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16. Having defined "strike" and "lock-out", the Act prohibits resort to strike or lock-out without following the procedure prescribed. Section 22 makes a distinction between the ordinary industrial establishment and what is known as a "public utility service". The definition of "public utility service" covers most of the public service industries, though it is competent to the Government to declare as a public utility service certain types of other industries which are indicated in the First Schedule to the Act. It is not in dispute that the Appellant has been declared as a "public utility service" within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the 1947 Act. With regard to workmen employed in public utility services, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 imposes a restriction on their right to strike : (a) without giving to the employer notice of strike in the prescribed manner within six weeks before strike; (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice: (c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice and (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. Corresponding restrictions on the right of lock-out of a public utility service are to be found in sub-section (2) of Section 22. Section 23 makes similar restrictions with reference to strikes and lock-outs in non-public utility service industries, with which we are not presently concerned. Then we have Section 24 which declares a strike or a lock-out to be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or 23. Under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the 1947 Act, the Appropriate Government is empowered to refer an industrial dispute between an industry and its workmen and simultaneously prohibit commencement or continuance of a strike or lock-out in such industries.

26. Mr. Cama cited certain judgments and contended that these Judgments, on which he relied, showed that even in a situation such as the one before use. Civil Courts have exercised jurisdiction and granted preventive relief. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees Union (Regd.) & Ors., a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court granted an ad interim injunction restraining the employees' Union from instigating and abetting other employees and resorting to strike, shouting slogans, etc. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the footing that the right to strike is neither fundamental, nor absolute, since restrictions are to be found thereupon in Sections 10(3), 10A(4A), 22 and 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, even if the workmen had a right to go on strike, they could not exercise the said right so as to cause nuisance to the employer, as the right to go on strike was no unlimited. Most of the reliefs pertained to holding demonstrations, circulating and displaying pamphlets or any other material, putting up of pamphlets and banners on the property of the Bank, raising slogans or preventing ingress and egress of any office-bearer, members of the staff and customers of the plaintiff Bank. The Union and the workmen were restrained from instigating, abetting other employees to resort to strike by an ad interim injunction. Similarly, an ad-interim injunction restrained them from resorting to strike without compliance of Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We are extremely doubtful whether the injunctions could have been granted with regard to resort to or instigation of strike, legal or illegal, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Rohtas's case (supra). In any event, these were ad interim injunctions and it is well settled law that ad interim injunctions do not make precedents.

27. Another judgment that was brought to our notice is Indian Oil Corporation v. Oil Sector Officers' Association,. In this case also an ad interim injunction was granted, inter alia, to restrain employees and the Union from going on a strike in contravention of the provisions of section 22(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We are unable to accept the correctness of this view, with respect, for both reasons as already indicated earlier.

28. Mr. Cama then referred to the judgment in All-India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, to highlight that the right to go on strike is not a fundamental right and that the Supreme Court has pointed out that it is not even a statutory right, but a right which is limited by the statute subject to the restrictions under the statute. That is correct. The right to go on strike is not conferred either by the Constitution or by any other statute. On the other hand, statute recognises this as inherent right to every human being who has to render service to another, but seeks to restrict it in the larger interests of society.

29. In Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak, the Supreme Court opined out that though strike was a weapon evolved by the workers' as a form of direct action during their long struggle with the employers, it Is essentially a weapon of last resort being an abnormal aspect of the employer-employee relationship and involves withdrawal of labour disrupting production, services and the running of the enterprise. Hence, the Supreme Court pointed out that industrial legislation, while not denying the right of workmen to strike, has tried to regulate it along with the right of the employer to lock-out and has also provided a machinery for peaceful investigation, settlement, arbitration and adjudication of the disputes between them. Where such industrial legislation is not applicable, the contract of employment and the service rules and regulations, many times, provide for a suitable machinery for resolution of such disputes. In such circumstances, where a machinery for resolution of the industrial dispute is available either under the statute or contract or regulation, the Supreme Court opined that resort to a strike or lock-out as a direct action is, prima facie, unjustified. Under certain circumstances, if the provisions of a statute are breached, it may also be Illegal. The question mooted before us today in the Appeal is not whether the strike resorted to by the Respondent Unions and the workmen represented by them is illegal or unjustified. May be an appropriate forum might hold the strike to be illegal, reasonable and unjustified, and give appropriate reliefs to the Appellant employer. The question before us really is whether the Civil Court is the appropriate forum to decide these issues. In our view, the answer must be an emphatic negative.