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We approve the view taken by the Division Bench in Narasimhachar v. Assistant Settlement Officer, (1971) 2 Andh LT 17 at p. 35. There is no material to support the plea that Periannan's case (FB) must be deemed to have been overruled on the application of the doctrine of implied overruling. It is well-settled that a decided case can be deemed to have been impliedly overruled only when the ratio of the subsequent decision of a superior court is inconsistent with, or is contrary to, that of the decision of the inferior court. As observed by Parthasarathi J., speaking for the court in Narasimhachar v. Assistant Settlement Officer, (1971) 2 Andh LT 17 at p. 35 :

"The doctrine of implied overruling can be resorted to only when there is no means of reconciling two pronouncements. An overruling is implied when the ratio of the later decision of a superior court is inconsistent with that of the inferior court. The inconsistency becomes material only when it is attributable r is implicit in the ratio of the later decision. The mere existence of dicta suggestive of an inconsistency is insufficient foundation for invoking the rule of implied overruling. The test to be adopted for applying the rule of implied overruling may be gathered from Morris v. Edmonton Corporation, (1957) 2 QB 564. At p. 571 Lord Goddard, C.J. observed as follows:
"With regard to Keats v. London County Council, (1954) 1 WLR 1357 = (1954) 3 All ER 303) my view is that it is irreconcilable with East Riding County Council v. Park Estate (Bridlington) Ltd. (1957 AC 228) and I think in effect although their Lordships did not refer to Keat's case in their speeches, it must be taken to be overruled by it. I cannot reconcile the reasoning of this court in Keat's case with the reasoning of the House of Lords in the East Riding case." We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the doctrine of implied overruling cannot be applied to the facts of the present case and there is no merit in this submission of the appellant. We may add that another Division Bench of this Court in Yeljipurupu Appaldu v. S.Lakshminarayana (1972) 2 Andh LT 30 at p. 34 opined that the proof of direct cultivation is not the only method by which it can be proved that the lands are private lands" and "proof can let in to show the intention of the landholder to regard the lands as retained for the personal use of the landholder and his establishment to treat the lands as private lands' but did not determine the question whether Chidambaram Chettiar's case has impliedly overruled Periannan's case, as it was considered to be unnecessary.

(ii) intention of landholder to cultivate or resume the land for personal cultivation. Such intention of the landholder can be inferred from admitted of proved facts such as (a) continuous course of conduct of the landholder asserting and acting on the basis that he is the absolute owner of the land and (b) recognition and acceptance on the part of the tenants who are inducted into possession of the lands under short term leases that the landholder has absolute right, interest and tittle in the land. It is the totality or the cumulative effect of the relevant facts and circumstances that would be material to determine the existence or otherwise of the intention of the landholder to cultivate or retain the land for his personal cultivation, but each factor or circumstances by itself would be of little or no consequence or importance. The heart of the matter is that the landholder, in order to establish his claim that the land in dispute is his private land, must prove direct cultivation by himself or the members of his family or through his agents or farm-servants for some period and on the material dates or in the alternative prove his intention to retain the land for his personal cultivation and use as and when he desires. The mere possession of both the warams b the landholder would not displace the statutory presumption unless something in the evidence either by way of proof of direct cultivation or by some clear indication of an intent to regard the land as retained for his personal use is established. The tests laid down by the majority of the Full Bench in clause 4 to 6 of paragraph 49 of its judgment in Periannan's v. A.S. Amman Kovil, (FB) are in no way in conflict with the test of personal cultivation and the intention to retain for personal cultivation enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chidambaram Chettiar's v. Santhanaramaswami Odayar ). The test laid down and applied in Chidambaram Chettiar's case as well as in Jagadeesam Pillai's case must be confined to the facts of those cases where the lands in dispute are known once to be ryoti. Hence, it cannot be said that the test of personal cultivation alone can be applied to cases where the nature and character of the land from its inception is not known. The tests laid down in paragraph 4 to 6 of paragraph 49 of the judgment in Periannan's case have not been overruled either specifically or impliedly in Chidambaram Chettiar's case and they are still good law. Some observations of the Supreme Court in Chidambaram Chettiar's case, even if construed to suggest contrary principles in detail are in substance in accord with the dicta and guidelines enunciated in Periannan's case. From such observations or from a reading of the entire judgment, it cannot be inferred that the Supreme Court intended to overrule by implication the decision in Periannan's case, as the doctrine of implied overruling can only be applied or invoked where it is impossible to reconcile the two pronouncements. There is absolutely no basis or foundation either to suggest or point any inconsistency or conflict between the two decisions warranting the application of the rule of implied overruling.