Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

So long as the fourth defendant is the person against whom the property or right is claimed, it does not matter whether at the moment of his making the acknowledgment, the claim could have been enforced.

13. The same view was taken by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Mathdi v. Annamma I.L.R. (1955) Tra. Co. 1224. In Pena Parayan Ambalam v. Venkatachalam Chettiar . Ramaswami, J., gave expression to his inclination to accept the view taken in the above cases, but it was not necessary for the learned Judge to decide the question finally for the purpose of disposal of the case before him. More recently Sadasiyam, J., gave expression to quite a different view in Devad]asan v. Kalikunji . The learned Judge appears to have been under a misapprehension that Ramaswami, J., had based his conclusion on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Fakirchand Jankiram v. Narmadabai Tulasiram I.L.R. (1943) Bom. 701. This decision was overruled on appeal in Fakirchand Jankiram v. Narmadabai Tulsiram I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 827. It will be seen from the judgment of Ramasami, J., in Pena Parayan Ambalam v. Venkatachalam Chettiar that the learned Judge was conscious of the fact that the decision of Lokhur, J., in Fakirchand Jankiram v. Narmadabhai Tulsiram I.L.R. (1943) Bom. 701 had been set aside on appeal. Although Sadasivam, J., has given no other reason for coming to the conclusion he did, we consider that his view is consistent with the provisions of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act construed in the light of certain well understood principles.

17. The requirement that the person acknowledging should have an interest which would suffer by that acknowledgment at the time when it is made is a real one and not based merely upon any principle of estoppel similar to the one contained in Section 42 of the Transfer of Property Act.

18. In Fakirchand Jankiram v. Narmadabai Tulsiram I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 827 the Bombay High Court held that an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act must be an admission of a present liability of the person acknowledging corresponding to a present right in someone else. Mudholkar, J., (as he then was) was inclined to take the same view in Jivan Lal v. Ram Rao A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 240. We ourselves are of the opinion that the decision of Bombay High Court in Fakirchand Jankiram v. Narmadabai Tulsiram I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 827 is one which is in accord with the true meaning of the word acknowledgment in Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and that it must be accepted in preference to the decision in Jugal Kishore v. Fakhr-ud-Din (1906) I.L.R. 29 All. 90. It must follow that neither the preference shown by Ramaswami, J., in Pena Parayan Ambalam v. Venkatachalam Chettiar nor the decision of Jackson, J., in Krishnayya v. Venkatappayya A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 134 can be regarded as correct. We accept the decision of Sadasivam J., in Devadasan v. Kali Kunji and answer the question set out at the beginning of this judgment accordingly.