article 33 of the First Schedule has to be made on the same basis as the valuation of a "conveyance" under Article 23 of that Schedule. Article 33 specifically says that the duty payable on a gift deed will be "same as a conveyance for a consideration equal to the value of the property as set forth in such instrument."

For the purpose of this case, we shall proceed on the assumption, without deciding, that the charging words in Article 23 of the Stamp Act "where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveyance as set forth therein"

do not mean that the Revenue must have regard only to what the parties to the instruments have elected to state the consideration to be, but the duty must be assessed upon the amount or value of the consideration for the transfer as disclosed upon an examination of the terms of the instrument as a whole. We are of the opinion, that the learned Chief Justice and Naik J. were not justified in holding that the Deed of Assignment incorporates into itself the various agreements entered into between Uttamchand and the persons to whom he assigned flats, offices and shops. The only reference to those persons in the Deed of Assignment is in the preamble wherein it is stated "AND WHEREAS the Assignor having erected a building known is Himalaya House on the said piece of land had granted to certain persons the right to occupy flats, offices and shops in the said building AND WHEREAS the Assignee Company has been formed for the better administration of the said building and for the protection of the interests of the persons occupying the flats, offices and shops therein." These clauses merely refer to the earlier transactions. They do not incorporate into the Assignment Deed the earlier agreements with the persons referred to therein. Mere reference to some earlier transactions in a document does not amount to an incorporation in that document, of the terms and conditions relating thereto. From the language used in the Assignment Deed it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the terms and conditions of the earlier transactions have been made a part of that Deed. Further barring one particular agreement, other agreements were not before the Court. Therefore, it is not possible to know what the terms and conditions of those agreements were. Before the terms and conditions of at, agreement can be said to have been incorporated into another document, the same must clearly show that the parties thereto intended ,to incorporate them. No such intention in available in this case.

"23. Conveyance (as defined by section 2(10) not being a transfer charge or exempted under section 52Where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveyance as set forth therein............"

This Article has come up for consideration before various High Courts on a number of occasions. In Ramen Chetty v. Mohamed Ghouse(1) the Calcutta High Court held that in determining whether a document is sufficiently stamped for the purpose of deciding upon its admissibility in evidence, the document itself as it stands, and not any collateral circumstances which may be shown in evidence must be looked at. In Sakharam Shankar and Others v. Ramchandra Babu ohire,(2) it was held that in determining the question whether a particular document is sufficiently stamped, the Court should look at the instrument as it stands. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Muhammad Muzaffar Ali(3) held that if in a deed of gift the value of the property dealt with is not set forth, the deed does not require any stamp, and it is not within the competence of the Collector to have the said property valued in order to assess the duty (1) (ILR 16 Cal 432). 2 (ILR 27 Bom 279).

(3) (ILR 44 All. 339).

payable. If, however, the value of the property is intentionally omitted with a view to defraud the Revenue, a prosecution will lie under section 64 of the Stamp Act. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sri Sitaram Ramalia and Another v. State of Bihar(1) held that the Collector had no power under section 40 of the Stamp Act to embark upon an inquiry with regard to the market value of the properties covered by the document and require the payment of further stamp duty in accordance with his finding as to valuation and, therefore, that the impugned orders of the Collector, Commissioner and the Board were ultra vires and were liable to be set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therein the Court was considering the scope of section 58 of the Stamp Act which requires that an instrument of settlement should be stamped with the same duty as a bond "for a sum equal to the amount or value of the property settled as set forth in such settlement." The Court observed that the words 'as set forth in the settlement" in the section refer back to the word "value" and not to the words "property settled". Recently the same view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Sahib and Another v. District Registrar, Kurnool(2). No decision taking a contrary view was brought to our notice. The question arising for decision in this case is settled by stare decision. We are entirely in agreement with the view expressed in those decisions. Even if we had been inclined to place a different interpretation on Article 23, we would have hesitated to do so in view of the long line of decisions to some of which we have already made reference. The Legislature may have had. good reasons for not empowering the Revenue to make an independent inquiry as regards the valuation of the right sought to be assigned.