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"Under the Constitution the Governor is conferred with the executive power by Article 154, judicial power by Article 161 and Legislative power by Article 162. That does not mean that Article 361 of the Constitution of India contemplates only the powers, which are conferred in the Constitution for the purpose of affording immunity to the Governor. If the Governor acts as such under any other statutes in his capacity as Governor that will also be exercise of power within the meaning of Article 361 of the Constitution of India. The power contemplated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as Section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code is to be exercised only by the Governor as such and not in any other capacity. Consequently he will be entitled to the protection of the immunity afforded by the Article."

"But since the Governor has claimed absolute immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution, it is contended that he has no immunity under the Article where his bona fides in proroguing the Legislature are in question. In our opinion, Article 361(1) affords the President or the Governors, absolute immunity. He cannot be made by any Court answerable to it for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of his powers and duties. The immunity is personal to him. He cannot be made a party defendant or respondent in respect of his official act done or purported to be done which pertains to the exercise and performance of his powers and duties by his office. The policy behind the immunity is that just like the sovereign in England, the President or the Crown, is head of a State. That seems to be the view of the basis for protection in the King v. The Governor of the Slate of South Australia."

48. With regard to the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Governor's actions are subject to judicial review, we fail to comprehend how it can be held that a writ petition would be maintainable against the Governor specially in view of the specific provisions of Article 361 of the Constitution whatever the credence to judicial review one may give as it being the basic structure of the Constitution. The sole question in I consideration in this case is whether a writ petition is maintainable against the Governor or not. It is not the actions of the Governor which have been made subject-matter of judicial review. He has taken no action yet. Relief sought is a mandamus to the Governor directing him to do a particular act, thus, forestalling his decision and exercise of his discretion which has categorically not been envisaged by Article 361 of the Constitution.

49. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that provisions of Article 361 be read down in order to hold that the protection available to the Governor is only limited to the municipal Courts. We fail to comprehend the distinction attempted to be made between the municipal Courts and the High Courts. The word 'Court' in the Constitution has to be interpreted in the broad sense. No restrictions by implication can be put on the word 'Court' used in Article 361. There are no grounds for reading down Article 361 or importing limitation by interpretative law and restricting the broad umbrella given to high constitutional executive functionary, which was thought of quite essential for the appropriate functioning of the polity of the society free from fear, etc. Thus, we find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Article 361 needs to be read down and the immunity provided to the Governor has to be limited to the Municipal Courts alone. There are no bases that the expression 'Court' in Article 361 does not encompass this Court exercising powers of judicial review. The contention is misconceived. There is no warrant to come to such a conclusion on the constitutional text and context or any accepted principle of constitutional interpretation for such a view. Categorical plain reading of constitutional provisions and scheme does ordain such a conclusion.