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2.10 On 23rd July, 2024, the Petitioner issued another Memorandum urging Respondent No. 3, to immediately his duties at NPTI (ER), Durgapur. 2.11 On 26th July, 2024, the CCPD issued a subsequent notice summoning the Petitioner to appear on 30th July, 2024. Meanwhile, Respondent No. 3, in an email dated 29th July, 2024, again assured the Petitioner of his intention to join NPTI (ER), Durgapur, contingent upon medical clearance. 2.12 Concurrently, Respondent No. 3 pursued his complaint before the CCPD, who, after hearing the parties on 30th July, 2024, reserved the matter for a later date in August. However, two days later, the CCPD issued an interim order, which provided as follows:

3. By virtue of the aforementioned order, the transfer of Respondent No. 3 to NPTI Durgapur has now been stayed. The Petitioner's grievance is that despite Respondent No. 3's assurances that he would join NPTI Durgapur upon recovery from his illness, he simultaneously sought intervention from the CCPD to challenge his transfer. The Petitioner argues that this act of invoking the CCPD's executive authority to adjudicate his transfer grievance exceeds the mandate of the said authority. Furthermore, it is contended that Digitally Signed W.P.(C) 11104/2024 Pa ge 5 of 11 the CCPD has acted beyond its jurisdiction by passing the impugned decision, as it is not a Tribunal or adjudicatory forum empowered to resolve such employment-related disputes between an employee and their employer.

6. The Court has considered the aforenoted contentions. Under Section 75 of the RPWD Act, the CCPD is empowered to inquire, suo motu or otherwise, into complaints regarding deprivation of rights of persons with disabilities and take up such matters with the appropriate authorities for corrective action. However, Section 75 does not confer the authority upon the CCPD to pass binding or adjudicatory orders akin to those issued by a court of law. Instead, the role of the CCPD, as per the statutory framework, is investigatory and recommendatory in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with the rights and safeguards established under the RPWD Act. Moreover, Section 77 of the Act grants the CCPD certain powers similar to those of a civil court, such as summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, requiring the discovery and production of documents, and receiving evidence on affidavits. However, these powers are procedural and limited to the scope of conducting inquiries and investigations. They do not Digitally Signed W.P.(C) 11104/2024 Pa ge 7 of 11 extend to adjudicating disputes between an employer and an employee or issuing binding directions regarding service matters, such as the transfer orders which are in question in the present writ petition.

7. In the present case, the Court is seized with the question of whether CCPD has the powers and jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. On this issue, there are several judicial precedents, which guides this Court regarding the powers of CCDP. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the CCPD appears to exceed the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it by the RPWD Act, as it purports to issue a stay on the transfer order issued by the Petitioner, which is beyond its recommendatory and investigatory mandate. This overreach is not supported by the provisions of the RPWD Act, which do not envisage the CCPD as an adjudicatory body capable of deciding service-related disputes or issuing enforceable orders in such matters.