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27. If the matter had rested here, we would have found no difficulty in convicting accused 1 to S for an offence under Section 302 I. P. C. But the matter does not rest there. The evidence on record shows that this offence was committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, thereby attracting Exception 4 to section 300 I. P. C. In this case there is no dispute that 'there were strained feelings between the parties on account of the accused asking the deceased to give back 2 acres of land. We do not know the rights and wrongs of it. The accused were constantly asking the deceased for the return of two acres and on the day of the offence they have gone to the field which the deceased was ploughing and asked him to return the two acres. There has been a wordy quarrel. From words the parties have come to blows. The weapons which they had been using are those which these ryots generally carry to the fields or those lying handy in the fields viz., sticks. In 'the course of the quarrel both the parties have sustained injuries. It cannot he said that the accused took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, all the elements for attracting Exception 4 to Section 300. I. P. C., are present in this case. There was no premeditation and it was only from words and that 'they had suddenly come to blows. It cannot be said that the accused had gone to the field with express malice or pre-arrangement to cause the death of Naina Goundan. The term "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, I. P. C., is not defined in the Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight. In order of constitute a fight it is necessary that blows should he exchanged and it is not necessary that weapons should be vised. Heat of passion requires that 'there must be no time for the passion to coot down and in this case the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. The fight, as the nature of the injuries on both sides would show, appears to be on equal terms. In fact if after exchange of blows on equal terms one of the parties without any such intention at the commencement of the affray suatches a deadly weapon and kills the other party with it, such a killing will be only manslaughter. But if A party under colour of fighting, upon equal terms, uses from the beginning of the contest a deadly weapon without the knowledge of the other party and kills the other party with such weapon, or if, at the beginning of the contest he prepares a deadly weapon so as to have the power of using it at some part of the contest and uses it accordingly in the course of the combat, and kills the other party with the weapon, the killing in both these eases will be murder. Thus to sum up, this is a case where when two men "engage suddenly in a fight the death of one of them is not the most natural or inevitable result, nor can it be said that either of them desires the end of the other.

So long as 'the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, the accused, irrespective of his conduct before the fight, earns the mitigation provided for in the Exception 4 to Section 300 subject to 'the condition that he did not in the course of the fight take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner. This has been the case here and therefore the offence committed by the accused would attract Exception 4 to Section 300, I. P. C.

28. The net result of this analysis is that though the appeal by the State arose from the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge due to his failure to comprehend the distinction between Ss, 299 and 300, I, P. C., on the facts of the case the convictions of accused 1 to 3 under Section 304 (Part II), I. P. C., have to be maintained for another reason viz., that the offence attracts Exception 4 to Section 300, I. P. C.