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The compromise cannot be treated as the decree. If either party seeks to specifically enforce any term of the compromise, not only would it not be a case of executing the decree but also any question relating to the execution etc. of the compromise would not fall within the scope of Section 47 and cannot be determined by the executing court. If it cannot determine any question relating to the execution etc. of the compromise it means that it cannot execute the compromise. It is all the time concerned with the decree, whether in respect of its execution or in respect of its discharge or satisfaction. If a compromise that has the effect of discharging or satisfying it or preventing its execution is brought to its notice, it will certainly be bound to consider it, but only for the purpose of seeing whether the decree should be executed or not.

4. From the proposition that a decree after being passed cannot be varied even by the parties acting in agreement or by any court at their instance, it follows that if there is a compromise varying its terms, so long as the decree is not set aside by a competent court it remains executable. If the compromise also becomes executable, it would result in an anomalous position of there being two different liabilities operating against the judgment-debtor in respect of the same subject-matter. It cannot be disputed that both the decree and the compromise cannot be executed against him simultaneously or one after the other. The liability under the compromise cannot be enforced against him unless the decretal liability has been or stands cancelled.

Considering this question their Lordships stated.

"The authority relied upon by the learned Judges of the Chief Court is ILR 54 All 573: (AIR 1932 All 273), and the principle invoked is that the original decree cannot be altered or varied by the parties even with the sanction of the Court and that in any case mere consent of the parties cannot confer such a jurisdiction on the executing Court. This line of reasoning is not without support from other decisions of the Indian High Courts though authority and practice to the contrary is also to be found. On this difficult and important question, their Lordships are not in agreement with the view taken by the Chief Court. They do not consider that it takes sufficient account of the facts that the Code contains no general restriction of the parties' liberty of contract with reference to their rights and obligations under the decree and that if they do contract upon terms which have reference to and effect the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, the provisions of Section 47, involve that questions relating to such terms may fall to be determined by the executing Court...... No doubt an adjustment, if not recorded under Order 21 Rule 2, cannot be recognised by any Court executing the decree. The compromise of 1927 however was recorded: it was an adjustment even if it was something more, and it contained the terms upon which the adjustment was agreed to. It was not an attempt to bring under the decree a liability extraneous to the mortgage or the mortgage suit; of Pradyumna Kumar Mullick v. Dinendra Mullick, 64 Ind App 302 at p. 308; (AIR 1937 PC 236 at p. 259). Their Lordships see nothing in the Code requiring them to hold that had the judgment-debtor paid the agreed instalments punctually the appellants, after 1927, could have executed the decree for the whole sum outstanding contrary to the terms of the compromise. Nor do they think it reasonable that such a compromise, if enforced by the executing Court, should not be enforced as a whole. They are not prepared to regard a fair and ordinary bargain for time in consideration of a reasonable rate of interest as an attempt to give jurisdiction to a Court to amend or vary the decree. Such a bargain has its effect upon the parties rights under the decree and the executing Court under Section 47 has jurisdiction to ascertain its legal effect and to order accordingly. It may or may not be that any and every bargain which would interfere with the right of the decree-holder to have execution according to the tenor of the decree comes under the term 'adjustment': on that their Lordships do not pronounce. Nor will they here consider what consequences would flow from a finding that a particular bargain for time was not an adjustment. In the absence of express statutory authority it is not possible in their Lordships' view to regard Order 20, Rule 10, as excluding any possibility of the parties coming to a valid agreement for time to which the Court under Section 47 will have regard. The rule does not apply to all decrees; but only to decrees for the payment of money in so far as they are of that character."

44. Again in Meghraj Ramkaranji v. Kesarimal Rikhabchand, AIR 1948 Nag 35, a Bench of the Nagpnr High Court held:

"Agreements to compromise a claim to execute a decree may be divided into three classes. In the first class of agreement, the decree-holder agrees to give up all his rights under the decree on the judgment-debtors' doing something or other, and there is no adjustment until the judgment-debtor hits done whatever he promised. The second class of agreement is where the decree-holder agrees to give up all his rights under the decree in return for a promise by the judgment-debtor to do something or the other; on the recording of such an adjustment, the decree becomes fully satisfied and the decree-holder can enforce the fulfilment of the judgment-debtor's promise only by a separate suit..... The third class of agreement is one in which the parties agreed that the decree shall be modified in some way or other and that the decree-holder shall be entitled to execute the decree as modified but not the original decree. The question of the class in which the compromise falls is a question of fact."