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From the bare reading of these rules it is obvious that the Secondary Schools Code expects from a full-time teacher that he will devote all his time and energy to his teaching job in the school. Rule 76(1)(i) lays down that Heads and Assistant Heads of schools should not undertake any regular private tuition even without remuneration. Rule 76(1)(ii) then states that no teacher should do private tuition for more than two hours in a day or teach more than five pupils during his whole period of tuition in the day, and for that also he must obtain the previous permission of the Head of the school. Rule 76(1)(iv) then makes it clear that no teacher will be allowed to associate himself directly or indirectly with any coaching classes to prepare pupils for the internal or external examination of secondary schools or any other examining body. Then in Rule 77(3)(1) the procedure for inquiry is prescribed providing for punishment of removal or dismissal if ultimately on an inquiry it is found that an employee of a school including a teacher is guilty of insubordination, neglect of duties or misconduct (in each case of serious nature). As to what would constitute misconduct is neither defined nor specified in the Secondary Schools Code. In the absence of a definition of the term "misconduct" it would be open to the employer to consider reasonably as to what conduct can be properly treated misconduct. As observed by the Supreme Court in Again v. Badri Das and others, [1963 - I L.L.J. 684], what is misconduct will entirely depend upon the circumstances of each case and it is not possible to lay down any general rule in that behalf. In the absence of any specification or definition, therefore, the question will have to be dealt with reasonably and in accordance with the commonsense having regard to the nature of employment and the corresponding duties and obligations. A conduct which would be quite incompatible with the express and implied norms of the relationship of the employee with the employer will obviously amount to misconduct. Certain species of misconduct are enumerated in the Secondary Schools Code itself which, to some extent, provides guidelines in that behalf. Chapter III, Section III, of the Secondary Schools Code prescribes the rules of discipline and leave. Rule 71(2) lays down that all employees shall, during the period of their service, employ themselves honestly and efficiently under the orders of the Head of the school and shall make themselves in all respects useful to the school. The rule further says that they shall not on their own account or otherwise, either directly or indirectly, carry on or be concerned in any trade or business. Rule 73(1) casts a duty on a full-time teacher that he shall be present on the school premises during the working hours of the school. From the various rules incorporated in Section III of Chapter III of the Code, it is quite clear that the School Management has a right to expect from its full-time teacher that he will devote all his time and energy to his duties as a teacher. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, it will not be open to a full-time employee to carry on such activities which are inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his obligations undertaken by him either expressly or impliedly in accepting the full-time job. When a teacher accepts a full-time job, by necessary implication he agrees to so conduct himself that his activities would not be inconsistent with the nature of his job. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Madhosingh v. State of Bombay, [1960 - I L.L.J. 291], though in a different context. While considering the law relating to disciplinary action, this Court observed as under :

6. However, a contention was raised by Shri Kukday that the writ petition filed by the petitioner-school is not maintainable under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. According to Shri Kukday, the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code are merely administrative instructions and any right or obligation flowing from the said provisions of the Code are not enforceable in a writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. For this proposition Shri Kukday has relied on a decision of this Court in Sohanlal Fulchand v. Deputy Director of Education, 6, 1975 Mh. L.J. Note 20. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. It is no doubt true that it has been held by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court that the rules contained in the Secondary Schools Code are only executive instructions issued by the State Government for the purposes of managements of schools receiving grant-in-aid. However, Sohanlal Fulchand's case on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 was a case which was filed by a teacher. In this context, it was observed by this Court that a breach of any of the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code does not confer any right on a third party like a teacher in a private school. This Court further found that so far as a teacher in a privately managed school receiving grant-in-aid is concerned, even if his dismissal is held, to be wrongful being in breach of Rules of the Secondary Schools Code or for non-observance of rules of natural justice, he is not entitled to a relief of reinstatement as the case does not fall within the well recognised exceptions to the general rule that a contract of personal service is incapable of specific performance as this is not a case of a Government servant enforcing fundamental right under Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that the contract of service is the basis on which the relief could be granted in such a case and for breach of contract of personal service the only relief the servant would be entitled to would be a claim for damages and, therefore, such a contract is not enforceable under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The earlier decision of this Court in Mithailal v. S. V. Joag, (1974) Mh. L.J. 220, was, therefore, distinguished. In Mithailal's case, a reference was made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Amratlal v. State, . In the said case a petition was entertained by the Gujarat High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge of the Gujarat High Court in this context observed as under :

From these observations of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the appeals which are provided by the Secondary Schools Code against an order passed by the management against a teacher are limited to enforce the satisfaction of the condition under which recognition and aid would be granted and withdrawn an not for regulating as between the teacher and the management the relations of master and servant arising under the contract of employment. If the direction given by the Deputy Director of Education in appeals is not enforced, then the result would be that the grant-in-aid which is given to the petitioner-school could be withdrawn. Manifestly, in the absence of recognition by the Government the school will have little practical utility. It cannot be forgotten that a school is a non-profit making institution and depends primarily upon the fees and by the students, donations and the Government grant for meeting its expenses. Without such a grant it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an institution to function. It that is so, it is obvious that if the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education in appeal is not set aside, it will be binding upon the school, and if the school refuse to obey the said order, its recognition and aid could be withdrawn. Therefore, such an order could result in a drastic action. In our opinion, therefore, so far as the School Management is concerned, it stands on an altogether different footing and, therefore, the law laid down by the Court in Sohanlal Fulchand's case (supra) is not applicable to the case of Management. In what circumstances and subject to what conditions a writ petition could be entertained by this Court under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither possible nor advisable to lay dawn any general rule in that behalf. However, so far as the present case is concerned while deciding the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 teacher, the Deputy Director was acting as a non-statutory tribunal discharging the functions of a public nature and was expected to decide the appeal in conformity with the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code. In the present case, the Deputy Director of Education has wholly misconstrued the provisions of the Code and has, therefore, passed an arbitrary order. It is by now fairly settled that even an administrative act of authority which directly affects the rights or interests of a person can be challenged in a proceeding under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. If this is so, in our opinion, such an order can be corrected by this Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, the claim made by the Management before the Deputy Director of Education has been arbitrarily rejected by him on the basis of misinterpretation and misconstructions of the rules themselves. It is no doubt true that the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code are in the nature of executive instructions, but it is also well-settled that even in such cases it is not open to the Government or its officers to depart from its declared policy at it sown sweet will without any rational justification.

The powers which are being exercised by the Deputy Director of Education as appellate authority must be exercised reasonably and in conformity with the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code. To say the least, the said function is in the nature of a quasi-judicial function. If an order passed by the Deputy Director of Education is contrary to the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code, the action could be termed as arbitrary and discriminatory. It amounts to departing from the declared policy of the Government incorporated in the Secondary Schools Code and, therefore, in our opinion, the Management of a school which is likely to lose its grant-in-aid as well as recognition if such an order is not obeyed is entitled to approach this Court for invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the present writ petitioner is maintainable.