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6. Turning now to the contentions raised on merits, the first contention which needs consideration in the instant writ petitions is whether it was competent for the Central Government to authorise the officers of the State Government for the purpose of exercise of its powers under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the provisions of Article 73(1) and Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India to show that no such delegation of executive power of the Union Government is permissible hereunder. In appreciating the above submission made on behalf of the petitioners it may be seen that section 3(ee) of the Act defines the expression "appropriate Government" to mean, in relation to the acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and in relation to the acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. In sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act the "appropriate Government" would thus mean that if the land to be acquired is for the public purpose of the Union Government, then the appropriate Government for exercising the power there under would be the Union Government and for all other public purposes the appropriate Government would be the State Government there under. It is not in dispute that the land in question of the petitioners is being acquired for the purpose of approach lights for night landing at the airport at Aurangabad, which is the purpose of the Union Government. It is, therefore, not in dispute that the appropriate Government in this regard would be the Union Government.

8. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners on the basis of Article 73(1), Article 258(1) and Article 298 of the Constitution is, however, no more res integra and is fully answered in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayantilal v. F.N. Rana & ors., . It is held by the majority view in the said case that except the functions or the powers which are vested in the president by the constitution and which are incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any authority or body under Article 258(1), the President can delegate under Article 258(1) of the Constitution the functions of the Union Government. After pointing out the distinction between the executive, legislative and judicial functions, the majority view held that the Notification issued by the President under Article 258(1) of the Constitution had the force of law within the meaning of section 87 read with section 2(d) of the Bombay Re-organisation Act. It held that by virtue of Article 73(1)(a), the executive power of the Union extends to the acquisition of property for the Union because the acquisition of property is a subject-matter covered by Item 42 of List III, i.e. the concurrent list in the Seventh Schedule, upon which the Parliament has power to make laws. As regards the requirement of the proviso to Article 73(1) about there being express provision in the Constitution or in any law made by the Parliament for the executive power of the Union to extend in any State upon matters with respect to which the State has also power to make laws, it held that the said requirement is satisfied by virtue of the provisions of Article 298 of the Constitution under which the power of the Union extends to carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. It then interpreted the expression "acquisition, holding and disposal of property" used in Article 298 to include compulsory acquisition of property also.

9. We may venture to state that the delegation of functions of the Union in relation to matters under the concurrent list can be rested solely upon Article 258(1) itself without taking recourse to Article 298 because in view of the non-obstinate clause used therein it can operate despite the proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution which requires an express provision in the Constitution or in the law by the Parliament for the executive power of the Union to extend in the State. It may be seen that when the functions of the Union in respect of matters over which it has power to legislate can be entrusted to the State Government or its officers with the consent of the State Government under Article 258(1) and can be entrusted to it or its officers without its consent by a law enacted by the Parliament as provided in Article 258(2) there is no reason why the proviso to Article 73(1) should not be held to be dispensed with by the non-obstante clause in Article 258(1).

11. It is, however, urged that since the acquisition of land is for the purpose of approach lights for night landing at the airport, which subject matter is covered by Entry No. 29 in the Union List, i.e. the exclusive list of the Union relating to airways, air-craft and air navigation, provision for aerodromes, regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes, such power could not have been delegated to the officers under Article 73(1) and Article 258(1) of the Constitution. The above contention in fact runs counter to the language used in Article 73(1)(a) and Article 258(1) because it is precisely in respect of the matters in the Union List that the delegation of the functions of the Union Government is provided in Article 258(1) of the Constitution . As regards the matters in the Concurrent List in regard to which the State has also power to legislate unless there is an express provision in the Constitution such as Article 298 relied upon in the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayantilal's case, cited supra, or in the law made by the Parliament the executive functions of the Union Government do not extend in the State in view of the proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution.