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16. Section 457 Cr.P.C. deals with the complementary situation precisely the one the WLPA creates through Section 50(4), namely, when a seizure is reported to the Magistrate but the property is not produced before any Criminal Court during inquiry or trial. In such cases, "the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof," or, if that person cannot be ascertained, make appropriate orders; subsection (2) provides for an order if necessary. This harmonises with WLPA Section 50(4), which obligates the seizing officer to "forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction." Read together, WLPA Section 50(4) places the weapon within the Magistrate's supervisory orbit, and Section 457 Cr.P.C. confers the very power to regulate its interim custody or delivery when it has not (or not yet) been produced in Court. The statutory architecture thus channels executive seizure into judicial control.

19. Consolidated reading of these provisions together yields a coherent rule that is directly applicable to WLPA seizures of weapons:

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(i) seizure of a weapon used in an alleged wildlife offence is reported forthwith to the jurisdictional Magistrate (Section 50(4), WLPA);
(ii) from that moment, the Magistrate exercises judicial supervision over its custody under Section 457 Cr.P.C., if it is not produced in Court, and under Section 451, if it is produced;

25. It is true that in Lalloo Singh (Supra), as also observed in the impugned judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressly observed that "the High Court is not justified in holding that Section 457 of the Code has application." This sentence, however, cannot be read in isolation. The Court's reasoning, when read in a comprehensive manner, makes it clear that the objection was directed not against the Magistrate's power to regulate custody, but against a mechanical transposition of Section 457 Cr.P.C. to a statutory scheme where seizure is carried out not by a "police officer" but by officials under the WLPA. The ratio of Lalloo Singh (Supra) is not that the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction, but rather that jurisdiction does not arise from a precise application of Section 457 in isolation. It arises from the combined reading of Section 50 WLPA with the general powers of the Magistrate under the Cr.P.C. to regulate seized property. Indeed, the Court itself held that when property is taken before a Magistrate, he "can pass appropriate orders in respect of the purported seized property." The doctrinal takeaway is thus: while Section 457 Cr.P.C. may not apply textually to WLPA seizures, the Magistrate nevertheless retains the jurisdiction to make custody orders because Section 50(4) expressly contemplates judicial oversight, and such oversight necessarily operates through the procedural machinery of the Cr.P.C.

32. It is pertinent to note that, as of now, there is no instructions received as to any independent confiscation proceedings having been initiated under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, by the authorised officers. In the absence of such proceedings, the only jurisdictional framework presently available is that under Section 50(4) of the Act, read together with Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Consequently, the property in question, having been seized and duly reported, is to be dealt with by the Magistrate "in accordance with law," and the general powers conferred under Sections 451 and 457 Cr.P.C. stand attracted. To assume otherwise would amount to reading into the statute a bar which the legislature has not expressly enacted.