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32. In fact, in paragraph no.7 of Vashu Deo (supra) itself, while examining the meaning of "eviction by title paramount", the Supreme Court considered Krishna Prasad Singh v. Adyanath Ghatak, reported at ILR (1943) 22 Pat 513, where it was held that, to constitute eviction by title paramount, no physical dispossession is necessary. If the true owner is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted, even though the tenant is not put out of possession, the threat to put him out of possession followed by attornment amounts in law to eviction. An exception to the requirement of actual physical dispossession was also carved out in paragraph no.9 of the said judgment where it was considered whether the landlord‟s tenancy had not come to an end "by operation of law".

33. In paragraph no.10 of Vashu Deo (supra), the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the paramount title holder must be armed with such legal process of eviction as cannot be lawfully resisted. Since the said case 2025:CHC-AS:855-DB was governed by the Rent Control law, where a tenancy can be terminated only by a valid decree of a court, it was held that mere threat of eviction would not suffice. However, by dint of the exceptions carved out in paragraph nos. 7 and 10 of the said judgment, as discussed above, to constitute eviction by title paramount, no physical dispossession is necessary if the true owner or paramount title holder is armed with a legal process of eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted.

34. In the present case, the lease executed by the owner/trust in favour of the appellants was after the expiry of the entire gamut of leases and sub-leases granted under the head lease by efflux of time. Thus, on the date when the appellants acquired title/right as lessors, it was the paramount title holder which had conferred such right in favour of the appellants within the contemplation of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the appellants stepped into the shoes of the paramount title holder insofar as the occupants of the suit premises were concerned.

35. On the other hand, upon the expiry of the head lease as well as the sub-leases created under it by efflux of time, all the said leases and sub-leases stood determined by operation of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act.

36. Thus, it was a typical case where the appellants were armed with a legal process for eviction which could not be lawfully resisted. To constitute eviction by title paramount, as held in Vashu Deo (supra), no 2025:CHC-AS:855-DB physical dispossession is necessary if the paramount title-holder is armed by a legal right to dispossess [here, under Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act]. Thus, on the expiry of the head lease and the lease granted in favour of the plaintiff, the sub-lease between the plaintiff and WEBEL also stood determined and head lessor/owner, through the appellants/lessors, were armed with the legal right to dispossess the plaintiff as well WEBEL. As such, WEBEL was not barred under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (and the corresponding Section 122 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) from disputing the title of the plaintiff on the relevant date. Whether WEBEL was duty-bound under Section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act to hand over possession only to its lessor, the plaintiff