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It is on this principle that when a widow succeeds to her husband's estate as heir and then makes an adoption, the adopted son is held entitled, as preferential heir, to divest her of the estate. It is on the same principle that when a son dies unmarried and his mother succeeds to his estate as his heir, and then makes an adoption to h er husband, that adopted son is held entitled to divest her of the estate. (Vide Vellanki Venkata v. Venkatarama(1) and Verabhai v. Bhai Hiraba(2). The application of this principle when the adoption was made to a deceased coparcener raised questions of some difficulty. If a joint family consisted of two brothers A and B, and A died leaving a widow and the properties were taken by survivorship by B, and then W took a boy X in adoption, the question was whether the adopted son could claim a half share in the estate to which A was entitled. It was answered in the affirmative on the ground that his adoption -related back to the date of the death of A. But suppose before W makes an adoption, B dies leaving no son but a widow C and the estate devolves on her, can W thereafter make an adoption so as to confer any rights on X to the estate in the hands of C ? It was held in Chandra v. Gojarabai(3) that the power to make an adoption so as to confer a right on the adopted son could be exercised only so long as the coparcenary of which the adoptive father was a member subsisted, and that when the last of the coparceners died and the properties thereafter devolved on his (1) 4 I.A. 1 (3) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 463.

(2) 30 I.A. 234.

heir, the coparcenary had ceased to exist, and that therefore W could not adopt so as to divest the estate which had vested in the heir of the last coparcener. In view of the pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in Pratapsing Shivsing v. Agarsingji Raisingji(1) and Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh(2) that the validity of an adoption did not depend on whether the adopted son could divest an estate which had devolved by inheritance or not, a Fall Bench of the Bombay High Court held in Balu Sakharam v. Lahoo Sambhaji(3) that in such cases the adoption would be valid, but that the estate which had devolved upon the heir could not be divested. In Anant Bhikappa Patil (Minor) v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil(4), the Privy Council dissented from this view, and held that the coparcenary must be held to subsist so long as there was in existence a widow of a coparcerier capable of bringing a son into existence by adoption, and if she made an adoption, the rights of the adopted son would be the same as if he had been in existence at the time when his adoptive father died, and that his title as coparcener would prevail as against the title of any person claiming as heir of the last coparcener. In substance, the estate in the hands of such heir was treated as impressed with the character of coparcenary property so long as there was a widow alive who could make an adoption. This principle was re-affirmed in Neelangouda Limbangouda v. Ujjan Gouda(5). Thus far, the scope of the principle of relation back is clear. It applies only when the claim made by the adopted son relates to the -estate of his adoptive father. This estate may be definite and ascertained as when he is the 'sole and absolute owner of the properties, or it may be fluctuating as when he is a member of a joint Hindu family, in which the interest of the coparceners is liable to increase by death or decrease by birth. In either case, it is the interest of the adoptive father which the adopted son is declared entitled to take as on the date of his death. The point for (1) 46 I.A. 97. (4) 70 I.A. 232.

We next come to the decision in Anant Bhikappa Patil (Minor) v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil(2). The facts of that case were that one Bhikappa died in 1905, leaving him surviving his widow, Gangabai, and an undivided son Keshav. In 1908 Narayan, the divided brother of Bhikappa died, and Keshav succeeded to his properties as heir. In 1917 Keshav died unmarried, and as the properties were Watan lands, they devolved on a collateral, Shankar. In 1930 Gangabai adopted Anant, and he sued Shankar to recover possession of the properties as the adopted son of Bhikappa. The High Court had held that as the joint family ceased to exist in 1917 when-Keshav died, and as the properties had devolved on Shankar as his heir, the adoption, though valid, could not divest him of those properties. The Privy Council held that the coparcenary must be taken to continue so long as there was alive a widow of the deceased coparcener, and that GaDgabai's adoption had the effect of vesting the family estate in Anant, even though it had descended on Shankar as the heir of Keshav. The decision so far as it relates to joint family properties calls for no comment. When once it is held that the coparcenary subsists so long as there is a widow of a coparcener alive, the conclusion must follow that the adoption of Anant by Gangabai was valid and operated to vest in him the joint family properties which had devolved on Shankar. Then, there were the properties 'which Keshav had inherited from Narayan , -which had also devolved on Shankar as his (1) 60 I-A, 242.

(2) 12 I.A. 137. (4) 2 B.L.R. 103 F.B. interest as that must carry with it the liability to be divested by the introduction of a new coparcener by adoption. This reasoning, however, is wholly inapplicable to property which is not held in coparcenary, such as the estate of a collateral devolving by inheritance. The judgment then refers to the decisions of the Board in Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh(1) and Vijaysingji Chhatrasingji v. Shivsangji Bhimsangji(2), and it is observed that the impartible estates which were concerned therein were treated as separate property and not as joint family property, a conclusion which does not settle the question, because even on the footing that the estates were separate properties, no question of collateral succession was involved in them, the claim under litigation being' in respect of the estate of the adoptive father and covered by the principle already established in Vellanki Venkata v. Venkatarama (3) and Verabhai v. Bhai Hiraba (4). Then follows the conclusion already quoted that no distinction can be drawn between properties which come from the father and properties which come from others. This is to ignore the principle that the doctrine of relation back based on the notion of continuity of line can apply and had been applied, only to the estate of the adoptive father and not of collaterals. We may now turn to Jivaji Annaji v. Hanmant Ram. Chandra (5) wherein the scope of the decision in Anant Bhikappa Patil (Minor) v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil (6) came up for consideration. There, the material facts were that Keshav and Annappa who were members of a joint family effected a partition, and thereafter, Annappa died in 1901, leaving behind a widow, Tungabai. Keshav died leaving behind a son, Vishnu, who died in 1918 without male issue, and the property being Watan lands devolved on a collateral called Hanmant as his heir. In 1922 Tungabai adopted Jivaji. The question was whether he was entitled to divest the properties which had become vested in Hanmant as the preferential heir of Vishnu, and the decision was that he was not. It will be noticed that (1)60 I.A. 242. (4) 30 I.A. 234.