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11. The provisions of Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, to the extent it provides that no Court shall exercise the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings are pari materia with Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted in the year 1988, much after the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came into force and the provisions of Section 19(3)(c) have been given overriding effect over the provisions contained in Code of Criminal Procedure. Had the intention of the Legislature been to give the same meaning to the term ‗interlocutory order' in Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, as had been given to this term in the context of Section 397 (2) of the Code, there would have been no necessity of incorporating a specific provision to this effect in Prevention of Corruption Act. Even in the absence of such a provision in Prevention of Corruption Act, revisional powers could not have been used in respect of an interlocutory order, in view of the embargo placed by Section 397(2) of the Code. The Acts of the Legislature are not intended to be superfluous, and the Legislature is presumed to be aware and conscious of all other statutory enactments when it passes a particular legislation. Hence, if the Legislature, despite pre- existence of similar provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, chose to make a specific provision in Prevention of Corruption Act so as to take interlocutory orders out of the purview of revisional jurisdiction of the Court, it could not have intended to give same meaning to the expression ‗interlocutory order' as had been given to this term in the context of the Section 397(2) of the Code. It would also be pertinent to note here that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra), interpreting the expression ‗interlocutory order' in the context of Section 397(2) of the Code, had come many years before Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted in the year 1988. Therefore, the legislative intent obviously was to give a different meaning to this expression in the context of Prevention of Corruption Act and that is why the provisions of Section 19(3)(c) were given overriding effect over the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the term ‗interlocutory order', as used in Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, cannot be given the same meaning as was given to it by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath (supra) and Madhu Limaye (supra). The meaning to be assigned to the expression ‗interlocutory order' in the context of Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act has to be derived considering the objective behind enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, including the mischief which the Legislature intended to do away with by this enactment. This rule, known as ‗purposive construction', enables consideration of the following matter while construing an Act (i) what was the law before making of the Act; (ii) what was the mischief for which the earlier law did not provide; (iii) what is the remedy the Act has provided; (iv) what is the reason of the remedy. This rule requires the Court to adopt a construction which will suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Before enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, orders such as order framing charge or directing framing of charge having been held to be intermediate orders came within the purview of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and resulted in delay of trial by filing revision petitions or petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, obtaining stay orders, summoning the Trial Court Record and thereby thwarting progress of the trial. This defect in the law was sought to be remedied by taking away the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of interlocutory orders and by prohibiting stay of proceedings on any ground whatsoever. The Court must, therefore, give such a construction as would advance the legislative intent, instead of perpetuating the defect which existed in the law before enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

12. One main object behind replacing Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by a new Act in the year 1988 was to expedite the proceedings initiated under Prevention of Corruption Act by providing for day to day trial of cases and incorporating prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory order. It has been experienced that those who are arraigned for trial under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, try to delay the trial, using one or the other method and availing all possible remedies available to them in law, presumably in the hope that with the passage of time, the evidence that can be used against them during trial may not remain available, if they are able to delay the progress of the case, to the extent they can possibly do. Not only final or intermediate orders even interlocutory orders used to be and are still challenged despite the accused knowing it fully well that such orders cannot be subject matter of challenge in revisional jurisdiction. Though there is an absolute bar on stay of proceedings, it is not uncommon for the accused in such cases to seek stay of proceedings on the ground that they are likely to be seriously prejudiced and failure of justice is likely to be occasioned, unless the proceedings are stayed. Even if the Court is not inclined to stay the proceedings, considering the embargo placed by Section 19(3)(b)(c), the accused persons insist upon the record of the trial being summoned, contending that examination of the record would be necessary for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by them. Section 22(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that where the powers under Section 397(1) of the Code are exercised, the Court shall not ordinarily call for the record of the proceedings without giving the other party an opportunity of showing cause why the record should not be called for, or if the Court is satisfied that examination of the record of the proceedings may be made from the certified copies. But it has been experienced that the record is requisitioned in many cases, entertaining the submission of the petitioners to the effect that scrutiny of the original record would be necessary for the purpose of proper and complete appreciation of the controversy involved in the case. As a result, even if there is no stay of proceedings, the trial comes to be stalled on account of the record having been requisitioned by the Superior Court. In fact, Trial Court Record has actually been summoned in Crl.Rev.P. No. 293/2006, 352/2006 and 294/2006 being disposed of this order, which shows that despite legislative restriction, the record of Trial Court continues to be summoned by the Superior Courts. Ordinarily, the accused in such cases command vast material resources and are in a position to have access to the best legal assistance for the purpose of their defence. If an order framing charge or directing framing of charge is held to be an interlocutory order, the inevitable result would be a flood of Revision Petitions challenging such orders, coupled with request for either staying the proceedings in exercise of inherent powers of the Court or seeking summoning of the Trial Court record, thereby staying the trial for all practical purposes. This is yet another reason why the expression ‗interlocutory order' used in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act needs to be interpreted differently from the interpretation given to it in the context of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

13. With a view to expedite the trial of cases, involving offences under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the Legislature has made a number of changes in the regular procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of criminal cases. Special Courts have been constituted for trial of such cases. The Special Judges are required, as far as practicable, to hold the trial on day to day basis. A specific provision has been made placing embargo upon stay of proceedings under Prevention of Corruption Act not only on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction unless such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice, but also on any other ground. Section 243(1) of the Code has been amended so as to require the accused in a corruption case, to give in writing, a list of the persons to whom he proposes to examine as his witnesses and the documents on which he proposes to rely. Another provision made in Section 22(b) of the Act provides that the proceedings shall not be adjourned or postponed merely on the ground that an application under Section 397 has been made by a party to the proceedings. This provision was necessitated since it was experienced that after filing a petition under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused would seek adjournment or postponement of proceedings on the ground that the Revision Petition filed by him was pending before the superior Court, and therefore, the trial Court should keep its hands off the proceedings. A specific provision has been made in Section 317 of the Code providing that the Judge may, for reasons to be recorded by him and if he so thinks fit, proceed with the inquiry or trial in the absence of accused or his pleader and record the evidence of any witness subject to the right of the accused to recall the witnesses for cross-examination. This provision was necessitated experiencing that either accused or his pleader would be absent when the material witnesses are present and that would necessitate adjournment of the case to another date, thereby not only delaying the trial, but also causing inconvenience to the witnesses and putting pressure on them to get tired and exhausted on account of frequent visits to the Court. The objective behind all these provisions is to expedite trial of the cases instituted under Prevention of Corruption Act. If an order framing charge or directing framing of charge in such cases is held to be an interlocutory order, the legislative objective behind enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is likely to be substantially defeated. The virus of corruption continues to eat into the vitals of our character and strength. With Government entering into large commercial contract and making huge purchases with increased expenditure on social welfare schemes and infrastructural projects, the scope for corrupt practices has increased manifold as the schemes and projects of the Government and its instrumentalities are executed only through public servants which gives considerable scope for misconduct on their part. Misuse of powers by those who occupy posts in Government is capable of causing considerable damage to the image and reputation of our country. We, therefore, need to curb and control the growing temptation to make a fast buck and get rich overnight by indulging in corrupt practices. This is possible only if those who indulge in such activities are given swift and deterrent punishment, which, in turn, is possible only if they are tried promptly and expeditiously, unhindered by unnecessary interference from superior Courts. It is with this objective in mind, Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act has been enacted so as to take away the revisional powers of the High Court in the cases involving corruption by public servants.

20. It was contented by the learned counsels for the petitioners that speedy trial is the objective not only behind the enactment of Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, but also behind various provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure which are aimed at curtailing delays and expediting disposal of criminal cases, and therefore, there is no reason to interpret the expression ‗interlocutory order' in Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act differently from the interpretation given to it by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of Code of Criminal Procedure. In my view, the contention is devoid of any merit. Despite the provisions contained interlocutory order the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of V.C. Shukla took the view that an order framing charge is an interlocutory order. The reasons given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for giving a natural meaning and not a wider meaning to the term ‗interlocutory order' in Section 11(i) of the Special Courts Act equally apply to its interpretation in the context of Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act. As noted earlier, the Legislature, despite the provisions contained in the Code, chose to make a specific provision taking away revisional jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the interlocutory orders and the legislative intent needs to be respected and given effect to by the Courts, while interpreting a statutory provision.