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So far as the other contention made by the appellant, namely, that the transfer order is vitiated in view of the fact that the appellant was sought to be reverted to a lower post in violation of the procedure in Rule 9 (l) of IAS (Pay) Rules and Rule 4 of IAS (Cadre) Rules in concerned, it has been contended by the appellant that a Notification issued on January 5, 1991 declaring the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, as equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary, was of no consequence and could not cure the initial defect inasmuch as prior to such Notification issued on January 5, 1991 declaring equivalence of the said posts, the impugned order of transfer was sought to be effected and the respondent No. 4 was allowed to join the post of Chief Secretary pursuant to the order of transfer of the appellant. The Central Administrative Tribunal referred to four documents being Annexures 7, 8, 9 & 10 to the application made by the appellant and also the affidavits filed by the parties and accepted the contention of the respondents that the post of the Secretary was declared equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary and the post of Additional Chief Secretary was also declared equivalent to the post of (Chief Secretary, and such declarations had been made ever since 1980 and the appellant was fully aware of the said position. The Central Administrative Tribunal also accepted the contention of the respondents that in order to avoid any embarrassment and complication, the State Government had also made a declaration on January 4, 1991 prior to the transfer of the appellant that the post of the Secretary, High Power Committee, was equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary but the formal authenticated order declaring the said equivalence was issued next day i.e. January 5, 1991. There was no delay in issuing the declaration and even assuming that there was a delay of one day in making the formal declaration of equivalence, such delay had not nullified and invalidated the decision of the Government. Referring to the various decisions of this Court including the decision made in the case of Babulal v. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others, [19821 2 SCC p.525, the Central Administrative Tribunal indicated that a deviation from the strict procedure prescribed by law would not vitiate an action taken by the Government or public authority in the interest of public unless it could be shown that such an act had resulted in gross injustice to the affected party. The Central Administrative Tribunal held that the appellant could not establish that impugned order had caused any serious injury to him. The Central Administrative Tribunal further held that the appellant had submitted that because of the delay in issuing the declaration strictly in accordance with the Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, the appellant was in dark as to the nature and duties of the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, to which he had been transferred under the impugned order. The Central Administrative Tribunal held that the form and procedure in Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules do not make it obligatory to approach the issue in a judicial or quasi judicial manner and the violation, if any, of Rule 9(1) was only a mere technicality and it did not cause any legal injury or injustice to the appellant. Such violation, even if any, was not so serious that it required a judicial scrutiny by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Central Administrative Tribunal also held that after going through the files leading to the declaration under Rule 9(1) since placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Government had considered the question in detail and sufficiently in advance and had taken a decision to issue the declaration of equivalence on January 4, 1991 and it was a valid decision satisfying the requirement of Rule 9 (1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954. Referring to the allegations of mala fides, the Central Administrative Tribunal came to the finding that the facts were narrated in paragraphs (1) to (w) of paragraph 6 of the application of the appellant. The Tribunal categorically came to the finding that there was no firm foundation to find on facts that the impugned order was vitiated by any mala fide. In that view of the matter, the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed the application made by the appellant. As aforesaid, the said decision is under challenge in this appeal.

Mr. Attorney General has contended that it has been specifically stated by the Chief Minister in his affidavit in opposition that declaration of equivalence was made on January 4, 1991 prior to the impugned order. Mr. Attorney General, has also submitted that even if it is assumed that the publication of declaration of equivalence was made on January 5, 1991 but the impugned order of transfer was made on January 4, 1991, and by that process there has been violation of Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, such violation is a mere technical violation for which no interference by this Court is called for. He has submitted that Central Administrative Tribunal was justified in coming to the finding that no real injury was caused to the appellant for such technical violation, even if any, and as such no interference was called for by the Tribunal against the impugned order of transfer. Mr. Attorney General has contended that interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is not a matter of course. Such interference is required to be made if it conforms both to equity and law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant has not been able to make out any case for such interference within the discretionary remedy of this Court and the appeal should, therefore, be dismissed. Mr. Attorney General has also submitted that the appellant is guilty of suppression of material facts. After the impugned order of transfer, in view of some statements made by the appellant to the Press against Chief Minister, a decision was taken to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the appellant and he was placed under suspension. Such suspension was challenged by the appellant before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore, in Application No. 78 of 1991 and an interim order of stay of the order of suspension was passed in the said proceeding, but subsequent to the filing of the instant special leave petition before this Court, the interim order of stay was vacated by the Administrative Tribunal. In the aforesaid facts, the factum of suspension was required to be disclosed by the appellant. Mr. Attorney General has contended that for suppression of material facts, this Court should refuse to interfere in this appeal and should dismiss the same. He has also contended that in view of order of suspension, the appellant, in any event, cannot be permitted to hold or continue to hold the post of Chief Secretary.

So far as the other contention of the appellant, namely, invalidity of the impugned order of transfer for want of declaration of equivalence under Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules is concerned, it may be indicated that there had already been a declaration when the re-designated post of Secretary, High Power Committee, was established that the said post was equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary. It is the positive stand of the State Government that the posts of Chief Secretary and the Additional Chief Secretary are equivalent. But in the instant case, it is also not necessary to decide the question in detail as to whether in reality both the said posts are not equivalent as sought to be contended by Mr. Venugopal. It appears to us that prior to the impugned orders, a decision to declare the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary of the State had been taken. Since the impugned order of transfer was implemented with immediate effect, the formal publication could not be made on the very same day but was made on January 5, 1991, namely, on the very next day. It appears from the records that the decision to declare equivalence was taken prior to the impugned order of transfer and the formal publication by way of statutory requirement was made in order to give effect to the decision to declare equivalence already taken. In such circumstances, we do not think that the formal declaration made on January S, 1991 invalidates the impugned order of transfer. The Tribunal is justified in holding that infraction, even if any, in making publication formally on January S, 1991, is only a technical violation for which no interference is called for. In the result, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.