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2. The charge of forgery in this case has been the subject of considerable argument and has given rise to two or three questions of some importance in law, which, I think, should be dealt with before I go to the facts, The first point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants was that in view of the provisions of Section 195 (1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was not open to the Sessions Court to take cognizance of the offence of forgery described in Section 463 without the complaint of the committing Magistrate, and in support of that proposition the learned Counsel referred to a number of cases, viz., Bhau Vyanhatesh, In re (1925) I.L.R. 49 Bom. 608 : s.c. 27 Bom. L.R. 697, Nalini Kanta Laha v. Anukul Chandra Laha (1917) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 1002, and Kanhai-ya Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1925) I.L.R. 48 All. 60; and the learned Government Pleader has quoted Noor Mahomed v. Kaikhosru (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 263. But the point which arises in all these cases is not one which arises in the present case at all, Those are all cases in which a document produced in a Court in connection either with civil proceedings or with proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 145, or in some matter unconnected with the actual offence of forgery, has been found to be a forged document, and no prosecution for the offence of forgery could be taken cognizance of by a criminal Court except on the complaint of the Court in which the document was produced or given in evidence. But that is entirely different to the facts of the present case where the document was produced in Court not in connection with any other case, but in a prosecution founded upon it, for the purpose of convicting the accused of an offence in relation to it, and none of the cases which have been quoted will apply. No question of giving sanction by the committing Magistrate could arise when he himself was considering the question of what charge should be framed on this document. The first objection, therefore, in my opinion, does not stand.

Broomfield, J.

10. The facts of this case have been detailed in the judgment of my learned brother. The framing of the charge of forgery by the Sessions Judge has given rise to some interesting points of law, The first point taken by counsel for the appellants is that Section 195 (1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code prevented the Sessions Judge from taking cognizance of the offence of forgery in the absence of a complaint from the committing Magistrate in whose Court the diary alleged to have been forged was first produced. Section 195 (1)(c) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. The question is whether that provision applies in the present case. The offence of forgery is no doubt alleged to have been committed in respect of a document which was produced before the committing Magistrate, and at the time of the production accused No. 1 was of course a party to the proceeding. But he was not a party to the proceeding at the time the forgery is alleged to have been committed, and at the time the document was made use of by him there was no proceeding in Court at all. The diary is alleged to have been forged sometime between July 18 and 23, after the accused was suspended on July 17, The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Exhibit 71, states that he got orders to register the offence under Sections 330 and 348 of the Indian Penal Code on July 19, and sent up the charge sheet under those sections on August 24. The diary Exhibit 34 was sent to the Magistrate subsequently by the Police with a request to frame a charge under Section 218 of the Indian Penal Code. It is important to note the terms of the charge which the Sessions Judge framed under Section 465, which are as follows :-

11. In support of his contention that the sanction or complaint of the committing Magistrate was not necessary the learned Government Pleader referred us to the case of Noor Mahomed v. Kaikhosru (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 268 The facts there were that before the criminal prosecution for forgery there had been litigation in the Bombay Court of Small Causes in which the document alleged to be a forgery (a cheque) had been produced by the defendant who was afterwards the accused. A question was raised whether sanction under Section 195 (1)(c) was necessary and the Chief Presidency Magistrate referred to the High Court the following question: " Whether in the event of an offence punishable under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code being made out in a complaint, the use complained of being prior in date to the use of the document in question in evidence in civil Court, the sanction of such Court is necessary under Section 195 (1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure-Code, before a criminal Court can take cognizance of such offence." The judgment of this Court was as follows:-"The Court thinks that the answer to the question put by the Chief Presidency Magistrate should be in the negative. Sanction under Section 195 (1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code for an offence under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code is not necessary in respect of a use made outside the Court." That is no doubt an authority for holding that a complaint under Section 195 (1)(c) would not be necessary in the present case. This decision was not approved of by the High Court of Calcutta in Nalini Kanta Laha v. Anukul Chandra Laha (1917) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 1002; and the High Court of Allahabad in Kanhaiya Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1925) I.L.R. 48 All. 60 expressed the opinion that the decision was obsolete in view of the alteration of the language of Section 195 (i)(c) by the amending Act of 1928. Instead of the words " when such offence is alleged to have been committed " the clause originally ran "when such offence has been committed." With great respect I doubt very much whether this alteration in the language can really be said to have made any difference to the meaning. It is obviously incorrect to say that an offence has been committed before the Court has even taken cognizance of the case, and I think the presumption is that the legislature merely intended to give more appropriate expression to what must all along have been the meaning of the provision. At the same time the judgment in Noor Mahomad v. Kaikhosru is very brief and no reasons were given for it. In view of the contrary decisions of other High Courts, it may perhaps be necessary at some other time to consider whether the law was correctly stated on the facts of that case. However, it is not necessary to express any opinion on that point here, because the facts in that case, and in the other cases to which reference has been made, are clearly distinguishable from those with which we have to deal.

12. We have not been referred to any other case where the question of the necessity for sanction or complaint arose in respect of a document alleged to be forged which was produced for the first time at the trial or in the inquiry preliminary to the trial of the' forgery itself. The cases cited were all cases of production of the document in an independent proceeding. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the Police here had treated this as an offence of forgery and not as an offence under Section 218. In that case there could have been no question of moving any Court to make a complaint, because the document had not been produced in any proceeding in Court. The only thing that could be done would be to send up the accused for trial or for the Magisterial inquiry preliminary to the trial, At the same time, of course, the document alleged to be forged, the corpus delicti so to speak, would have to be produced in Court. Mr. Velinker's argument would require us to hold that the Court instead of inquiring into the case or trying it could do nothing but make a complaint and send it to some other Court to deal with. That, I think, would be an absurdity which the legislature can hardly have intended and it would be equally absurd to require a complaint of another Court when the Sessions Judge frames the charge himself. There is nothing in any of the cases cited which would make it necessary for us to hold a complaint to be necessary in such a case, and, in my opinion, Section 195 (1)(c) has no application when the document which is alleged to be forged is produced at the trial of the person alleged to have -forged it, not having been produced in any independent proceeding.