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"(1) In any proceedings under this Act, whether defended or not, if the Court is satisfied that -
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and
(b) any of the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 10, or in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of , or where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and

43. It is, therefore, appropriate to first of all notice the state of the law in this behalf and then to find out in the instant case whether the appellant was in fact taking advantage of his own wrong so as to disentitle him to the relief of divorce as the trial Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court seem to have found.

44. Now, if Section 10 and 13 of the Act are perused, it would be noticed that the several grounds for judicial separation or divorce comprise either a matrimonial offence or wrong or disability which in turn may be either self-inflicted or fortuitous. Looking at Section 10. it will be noticed that ground (a), viz. desertion, ground (b) viz. cruelty and ground (f) viz, extra marital sexual inter course are obviously matrimonial offences or wrongs. Ground (c) viz. Leprosy ground (Government) viz. venereal disease and ground (e) viz. unsoundness of mind rate obviously disabilities. Even as regards venereal disease is concerned, contrary to popular view it can be contracted innocently and. therefore it would be a disability and not a wrong.

90. As held by this Court in (supra). "there can be little doubt that in granting relief under Section 13(1A) the Court will and must take into consideration Section 23(1)."

91. In my opinion, if attention is focused on the nature of the wrong or disability which the Court is required to take into account for "the purpose of such relief. i.e. the petition on the grounds contained in Section 13(1A), then it will be noticed that there is no real conflict between the two view i.e. as to whether Section 23(1) of the Act will apply or not if regard is to be had to the fact that Section 13(1A) refers to an existing set of facts, that is to say in the case of judicial separation that there has been no resumption of conjugal rights that in fact there has been no restitution. If that is so, then a reference to what I might describe as the earlier matrimonial offence or wrong on which the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights was passed would be unwarranted. It would only be the conduct (if any) of the petitioner after the passing of the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights forming the ground for the petition of divorce the would have to be taken into consideration for the Court to satisfy itself that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong and/or disability for the purpose of such relief, that is to say, for the purpose of the petition for divorce. I am supported in this view by the observations of nain J. in (Supra). where he states at page 497 = (56 of AIR):

"It is the conduct of the petitioner after the passing of the decree for judicial separation that has to be taken into consideration for deciding whether the petitioner is or is not taking advantage of his own wrong and that such a wrong or disability must be for the purpose of such relief as the petitioner wants in the petition for divorce."

92. It is thus to be noticed that when a petition for divorce is based on either of the two grounds mentioned in Section 13(1A). Section 23(1) will apply and it would be the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that not only does the ground for granting the relief for divorce exists but that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability, if any, for the purpose of the relief of divorce. But the scope of Section 23(1)(a) in relation to the grounds for divorce, as contained in Section 13(1A). must in my opinion, of necessity any logic be somewhat limited. It is not possible to envisage what kind of wrong or disability would have to be taken into consideration. Human ingenuity being what it is there is no doubt that many cases will arise where notwithstanding that a ground for divorce exists, there may be something in the conduct of the petitioner which be so reprehensible that the Court would deny to such a petitioner the relief by way of divorce on the consideration that the petitioner was taking advantage of his or her own wrong.