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3. Mr. Bandyopadhyay was allowed to argue the point of jurisdiction of the third respondent to initiate the proceeding under the 1971 Act, notwithstanding the fact of presentation of this writ petition beyond the period stipulated for filing an appeal under Section 9 thereof and I propose to dispose of such point by this judgment.

4. According to Mr. Bandyopadhyay, the said plots originally belonged to Bengal Assam Railway and were allotted in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner as a measure of economic rehabilitation in 1942 by a memorandum of agreement. Although with the nationalization of the railway the said plots became the property of the Central Government, the relationship between the railway and the petitioner continued to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act (hereafter the 1882 Act) and the 1971 Act which was enacted much later could not have been pressed into service for the purpose of securing the eviction of the petitioner having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2014) 4 SCC 657 [Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.] and, therefore, initiation of the proceeding being without jurisdiction, it is the solemn duty of the Court to undo the legal wrong to which the petitioner has been subjected.

5. It was also urged by Mr. Bandopadhyay by referring to a previous writ petition of the petitioner, which is pending, that the third respondent ought not to have commenced and continued the proceeding without obtaining the leave of this Court.

6. The only point that arises for consideration in view of the decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) and the pending writ petition is, whether the proceeding initiated against the petitioner under the 1971 Act ought to be interdicted for want of jurisdiction.

7. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties, I have no hesitation to hold that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is without merit and the writ petition deserves dismissal without even calling upon the respondents to file an affidavit placing on record their version.

8. Since part of the claim of the petitioner rests wholly on the law laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), it would be useful to consider the facts of that case and the dictum of the Supreme Court bearing in mind such facts. The Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereafter the IMICL) had inducted a tenant, Mr. Eric Voller (hereafter Mr. Voller) in the premises in question (hereafter the said premises). A leave and license agreement was executed on December 20, 1972 by and between Mr. Voller and Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (hereafter the appellant) in pursuance whereof the appellant was put in exclusive possession of such premises initially for a period of two years. The owner of the premises i.e. the IMICL did not object to the appellant being delivered exclusive possession and the general manager thereof accepted the appellant as a tenant only for residential purpose. The appellant started paying rent to the IMICL. On March 14, 1973, the appellant sought for permission of the general manager to use the said premises for his clinic whereupon the general manager on April 18, 1973 conveyed that the IMICL would have no objection to the change of user, provided the Municipal Corporation of greater Mumbai gave its no objection. On or about January 1, 1974, the IMICL merged into the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (hereafter the respondent), a Government company. A notice dated July 12, 1980 was issued by the respondent to Mr. Voller terminating his tenancy and, thereafter, a suit for eviction was instituted against Mr. Voller and the appellant in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay under the provisions of the then applicable Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rents Control Act, 1947. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant by his letter dated November 22, 1984 requested the respondent to regularize his tenancy as a statutory tenant; however, the appellant was served notices under Sections 4 and 7 of the 1971 Act whereby he was called upon to show cause why he should not be evicted from the said premises and to pay damages for unauthorized occupation. Failure of the appellant to vacate the said premises led to initiation of proceeding by the Estate Officer under the 1971 Act, whereafter the respondent withdrew the suit on February 22, 1994. The proceeding under the 1971 Act culminated in passing of an order dated May 28, 1993 by the Estate Officer directing eviction of Mr. Voller and the appellant, and also for recovery of damages @ Rs. 6750 per month from September 1, 1980. An appeal under Section 9 of the Act preferred by the appellant resulted in a remand but on remand the order of eviction was maintained. The Bombay High Court was then approached with a writ petition, which was dismissed on June 7, 2010 with costs. It was the dismissal order that was the subject matter of the civil appeal before the Supreme Court.

17. I have not been able to locate any law laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) to the extent that the 1971 Act would have no application in cases where the tenancy/lease in respect of 'public premises' belonging to the Central Government came into existence prior to September 16, 1958. That was really not an issue there and it is axiomatic that the fact situation did not warrant such a finding being returned in that regard.

18. Now, adverting attention to paragraph 64 of the decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), it is noticed that the two categories of occupants for whom exclusion of coverage of the 1971 Act has been adumbrated therein are the "occupants of (sic premises of) these public corporations", and not the occupants of premises belonging to the Central Government. It is settled by a catena of judicial pronouncements that a line here or there in a judgment of a superior court need not be read as a statute. In fact in the said decision the learned Judge referred to the oft-quoted saying that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The Supreme Court carved out exceptions applicable to public premises belonging to public corporations, which cannot be extended to public premises belonging to the Central Government. The decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is clearly distinguishable and does not, therefore, aid the petitioner.