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The terms "assigned land" and "landless poor person" are defined in the Act by sub-sec. (1) and (3) of S. 2 as follows :

"(1) "assigned land" means land assigned by the Government to the landless poor persons under the rules for the time being in force, subject to the condition of non-alienation and includes lands allotted or transferred to landless poor persons under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to land ceilings; and the word "assigned" shall be construed accordingly;"

3. In spite of the forceful argument advanced by the counsel for the writ petitioners, we do not find ourselves persuaded to agree with the view expressed by the Single Bench, affirmed by the First Division Bench. The Single Bench found on facts that the vendor, Nagaiah was not shown to be a 'landless poor person' that the land involved in the case was not an 'assigned land' as defined in S. 2(1) of the Act; hence the Act itself could not be applied. Whatever observation the learned Judge made on the basis of the discussion in the concluding paras 7 and 8 in the judgment is on a hypothesis that there existed a 'landless poor person' and an assigned land, which in fact, as found by the learned Judge himself, did not exist; and could not, therefore, form the ratio decidendi of that case. The conspicuous absence of any discussion whatsoever on the pivotal expression 'and shall be deemed never to have been transferred' in S. 3(1) of the Act, which was the material expression that was required to be construed, also diminished the binding nature, may even persuasive value, of the decision. It is also noticed that instead of interpreting the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, giving them the natural and the plain meaning of the language, what the learned Judge is seen to have done is to restrict the scope and meaning of the sub-section, referring to the statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bill, which according to the learned Judge, indicated that the intendment of the Act was to prohibit alienations of lands assigned to landless poor persons. The learned Judge went further to hold that the Statement of Objects and Reasons also indicated that the prohibition of transfer sought to be made null and void under the Act was prospective but not retrospective. Before the First Division Bench which affirmed the decision of the Single Bench, it was argued on behalf of the State (appellant) that the learned single Judge had, while construing sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, lost sight of the implications contained in sub-sec. (5) of that Section, which reads as follows :

4. The Government had been assigning Govt. lands to landless poor persons who had no other means of livelihood, over the past few decades the avowed object being the improvement of the economic lot of the assignees. The rules governing such assignment of lands and the pattas granted thereunder invariably contained a clause that the lands assigned were heritable, but not alienable, in the hope that such restrictions would prevent the deprival to the poor landless persons of the land assigned to them. As experience would have it, this hope, however proved to be false. In most cases, the condition attached to the assignment was honoured in its breach; and the lands assigned found their way to the possession of money-lenders and moneyed class of people, the landless poor remaining landless poor, as before. Earlier by G.O.Ms. No. 1142 dt. 18-6-1954 the Government sought to resume the lands which were transferred by the original grantees in violation of the condition attached to the grant, but that was found to be too ineffective and too inadequate to achieve the social goal set by the Government. This realisation in the light of the unfortunate experience of the past led the legislature in its wisdom and in pursuance of its declared policy of safeguarding, protecting and improving the condition of the weaker section of the community consisting of landless poor persons, to bring about this change in the legal position by providing that any such transactions would be null and void not merely voidable. This is not only consistent with the mandates in the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of our Constitution, but also in consonance with the Contract Act which provided that any contract which is opposed to public policy would be rendered void. In all these cases, the purchasers would not claim to have acted with bona fides inasmuch as it was with full knowledge that the grantee was not entitled to alienate the lands, and in violation of that condition, that the lands had been so purchased. Voidable transactions could be legally avoided; and that has been done by law in order to avoid the agony of protracted litigation in which the exploited and the deprived would be locked up if the redressal of the grievance by the restoration to them of the land lost to them, is to be obtained by legal proceedings. The legislature undoubtedly is competent to pass an enactment providing that transfers of such assigned lands would be void, not merely voidable for properly safeguarding the interests of the landless poor for whose benefit alone these lands had been granted. The Supreme Court had in Sri Manchegowda's case, occasion to consider the constitutional validity of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act 2 of 1979, the scheme of which is in substance identical of that of the Act (Act 9 of 1977 of Andhra Pradesh) though there are slight variations in expressions used. Towards the end of para 12 at page 1156 of the report, the Supreme Court in that decision, stated as follows :

6. In that case, the Supreme Court also held that the provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Act did not violate either Art. 19(1) (f) which was in force at the relevant time, or Art. 14 of the Constitution.

7. The counsel for the writ petitioners drew our attention to paras 133 and 134 (at pages 576 and 577) of the decision of the Supreme Court in Privy Purse case and stressed that the attempt of the Court should be to interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeably to justice and reason and that in case of two or more interpretations possible, one which was more reasonable and just should be adopted, for there was always a presumption against the law-maker intending injustice and unreason; and the Court would avoid imputing to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision which flouts notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and unambiguous. The Supreme Court has, we notice observed in the very same decision, that a provision in a statute would not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general values which animate its structure. In this case, as we have already seen, it is only the defeasible right which was voidable that is sought to be avoided by the intervention of the legislation. The manifest intention of the Legislature is to save the landless poor persons from the clutches of the rich and the resourceful, who deprived them of the precious little, the small plots of land assigned to them by the Government, which alone provided them occupation and the source of livelihood. While interpreting the provisions of a progressive legislation, like the one relating to assignment of land to the landless poor persons, satisfaction of the judicial conscience, inspired and guided by our democratic Constitution wedded to socialism would lie in the discovery of the true spirit of the legislative purpose and giving full effect to the policy behind such legislation without adopting a negative approach to defeat the policy of the Legislature. What impelled the Legislature to bring forward a fairly comprehensive legislation to restore the assigned lands to the original grantees is the realisation of the grave injustice done to them by the affluent segment of the society who sought to become richer by exploiting them, the poor landless people, because of their ignorance, illiteracy and social economic backwardness. Justice and fairplay lie in repairing the damage done to them by nothing less than the restoration of the lands which they had been grabbed by the moneyed class often than not by unscrupulous methods, in violation of the condition attached to the grant of the land to them (the landless poor). According to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition page 225) "The rule against retrospective operation is a presumption only, and as such it may be overcome, not only by express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it. The decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Straw Products, and Chanan Singh v. Jai Kaur, cited also are for the well-accepted principle that in the absence of manifest expression to the contrary the legislation would be prospective in operation. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Manchegouda's case, (supra) has placed the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions beyond the pale of doubt. The presence of the expression "and shall be deemed never to have been transferred" in sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act is the unmistakable indication that the Legislature intended the invalidation of the transfer of assigned land retrospectively also. Decisions rendered in cases where there was absence of such an expressed provision indicating retrospective operation of the provision would not be of any assistance to decide the question in issue here.