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76. On a perusal of the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Krishna Iyer, J. I agree respectfully with findings (2) to (11), (13) and (14) enumerated by him in its concluding part as also with the first sentence occurring in finding (1). but regret that I am unable to endorse all the views expressed by him on the reformative aspect of penology, especially those forming the basis of finding (1) minus the first sentence and of finding (12). In relation to those views, while concurring generally with the note prepared bv my learned brother, Fazal All, J., I am appending a very short note of my own.

81. I conclude that the contents of Section 433A of the CrPC (or, for that matter any other penal provision) cannot be attacked on on the ground that they are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they are arbitrary or irrational because they ignore the reformative aspect of punishment.

S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.

82. While I concour with the judgment proposed by Brother Krishna Iyer, J. I would like to express my own views on certain important features of the case and on the nature and character of the reformative aspect of penology as adumbrated by Brother Krishna Iyer, J.

87. The problem of penology is not one which admits of an easy solution. The argument as to what benefit can be achieved bv detaining a prisoner for fourteen years is really begging the question because a detention for such a long term in confinement however comfortable it is. is by itself sufficient to deter every criminal or offender from committing offences so as to incur the punishment of confinement for a good part of his life. The effect of such a punishment is to be judged not from a purely ethical point of view but from an angle of vision which is practical and pragmatic.

96. Having regard to these circumstances I am clearly of the opinion that Section 433A is actually a social piece of legislation which by one stroke seeks to prevent dangerous criminals from repeating offences and on the other protects the society from harm and distress caused to innocent persona.

97. Taking into account the modern trends in penology there are very rare cases where the courts impose a sentence of death and even if in some cases where such sentences are given, by the time the case reaches this Court, a bare minimum of the cases are left where death sentences are upheld. Such cases are only those in which imposition of a death sentence becomes an imperative necessity having regard to the nature and character of the offences, the antecedents of the offender and other factors referred to in the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab . In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Parliament in its wisdom chose to act in order to prevent criminals committing heinous crimes from being released through easy remissions or substituted form of punishments without undergoing at least a minimum period of imprisonment of fourteen years which may in fact act as a sufficient deterrent which may prevent criminals from committing offences. In most parts of our country, particularly in the north, cases are not uncommon where even a person sentenced to imprisonment for life and having come back after earning a number of remissions has committed repeated offences. The mere fact that a lone term sentence or for that matter a sentence of death has not produced useful results cannot support the argument either for abolition of death sentence or for reducing the sentence of life imprisonment from 14 years to something less, The question is not what has happened, because of the provisions of the Penal; Code but what would have happened if; deterrent punishments were not given. In the present distressed and disturbed, atmosphere we feel that if deterrent punishment is not resorted to, there will be complete chaos in the entire country and criminals will be let loose endangering the lives of thousands of innocent people of our country. In spite of all the! resources at its hands, it will be difficult for the State to protect or guarantee the life and liberty of all the citizens, if criminals are let loose and deterrent punishment is either abolished or miti-gated. Secondly, while reformation of the criminal is only one side of the pic-ture, rehabilitation of the victims and granting relief from the tortures and sufferings which are caused to them as a result of the offences committed by the criminals is a factor which seems to have been completely overlooked while defending the cause of the criminals for abolishing deterrent sentences. Where one person commits three murders it is illogical to plead for the criminal and to argue that his life should be spared, without at all considering what has happened to the victims and their family. A person who has deprived another person completely of his liberty for ever and has endangered the liberty of his family has no right to ask the court to uphold his liberty. Liberty is not a one-sided concept, nor does Article 21 of the Constitution contemplate such a concept. If a person commits a criminal offence and punishment has been given to him by a procedure established by law which is free and fair and where the accused has been fully heard, no question of violation of Article 21 arises when the question of punishment is being considered. Even so, the provisions of the CrPC of 1973 do provide an opportunity to the offender, after his guilt is proved, to show circumstances under which an appropriate sentence could be imposed on him. These guarantees sufficiently comply with the provisions of Article 21. Thus, it seems to me that while considering the problem of penology we should not overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer or are maimed at the hands of criminals.